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“March to the beat of your own drum…but what if your drum is broken or 




As I am told is often the case with PhD theses, the final product you see here bears little 
resemblance to the best laid plans I initially had for this project. Yet, while over the past few 
years different ideas, methods, theories, and research avenues were cast overboard, I believe I 
can say that one central nugget has remained present, on some level, throughout. That is that 
this project emerged from, has been partly driven by, and goes some way towards addressing 
the following inquiry: “how do a people’s vision of themselves and their attitude towards 
(in)security impact each other?” 
This was simply the initial inquiry that gave rise to the thesis at hand. The actual 
research question of my thesis – which I lay out in my opening chapter – reflects this initial 
inquiry, but is more specific and constructed with particular methodological considerations in 
mind. Nonetheless, this inquiry contains the two core elements which remain at the roots of the 
hypothesis I have developed and tested through empirical research. These elements are, firstly, 
how a people have come to perceive themselves and, secondly, how they have come to perceive 
security and security threats. In other words, this inquiry is about public identifications and 
securitizations, and how they interact. By pursuing this inquiry, I have produced the following 
thesis in which I explore the influence of public identifications on securitizations, along with 
an enhanced understanding of both. 
This research has far-reaching implications and significance for a broad range of 
important academic and practical policy concerns. Few processes carry such immense 
consequences as those that lead a people to believe that they face a security threat. “Security” 
is a powerful word, its invocation triggering some of our most fearful and dangerous 
characteristics. Claiming that there is an imminent threat to our way of life can generate toxic 
environments, give apparent justification to more underhand motivations, and offer leaders 
potentially unbefitting mandates. On the other hand, failing to perceive certain developments 
as security threats can lead to significantly reduced qualities of life or even prove fatal. With 
both traditional and diverse usages, “security threat” has been applied by Nigel Farage to EU 
membership, by Joseph McCarthy to homosexuality, by Kofi Annan to climate change, and by 
Donald Trump to undocumented immigrants, to name a few. Securitization matters.  
Likewise, public identifications can lie at the heart of some of the most impactful 
events, shifts, and orders that shape the domestic and international world. The ways in which 
we fundamentally perceive our own people, nation, locality, ethnicity, civilization or political 
tribe can set firm limits on the range of interactions we are open to having with other groups, 
as well as on the ways we conduct ourselves. Identifications can forge group boundaries and 
conflicts, override hypothetically “rational” decisions, and delimit international values and 
even strategies.  
An enhanced awareness of the influence of public identifications on securitizations can 
open up, as I will show in this thesis, a much-improved understanding of what leads to 
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“successful” securitizations, how impactful our identifications are, why we appropriate force, 
and how we maintain and express our international self-images. This understanding can enable 
us to more properly forecast, shape, or block future securitizations and forge more sustainable 
international policies in tandem with shifting identifications. These are acts of real significance. 
As such, this understanding is not benign; its development directly affects how securitizations 
and broader international relations processes play out and can temper the extremity of their 
consequences.  
It is with this in mind that I present the following thesis. It aims to produce an enhanced 
understanding of the influence of public identifications on securitizations, and in doing so 








































In order to set the stage for my hypothesis, which is laid out in Chapter Two, in this 
chapter I overview the main shortcomings in the study of securitization that my research aims 
to address, as well as the specific developments in securitization studies that I consciously build 
on and synthesise. This overview orients itself around the place of the public audience in 
securitization. I outline not only that there is space for a theory that systematically looks at 
how public audiences power securitizations, but also that bringing the public audience into 
securitization can have meaningful impact. I show that the audience has been addressed by 
securitization scholars in a manner that has been unclear and that has suffered from a series 
of tensions, mistreatments, and omissions. Nonetheless, some positive steps towards 
integrating the audience into a securitization framework have been made, and I seek to develop 
these further while forwarding my own take. My research also builds on and contributes to 
studies in several fields beyond securitization. Some of these, such as research into the link 
between identity and security and the role of public opinion in foreign policy, are laid out in 




A securitization process is one that moves towards, and perhaps reaches, the point 
where a certain collection of people conceptualise a given issue as one that must be treated as 
a security concern. More specifically, a securitization process leads towards an audience 
conceptualising something as an object of worth, agreeing that there is a threat to this object, 
and deciding that this threat must and can be dealt with via certain means. Differing theories, 
“schools”, or independent scholars of securitization argue that this process involves and is 
powered by different series of components. However, despite the securitization field’s many 
internal debates and contradictions, a core principle linking different securitization schools and 
scholars is the idea that perceived security issues are not necessarily objective or real “things”, 
but rather can be (or always are) perceived qualities or constructions that result from a 
securitization process. As such, a security issue “becomes” a security issue (and is treated in 
what is deemed a commensurate manner) when an audience accepts that an issue is a security 
matter.1 
In this thesis, I examine how the public audience’s identifications impact the 
securitization processes leading to such an acceptance. The core research question I ask is 
                                                          
1 Waever, “Aberystwyth, Paris, Copenhagen: New ‘Schools’ in Security Theory and Their Origins between Core 
and Periphery”; Buzan, People, States & Fear; Côté, “Agents without Agency: Assessing the Role of the 
Audience in Securitization Theory”; Balzacq, Securitization Theory; Balzacq, “The Three Faces of Securitization”; 
Balzacq, Leonard, and Ruzicka, “‘Securitization’ Revisited”; Williams, “The Continuing Evolution of 
Securitization Theory”; Roe, “Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the UK’s 
Decision to Invade Iraq”; McDonald, “Securitization and the Construction of Security”; Buzan, Wæver, and 
Wilde, Security; Salter, “Securitization and Desecuritization”; Wæver, Identity, Migration, and the New Security 
Agenda in Europe; Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization.”  
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“How do the public audience’s identifications influence the success and failure of 
securitizations?” 
The “public audience’s identifications” refers to the identifications that are most 
commonplace amongst the citizens of a state in situations where securitizing actors are trying 
to convince a majority of these citizens that a certain matter must be treated as a security 
concern. To put this simply, in a country there are citizens. These citizens are individuals. They 
each hold identifications. Let’s say there are 1,000,000 individual citizens in the country. Some 
of these people are members of the military, some are members of the state bureaucracy, some 
are scientists, but all 1,000,000 citizens in the country, regardless of military or professional 
status, are members of the public. In certain situations, a securitizing actor might want to 
convince the majority of the individuals in the military that a certain matter must be treated as 
a security concern. In this situation, the audience is the members of the military. We would call 
these people the “military audience.” Let’s say there are 20,000 such individuals. 12,000 of 
them hold identifications A and B, 5,000 of them hold identifications C and D, and 3,000 of 
them hold identifications E and F. The “military audience’s identifications” refers to the 
identifications that are most commonplace amongst these military officers. So, in this situation 
the “military audience’s identifications” are identifications A and B. Note that the military is 
not seen as a unitary group in any sense other than the fact that the securitizing actor is trying 
to get the majority of the people in this group to agree with him/her that there is a security 
threat. The identifications held by members of the military are held by individuals, not by the 
group, and the “military audience’s identifications” is just a term for the identifications that are 
most commonly held by individuals within this group.  
In other situations, the securitizing actor might want to convince the majority of the 
individuals in the state bureaucracy that something must be treated as a security concern. In 
this case, the members of the state bureaucracy would be the audience. We would call this the 
“state bureaucratic audience”, and the identifications that are most commonplace amongst 
these people would be the “state bureaucratic audience’s identifications”. In some situations, 
the securitizing actor might want to convince the majority of the 1,000,000 citizens in the 
country, regardless of their military or professional status (in other words, the majority of the 
public), that something must be treated as a security concern. In this situation, the audience is 
termed the “public audience”. The identifications that are most commonplace amongst these 
1,000,000 people would be termed the “public audience’s  identifications”. 
My research examines the role that the public audience’s identifications play in 
securitizing arguments being accepted/rejected by the majority of the public in situations where 
securitizing actors are trying to convince the majority of the public that something must be 
treated as a security concern. My research is therefore aimed at, and this thesis is about, 
illuminating how the public audience’s identifications influence securitization success and 
failure. 
Beyond this core output, my research can provide further insights. By studying how 
public audience identifications influence securitizations we gain insights relevant to broader 
fields. These include identity research. Empirically, my research has required that I conduct an 
identification tracking study. In this study, I have traced the detail and prevalence of the modern 
British public’s national identifications over time. This research has provided a vast swathe of 
data regarding the content and trajectory of modern British national identifications, data that is 
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in and of itself highly informative for international relations and identity scholars concerned 
with Britain’s current direction.  
My examination of identifications’ changeability here also speaks directly to – and 
provides a platform for improving – contrasting research in identity scholarship regarding the 
persistence and impact of identifications in the face of broader forces. For instance, my research 
has produced an empirical dataset that highlights how, in one context at least, identifications 
remained persistent in the face of securitizing speech. This finding, though not generalisable, 
is noteworthy for sociological research arguing that state security rhetoric both attempts to, 
can, and does shape identity discourses. Without in any way arguing against the idea that state 
security rhetoric attempts to, can, and does do this, my research reveals one instance in which 
the other side of the coin (where identifications shape foreign policy, rather than foreign policy 
shaping identifications) appears to be at work. This is not a core finding, nor is it intended to 
represent a general process of identification persistence/changeability during securitizations, 
but it remains a dataset to be noted, built on, or refuted elsewhere. 
Beyond identity and security, my research can also shed light on how public audiences 
come to accept, reject, or drive demand for the formation of a much wider array of international 
policies. This includes commitments to international institutions, normative frameworks 
underpinning international affiliations, and varying sides of moral debates such as migration 
and interventionism. These insights into the relationship between public audiences and 
international policy formation can in turn enhance the study and practice of strategic 
communications between the political institutions developing these policies and wider publics 
– an enhancement which can directly produce more politically feasible, and hence sustainable, 
policy output. 
 
Identity and Security 
However, as mentioned above, the primary output of my research is an illumination of 
how public identifications influence securitization success and failure. In this regard, my study 
sits within and contributes to existing research on the link between identity and security. This 
research has adopted several different analytical foci and come to differing conclusions, some 
of which I build on and some of which I challenge.  
One thrust within this body of research that I challenge is the idea that security discourse 
and foreign policy actions are building blocks of identity. To be clear, I do not argue that 
security discourse and foreign policy activity do not impact notions of identity. However, I 
challenge any hard focus on this impact by highlighting how identity also impacts security 
discourse and foreign policy activity. A prime example of established work that focuses 
strongly on how security acts as a building block of identity comes from David Campbell. The 
underlying thrust of Campbell’s analysis of the link between identity and security is that 
notions of threat and danger are central for the creation and maintenance of an identity. 
Campbell argues that the way an individual formulates their identity is directly linked to that 
which they consider dangerous, stating that “the ability to represent things as alien, subversive, 
dirty, or sick has been pivotal to the articulation of danger.”2 He argues that is through an 
awareness of a malevolent or threatening other that a nation gains an idea of what it itself is, 
                                                          
2 Campbell, Writing Security, p3. 
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summarising his own argument as one that “proposes that United States foreign policy be 
understood as a political practice central to the constitution, production, and maintenance 
(emphasis my own) of American political identity.”3 For him, the interaction with the 
dangerous Other, who is dangerous by the very nature of holding and demonstrating alternative 
identities (hence denaturalising identity and in doing so endangering identity)4, generates an 
idea of the self.  
Unlike Hansen, who also addresses the link between and security and identity and also 
sees identity as relational5, Campbell repeatedly emphasises that a portrayal of the Other as 
dangerous is central to this generation of self-identity. He argues that “the project of securing 
the grounds for identity in the state involved an "evangelism of fear" that emphasized the 
unfinished and endangered nature of the world.”6 Campbell makes explicit the argument that 
foreign policy affects identity, not the other way around, stating that “identity can be 
understood as the outcome (emphasis my own) of exclusionary practices in which resistant 
elements to a secure identity on the "inside" are linked through a discourse of "danger" with 
threats identified and located on the "outside"…foreign policy (conventionally understood as 
the external orientation of preestablished states with secure identities) is thus to be retheorized 
as one of the boundary-producing practices central to the production and reproduction 
(emphasis my own) of the identity in whose name it operates.”7 State security actions therefore 
generate state identity discourse in Campbell’s thesis. 
I accept fully that state security actions impact identity discourses. Nonetheless, my 
research is aimed at highlighting that pre-existing identity discourses simultaneously delimit 
the range of security actions available to the state. I argue that identity is both produced by and 
produces state security discourse and foreign policy action. In doing so, I present a challenge 
not to Campbell’s findings, but to his tight analytical focus (and, to be more direct, his 
overemphasis) on security’s impact on identity. 
 In doing so, my work more closely approximates and builds upon the research done by 
Lene Hansen, who argues that “foreign policy discourse in general draws upon representations 
of identity (emphasis my own)…for problems or facts to become questions of security, they 
need therefore to be successfully constructed as such within political discourse”.8 Hansen 
builds explicitly on Campbell, seeing identity as relational but refining Campbell’s 
straightforward Self-Other foundation of identity to one of degrees of difference between 
different identities. She also challenges Campbell’s emphasis on the state’s ability to forge 
identities through state practices. She does so by emphasising that non-state actors have a 
significant impact on the kinds of security discourses state actors can adopt, stating that security 
“representations…draw upon (emphasis my own) and are formed by the representations 
articulated by a larger number of individuals, institutions, and media outlets.”9 My research 
                                                          
3 Campbell, p8. 
4 Campbell, 71. 
5 Hansen, Security as Practice, p5. 
6 Campbell, p61. 
7 Campbell, p68. 
8 Hansen, Security as Practice, p30. 
9 Hansen, p6. 
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adopts this emphasis to an even greater extent, and aims to show that this “drawing upon” 
process (rather than any “imposing on” process) is indeed central to securitizations.  
However, my research does not fully, or even fundamentally, accord with Hansen’s 
perspective on the link between identity and security. Hansen consistently emphasises that she 
is adopting a “non-causal epistemology”10 concerning this link. While my research does not 
adopt any traditional rationalist methodology (I instead embrace interpretivism), I cannot claim 
to be completely shaking off the shackles of causal explanation. Instead, I adopt a lighter causal 
perspective of “permissive causality,” whereby I see identity formulations as setting the 
permissive/preventive conditions for securitization success, while not guaranteeing or causing 
any specific security discourses. So whereas Hansen explicitly states that her “book argues that 
representations of identity and policy…do not stand in a causal relationship with one another 
as representations of identity are simultaneously the precondition for and (re)produced through 
articulations of policy”11, I argue that in the moment of a securitization pre-existing 
identifications have a great sway in permitting and delimiting possible securitizing rhetoric. 
This securitizing rhetoric can in turn shape identifications, but I show that the influence of pre-
existing identifications on securitizations is considerable and empirically traceable. I agree that 
identity and policy are mutually constitutive, but securitizations take place in time and 
identities often precede them. Once they meet they then shape each other, but we cannot 
underestimate the extent to which pre-existing identifications delimit and permit securitizing 
rhetoric. Causality therefore has its place in my research. 
 A further fundamental element of Hansen’s research that my work builds on is the 
observation that linking representations of identity and security to each other is the means for 
(re)producing certain identities and policies. Hansen argues that “the goal of foreign policy 
discourse is to create a stable link between representations of identity and the proposed policy” 
and additionally she sees one’s “identity as built through processes of linking and 
differentiation” to and from other identities12. Huysmans research into the link between identity 
and security argues along similar lines. Huysmans states that security representations are built 
through a similar process of linking, arguing that “the meaning of security is interpreted as a 
constellation of rules that define enunciations as security enunciations. In other words, a 
specific organization of enunciations makes them security enunciations.”13 For Huysmans and 
Hansen, the successful creation of security representations depends on elements of these 
representations linking well to pre-existing elements in other representations, including identity 
representations. My research takes up this idea and operationalises it, showing precisely which 
elements of identity discourse (which I outline as norms, influence, affiliations, and imagined 
perspectives of others) need to link to which elements of security discourse (which I outline as 
objects of worth, threats, and appropriate and feasible actions) in order for a securitization to 
be successful.  
 Huysmans also asks a question which my work builds upon. Interrogating the process 
whereby new security discourses are introduced to existing discursive environments “of 
                                                          
10 Hansen, p4.. 
11 Hansen, p9. 
12 Hansen, 16. 
13 Huysmans, “Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies”, p45. 
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cultural/ethnic identity and public order,”14 Huysmans points out that “alternative constructions 
do not exist in a vacuum or in a sheltered space. To be part of the game, they must, for example, 
contest political constructions. This raises the question of how the ‘engagement’ actually 
works.”15 Essentially, Huysmans is asking why certain security discourses win out when they 
engage with each other. Just having an alternative discourse of security is not enough to 
undermine existing dominant discourses. I agree with and build on this perspective. Simply 
because a securitizing actor introduces a new security discourse does not mean they will be 
successful. They must go through an “engagement” which they do not fully control. I argue 
and demonstrate that a major force within this engagement is the permissive/preventive 
capabilities of publicly held identity representations. These representations, I argue, partly 
determine the winner when new and differing security representations (for instance, a 
securitizing argument and an anti-securitizing argument) are articulated and contest each other. 
In doing so, my work goes some way towards addressing Huysmans’ query of how the 
engagement between security discourses within pre-existing discursive landscapes (such as a 
landscape of identities) operates.  
However, while Huysmans does argue that this engagement must take place, his vision 
of such an engagement is highly discursive. Indeed, the above authors all adopt strong 
discursive ontologies in their visions of the links between security and identity. I do not deny 
the productive power of language, but my research additionally draws from a cognitive and 
psychological rather than purely a discursive base. In contrast to these authors, and more in 
line with Hopf, (who argues that “the only motive for the ubiquitous presence and operation of 
identities is the human desire to understand the social world and the consequent cognitive need 
for order, predictability, and certainty”16), my study holds that language is both productive and 
expressive of deeper cognitive conditions. As such, discursive ontologies only cover part of the 
picture. I will argue in Chapter Two that insights from cognitive and neural research can help 
provide a more robust understanding of the engagement between discourses.  
My focus on the cognitive mechanisms underlying the interplay between identity and 
security discourses imbues my research with a certain level of trans-contextual applicability. 
While the symbols these cognitive mechanisms process would be expected to differ across 
cultures and eras, the cognitive mechanisms themselves would be expected to remain relatively 
uniform across different contexts. However, this is the only element of my research that is not 
thoroughly contemporary in its claims to validity. While I argue that pre-existing identities can 
permit/prevent new elite-imposed security discourses from taking root, the counter-argument 
that elites can override existing identities and indeed forge new identities through security 
discourse may have a greater claim to accuracy if we are not focusing on the 21st century, 
particularly the 21st century West.  
Campbell and Williams both engage a great deal with 20th century and indeed 16th and 
17th century examples of elites using security to override old identities and generate new ones. 
They both portray Hobbes and Locke as deliberate generators of a modernist identity which 
they forged from security concerns. Both authors give extensive examples of how Hobbes in 
                                                          
14 Huysmans, p41. 
15 Huysmans, p50. 
16 Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics, p4; Hopf, “The Logic of Habit in International Relations.” 
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particular instigated an “evangelism of fear” towards anything that was not based on reason, 
rationality, logic, and science, in order to create a modernist identity that would end the 
identity-based strife of his day17. Williams also presents a history of how the rationalist school 
of thought is actually a by-product of identities that were deliberately manufactured out of 
security concerns in the aftermath of the English Civil War.18 Campbell and Hansen both also 
use case studies of European and American foreign and security policy in the 20th century to 
demonstrate the interplay between identity and security in this period.19 While these authors 
may convincingly show how elite-driven security rhetoric that ran against the grain of pre-
existing identities in these periods was still able to gain wide acceptance and even transform 
identities, I argue that to assume elite-driven security rhetoric still has this capability in the 21st 
century may be a mistake.  
The late 19th and 20th centuries featured a broadcast media that allowed information to 
reach millions simultaneously and relatively uniformly. Earlier periods were characterised by 
a highly restricted access to political commentary. These characteristics may have provided the 
necessary conditions for a small number of elites to impose security rhetoric on a much greater 
discursive landscape without great reference to existing mass identity formations. However, 
the 21st century is much different. As argued separately by Mendelsohn, Smith-Shomade, 
Hayes, and Geraghty20, we now have a hyper-fragmented media landscape in which few people 
receive the same news in the same way, everyone has the ability to change the channel, and 
there is a growing distrust of politician rhetoric and political institutions. This makes it much 
more difficult for elites to seed any rhetoric that goes against the grain of pre-existing visions 
held by the public, including identifications, as the modern public is capable and cognitively 
incentivised to avoid any information that does not sit well with their pre-existing beliefs. This 
creates incentives for elites to ride the wave of pre-existing identities rather than challenge or 
ignore them.21 I therefore argue that conclusions about the interaction between elite security 
discourses and pre-existing popular identity representations that were built from cases within 
even as recently as the 20th century must be reconsidered. It is not that they are inaccurate or 
theoretically insufficient. It is simply that we must consider the possibility that these 
conclusions may be inapplicable to the modern day in which pre-existing public identifications’ 
have an increased potential to delimit the success of elite security discourse. As such, my 
research adopts a self-consciously contemporary focus, with case studies from 2013 and later, 
in contrast to the above-listed works. 
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Ole Waever provides further evidence that by the end of the 20th century public 
identities were showing signs of resisting and indeed defying elite guidance. This observation 
comes from Waever’s research into the concept of the “security identity.” Asking “who or what 
is constituted as security reference in post-bipolar Europe?” and asserting that “an answer to 
this question will tell us something not only about European security, but also about what 
Europe is politically”22, Waever develops the security identity concept as a complete overlay 
of the concepts of security and identity. He argues that a group or political entity can establish 
its very identity as being a thing, as being a political entity, by asserting its right to security. 
“Who today is able to establish itself with the self-referential gesture of security as a survival-
demanding unit?” Waever asks.  
While this question itself is an interesting development in the examination of the link 
between identity and security, the element of this research that is most meaningful for my work 
is Waever’s answer to this question. “It is arguments about the survival of the nation that are 
mobilized - and in most cases this definitely does not happen from the usual cockpit of the 
state. ‘The state’ - state elites - recommend integration, surrender of sovereignty, a gradual 
winding up (or Europeanization) of itself, whilst the ‘populations’…say no (emphasis my 
own).”23 Waever observes that when European elites present security concerns that are centred 
on (and indeed are intended to build) European identities, European publics respond by 
reasserting their national identities and refocusing their attention on national security concerns. 
Here, Waever is explicitly acknowledging that nations or other identity groups have the 
capability and now even the tendency to construct security concerns based on certain identities 
(such as the national society) that are in complete contrast to the security concerns based on 
other identities (such as the European society) that the state would wish them to. This, oddly 
enough, goes against the central thrust of most of the core securitization work Waever 
otherwise contributes to, as I will outline later. Nonetheless, this element of Waever’s research 
is one that I build upon, as my research shows how public identities can not only defy state 
security discourses but also actually shape them. 
 A common thread that runs between the research on the link between identity and 
security conducted by these scholars is that security can be used to call to the fore, highlight 
the value of, and consequently reify and stabilise, certain identities. This focus on how 
securitizing an identity can render that identity temporarily stable relates well to the ontological 
security field. This field of research has argued that a sense of insecurity can provide group 
members with a stable and fulfilling identity (and so these group members will subsequently 
cling to these insecurities).24 However, this perspective on the link between identity and security 
has not gone unchallenged. Browning has argued that “identities are always in the making, 
never fully stable, settled and complete.” Browning additionally argues that securitization can 
be just as destabilizing as desecuritization, so “the association of securitization with stability 
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and desecuritization with change and instability is also problematic.”25 This insight that the 
link between identity stability and securitization might not necessarily be so strong is one my 
research builds on. I agree that identities can be instable even during securitizations and that a 
securitization may prove to be too much of a destabilizing force, in which case it may well be 
rejected. My research accounts for both this potential instability of identities and for the 
possible rejection of securitizations that destabilize pre-existing identity discourses. It then 
seeks to empirically observe these trends and outcomes in action. 
 While the above authors present research into the link between identity and security 
that I partly build on, am distinct from, and challenge, perhaps the research into this link that 
my research runs most parallel to is Ted Hopf’s, both in terms of theoretical basis and 
methodology. While Hopf agrees that state security and foreign policy actions can have an 
impact on societal identities, he argues that states which fight the tide of societal identities are 
at a significant disadvantage, stating that “norms are more likely to be adopted by a state if its 
society already has a dominant discourse within which that norm resonates”.26 More directly, 
Hopf argues, and I agree, that we should “reject the assumption that identities are intentionally 
or deliberately chosen, used, and/or strategically manipulated”27. In the same vein as Hopf, I 
do not see identities as easily malleable or manipulable. They are developed slowly, held 
deeply, and acted out habitually. This does not equate to any fixed or permanent status, but it 
may enable identity representations to defy easy manipulation. My research allows for this 
possibility and empirically tests for its indication.  
Hopf also builds from a strongly cognitive basis of research, arguing that “the only 
motive for the ubiquitous presence and operation of identities is the human desire to understand 
the social world and the consequent cognitive need for order, predictability, and 
certainty…identities operate like cognitive devices”28. As a consequence, though “it is 
tempting to attribute causality [of foreign policy decisions] to discrete decision-makers; this 
would be a big theoretical and methodological mistake…once one has uncovered a prevailing 
discourse of national identity one can expect that discourse to both persist over time and explain 
a broad range of outcomes, regardless of who is making foreign policy in that state.”29 This 
perspective of Hopf’s research, which I also adopt, differs greatly from Campbell and 
Hansen’s. Whereas these authors treat identities as products of thoroughly political processes, 
I hold that identities are partly cognitive devices that stem from cognitive needs and which then 
have political impacts. They are not purely political devices that stem from political needs and 
then have cognitive impacts. As such, elites cannot generate a societal identity for use as a 
political device any more than one can command a wave to rise. But one can ride a wave, and 
the riding of the wave may well affect the wave to an extent over time. 
Methodologically, my research also runs quite parallel to Hopf’s. Hopf makes the case 
for a methodology that adopts “a thin cognitive account of identity that is thickly inductive and 
empirical”30, arguing that identities should not be assumed to have any particular form or 
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researched using any specific pre-conceived categories. Instead, they should be recovered 
inductively. After overviewing a range of tried methods of tracing identity and demonstrating 
their shortcomings, Hopf argues that the best way to operationalise and gauge national identity 
is through “discourse analysis of a broad range of relevant texts”31 through which identities are 
“inductively recovered”32, as this is the only way to “let the subjects speak”33 without 
preconceived identity labels. Hopf adopts an “interpretivist epistemology”34 and reconstructs 
identities by “contextualising them within the texts and relating them intertextually to the vast 
variety of other texts”35 from that period, before finally combining them into discursive 
formations. My own research similarly seeks to empirically operationalise and recover 
identities from widely read texts from specific periods, interpretively and intertextually sorting 
these identities into analytically meaningful data points only after they have been inductively 
uncovered (as detailed fully in my Methodology Chapter).   
Along with building on and speaking to this research into the link between security 
and identity, my research further relates to existing work in a related but distinct vein of 
research that focuses on the role of public opinion in foreign policy. Specifically, in contrast 
to previous decades when this field largely saw publics as “volatile, lacking a coherent 
structure, and naively following elite leadership”36, in the last 20 years a large body of work 
in this field has coalesced to acknowledge the relatively steady democratic constraint that 
publics place on elites whose ideas diverge from theirs. In 2006 a thorough review of existing 
scholarly understanding of public opinion’s impact on foreign policy concluded that there is 
“reason to believe that the public does have coherent foreign policy attitudes [and that the] 
electoral connection leads policy makers to consider public opinion consequences as they 
shape their foreign policies. In sum, the public can influence foreign policy.”37 By 2008, there 
was an “emerging recognition among scholars who study the interactions of the public, 
leaders, and the media that these actors are interdependent”.38 Notably, Baum and Potter 
document that “this scholarly evolution began with a revolution—originating in the cognitive 
sciences—in our understanding of when and how citizens gather, retain, and retrieve 
information.”39 As FPA scholars began to pay more attention to the ways in which human 
beings process discourses and narratives, and did so with reference to cognitive research, it 
became difficult to accept a perspective in which elites could manipulate or manage pre-
existing publicly held foreign policy norms. Consequently, the importance of pre-existing 
public ideas and the mechanisms whereby elite manipulative strategies simply utilise (rather 
than shift or generate) these ideas became a central focus of this scholarship into the role of 
public opinion in foreign policy generation. My research in turn adopts this focus and seeks 
to operationalise exactly how pre-existing public visions constrain elites and demand 
utilisation rather than alteration.  
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For instance, Hayes and Guardino have shown that the fragmentation and globalization 
of 21st century media has greatly reduced elites’ abilities to speak to their publics in any 
controlled or controlling manner. The social media bedrock which now underlies even 
traditional media institutions means that publics are exposed to a vast array of information 
streams that operate transnationally.40 As Rothschild and Shafranek comment, this “further 
complicates an already complex picture”41 of information flows between elites and publics, 
making it even more difficult for domestic elites to exert control over narratives and discourses, 
and giving publics more autonomy than they ever had before. Consequently, Gilens has 
suggested that such a complex media landscape (which prevents idea manipulation) 
incentivises elites to cater to certain constituencies whose pre-existing ideas already 
approximate theirs. Gilens uses this to explain why US foreign policy often reflects the ideas 
and predispositions of wealthier Americans when it comes to trade and international aid 
issues.42 Work by Baum and Potter has further shown that the ability of a public to constrain 
the military actions of the state is both notable and increases depending on the political variety 
within a state, the freedom afforded to the press within a state43.  
Perhaps the FPA research which my work most directly builds on is that of McLeod 
and Shah. These authors, after outlining the significant shortcomings of FPA literature that 
downplays the ability of publics to constrain elites, advocate a “Message Framing Model” and 
a “Message Processing Model” for researchers. These models are explicitly geared towards a 
focus on “audience predispositions” and “the activation of existing mental schemas” by elites44. 
McLeod and Shah argue that researchers who want to understand the link between foreign 
policy and public opinion must take these components into account. My research directly 
adopts this focus and provides a clearer empirical understanding of how this process of tapping 
into existing mental schemas works. More generally, McLeod and Shah and the above-
mentioned works each emphasise a need for elites to craft foreign policy statements that reflect 
public discourses, a perspective I provide additional evidence for and speak to. 
It is important to note that one of the earliest texts in this body of research is actually 
one that my research fundamentally challenges, despite the fact that it laid the groundwork for 
much of the above-referenced research which I build upon. Jentleson’s 1992 work “The Pretty 
Prudent Public” argues that public acceptance of elite-driven foreign policy rationales is not 
guaranteed but rather conditional, and conditional on more than just the human cost in war 
casualties (which had been the previous focus of scholarly work on how and why publics reject 
elite foreign policy rationales)45. He argues that the public is rather consistent and autonomous 
in its reactions to elite-driven foreign policy, and he shows through a review of existing 
literature that this “is a very different portrait than the [previous] portrayal found in much of 
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the literature on public opinion and foreign policy.”46 In this regard, Jentleson’s work paved 
the way for the later works referenced above and is one I build on. 
However, Jentleson also attempted to pinpoint an absolute set of real conditions which 
predicted public support or rejection of foreign policies. He argued that public support will be 
forthcoming depending on the “principal policy objective”, stating that if there is an aggressive 
adversary public support will be forthcoming, but if there is not (such in cases of humanitarian 
interventions) public support will only arise if costs are low.47 I argue that such an analytical 
focus, on objective foreign policy goals and costs, fundamentally misses the mark of what 
influences public support for foreign policy actions. It does so because it sees these conditions 
as objective and absolute, and almost completely ignores the public’s ability to conceptualise 
different goals, threats, and costs in their own terms. I argue that we cannot decide which goals, 
costs, or threats publics are generally going to be more or less likely to accept. We must firstly 
interrogate public schemata and understand how publics themselves conceptualise seemingly 
objective goals, threats, and costs. Only then can we evaluate whether or not they will support 
the overriding foreign policy rationale. 
Overall then, research into the link between identity and security has taken on different 
perspectives and conclusions, some which I adopt and build on, others of which I challenge. 
Campbell’s hard focus on how foreign policy constitutes and produces political identities (by 
deliberately generating ideas of a malevolent Other through which the nation comes to 
understand itself) is one that I challenge. While no doubt foreign and security policy impact 
domestic identities, I argue and aim to empirically show that these policies are also strongly 
constrained and impacted by these identities. This brings my research much closer to Hansen’s 
focus on identity and security formulations’ mutual importance for each other. Nonetheless, I 
do not adopt Hansen’s non-causal epistemology, as I argue that security policies occur in time. 
As such, they are often preceded by pre-existing identities which exert a visible influence in 
permitting or preventing certain security discourses from taking root. “Permissive causality” 
therefore has its place in my research. However, both Hansen and Huysmans focus on how 
identity and security notions are formed by linking different identity and security concepts to 
each other, a focus I also adopt and operationalise by showing precisely which identity and 
security concepts need to link to each other in order for new security discourses to gain traction. 
My work further builds on Huysmans observation that when differing security discourses are 
articulated they must contest with each other, and this engagement is not fully in the control of 
the elites introducing these discourses. I show that the winner in such an engagement will be 
partly determined by the permissive causal functions of pre-existing identity formulations.  
Nonetheless, while these authors all view the interaction between security and identity 
notions as taking place in a discursive landscape, my research does not purely adopt a 
discursive ontology but instead draws strongly on cognitive research. I view identity not simply 
as a political object, but rather as a cognitive product with political implications. This cognitive 
focus gives my research a degree of trans-contextual applicability, but otherwise my research 
is thoroughly modern. This is unlike Williams, Hansen, and Campbell’s examinations of 
historic cases whereby elites imposed security rhetoric that challenged and indeed reshaped 
                                                          
46 Jentleson, 72. 
47 Jentleson, 72. 
13 
 
existing identities. I argue that this process is much less likely to be possible in the 21st century, 
building on Waever’s observation that by the late 20th century general populations not only had 
the capability but also the tendency to reject elite security rhetoric that was based on identities 
contrary to those held by the general population. I further build upon Browning’s observation 
that, in contrast to the position held by the ontological security field, securitizations of identities 
are not necessarily likely to stabilize these identities. Securitizations can be destabilizing, and 
if they are too destabilizing they may be rejected. I therefore adopt Browning’s openness to the 
possibility of securitizations both stabilizing and destabilizing identities (and consequently 
being accepted or rejected), and I consequently attempt to empirically test for both outcomes. 
Perhaps the research on the link between security and identity which my work most closely 
follows (both theoretically and methodologically) comes from Ted Hopf. Hopf rejects the idea 
that identities are strategically generated or manipulated, instead seeing them as habitual, 
cognitively derived, and likely to persist in their form and impact regardless of the specific 
elites in power or the security rhetoric these elites espouse. Methodologically, Hopf argues that 
the best way to trace identities and their impact on state security action is through empirical 
inductive recovery of identities via an interpretive examination of widely read texts. My 
research adopts and applies both these theoretical and methodological perspectives. 
My work further speaks to research into the role of public opinion in foreign policy. In 
recent years a consensus has emerged in this area of scholarship that publics do have the ability 
to constrain foreign policy and indeed tend to do so in a relatively coherent manner. In previous 
decades this field generally viewed publics as easily manipulated and generally ignorant of 
foreign policy. The shift away from this perspective emerged from a focus on cognitive 
mechanisms that govern how we gather and retain information, along with a focus on 21st 
century fragmentation and globalization of media landscapes, and a concentration on mental 
schemas and their activation. I adopt each of these perspectives, and build on this field’s 
observation that in the complex modern media landscape elites are much less able to defy 
existing identity discourses and as such they are incentivised to ride the wave of these 
discourses. Despite largely building on and agreeing with the perspectives this field has 
recently adopted, I nonetheless challenge the focus of the work that paved the way for this body 
of research. While Jentleson’s research on the principal policy objective did highlight the 
conditional nature of public support (a perspective I aim to build on), it also treated security 
goals, threats, and costs as objective. In contrast, I argue that such conditions must be treated 
from the viewpoint of the publics themselves, who have the ability to conceptualise these 
conditions in a wide array of terms. 
 
Causes of Securitization Success and Failure 
While my research speaks to, builds on, and challenges existing works in the above 
fields, the area of scholarship I speak to and build from most directly is the securitization field. 
My primary aim is to detail the influence identifications have on securitizations and in doing 
so significantly enhance our understanding of securitization success and failure. Despite the 
potential impact of examining the role of public audiences and their identifications in 
securitizations, the audience remains a significantly understudied aspect of what determines 
securitization success and failure. Many – and indeed the initial – readings of securitization 
processes have seen these processes primarily as persuasive moves or struggles operated at the 
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elite level, involving bureaucratic interests, forwarding private goals, and potentially 
undermining the democratic limits of executive powers. As such, much securitization literature 
focuses heavily on the securitizing actors or high-level security professionals making such 
moves, along with their intentions, power relations, and effects. It has consequently been 
criticised for over-emphasising the ability of securitizing actors and their rhetoric to shape 
securitization processes while under-examining the role of audiences, both public and 
otherwise.  
Côté has argued that “the treatment of the audience within securitization theory has 
been inconsistent and at times non-existent, creating confusion surrounding both its identity 
and its purpose”, while Williams has described the audience as “radically underdeveloped”, 
and even Waever has contended that the audience requires “a better definition and probably 
differentiation.”48 Where the securitization field has examined the audience, it has had to spend 
much time on what might be termed preliminary questions of identifying the audience and its 
signs of acceptance. It has also developed several competing, unclear, and at times self-
contradictory views of the audience’s precise role in securitization. As such, the study of the 
audience’s impact on securitizations both promises extensive meaningful output while also 
being glaringly missing. This under-conceptualization and under-examination of the audience 
– which has been noted by several prominent securitization scholars including Balzacq, 
Stritzel, Léonard, Kaunert, and Salter49 – is no meagre item of neglect, as the audience was 
hypothetically one of the central elements of the original securitization framework as it was 
presented by what came to be known as the Copenhagen School.  
This framework innovatively forwarded the hypothesis that security, rather than 
belonging to the world of external or objective “realities”, is a discursive act. In this framework, 
security issues are not things in the world that need to be discovered. Rather, they are linguistic 
constructions waiting to be created through speech acts, or acts of saying “security”, which are 
conducted by a certain securitizing actor and to a certain group or audience.50 While the 
introduction of the word “securitization” by the Copenhagen School was indeed novel, the 
fundamental hypothesis behind it was a development on pre-existing fields of study. The idea 
that the allotment of certain issues into a certain category (for instance, seeing the establishment 
of Islamic courts in Britain as a security threat or as a deviant act or as a criminal activity) is 
the result of linguistic interactions on a societal basis rather than anything objective had 
previously been (and continues to be) explored under social constructivism and (in particular 
French) sociology51. Indeed, although the securitization concept has emerged from a post-
positivistic and relatively non-structural academic tradition the basic premises behind the 
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concept can be traced back at least to Durkheim52. Explicitly applying this theoretical 
standpoint to security, however, denaturalised one of the most “external-seeming” concerns of 
a human life, in that it transformed a “security threat” into a flexible, social, and non-objective 
concept. 
This denaturalisation of security opened several new avenues of inquiry, not least 
among them the question of “what quality makes something a security issue?”53 As was noted 
above, one of the central tenets of securitization theory is the idea that a security issue 
“becomes” a security issue when an audience accepts that an issue is a security matter, as it is 
audience acceptance that allows the flexible, social, and non-objective concept of security to 
gain some transient and socially-situated meaning. Indeed, the role of the audience in 
legitimising, authorising, and indeed creating the “securityness” of a given issue has been 
described as “the key insight”54 (emphasis in original) that makes securitization a distinct 
theory, although others may contend that the denaturalisation of security or the normative 
delegitimization of security practices are just as central to the securitization field’s 
distinctiveness. This would seem to place the audience at or close to the heart of the 
securitization framework, and would warrant a concerted study of how different audiences 
come to accept/reject securitizing arguments and subsequently power/prevent different 
securitization processes.  
Nonetheless, three approaches to explaining what causes securitization success and 
failure (each of which ignore or downplay the role of the audience) have received the majority 
of scholarly attention so far. These are (i) non-causal perspectives on securitization success, 
(ii) securitizing move-focused explanations of this success, and (iii) securitizing actor-focused 
explanations of this success. My research into how the audience influences securitization 
success/failure challenges these three outlooks. It does so by rejecting non-causal perspectives 
and highlighting that the securitizing move and the securitizing actor influence securitization 
success in tandem with the influence of the audience. I argue that non-causal explanations of 
securitization success have serious shortcomings and should be dispensed with. I do not seek 
to undermine the validity or importance of securitizing move-focused and securitizing actor-
focused explanations. Instead, my focus on the audience challenges any exclusive focus on the 
securitizing actor or securitizing move. Variations in securitizing moves and securitizing actors 
will surely impact securitizations’ probability of success. However, so does variations in 
audience characteristics. My research aims to show that the public audience’s identifications 
have a permissive causality on securitization success. I argue that if certain public audience 
identifications are not present, a securitization is doomed to fail. If they are present, then other 
factors (including the characteristics of the securitizing move and the securitizing actor) will 
determine securitization success. All things being equal, audience characteristics can make the 
difference between a successful and a failed securitization. 
Non-causal perspectives on securitization success have been severely critiqued by a 
range of authors already. Guzzini has highlighted and criticised the original formulation of 
securitization theory for “leaving ‘explanation’ and/or all versions of causality to the positivist 
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other [and in doing so] the Copenhagen School also left its own explanatory status often 
implicit”55. This is something of a hangover from securitization theory’s commitment to its 
post-structuralist roots (with its concentration on the constitutive and performative nature of 
language). Guzzini argues that this leads the theory to reduce far too much of a securitization 
process to the speech act itself, ignoring the link between speech acts and outcomes and treating 
speech acts as outcomes in themselves56. Van Rythoven has further argued that the regular 
equation of a speech act with a securitization is a detriment to the theory of securitization and 
one that can only be maintained if the field ignores the myriad cases of failed securitization 
available.57 Baele and Thomson have pointed out that the equation of the securitizing move 
with securitizing outcomes has left “the question of the determinants of success or failure of 
securitizing moves…one that most securitization scholars agree is underdeveloped.”58 Moving 
away from equating speech acts with securitization certainly represents a departure from the 
original securitization concept, and leaves modern versions of the theory more than a little 
detached from their roots (in which language is of prime importance). Nonetheless, building 
on these authors I agree that the possibilities and examples of failed securitization attempts 
(including one of my case studies, and the ongoing attempt to securitize climate change which 
continuously fails in large parts of the US) render non-causal accounts of securitization success 
insufficient.  
Although still “underdeveloped” as the above authors have mentioned, causal 
explanations of securitization success have been forwarded by several authors and even 
acknowledged by the Copenhagen School (who nonetheless focus heavily on those causal 
factors that are most closely related to the speech act itself). Buzan et al. originally 
distinguished the two sets of factors determining securitization success as “internal linguistic-
grammatical factors” and “external, contextual and social” ones59. However, the since 
evolution of the securitization field is such that it might be more helpful to widen these 
categories into securitizing move factors, securitizing actor factors, and audience factors.  
Of these three, by far the most attention has been given to securitizing move factors. 
Much of this is the result of the original securitization framework and its hard focus on the 
productive power of language. Thomson has noted the large tendency of the securitization field 
to adopt this focus, arguing that “since the original securitization framework, it is assumed that 
security words are performative and can trigger perlocutionary effects broadly speaking—that 
is, they ‘produce certain consequential effects upon the feelings, thoughts or actions of the 
audience’”.60 However, in recent years explanations of securitization success that still 
concentrate on the securitizing move itself have broadened and nuanced their focus. Questions 
have been asked of what specific types and mediums of language evoking which kinds of 
responses are most effective in securitization processes. The utility of scientific language has 
received particular focus, with Berling arguing that scientific language has significantly 
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enhanced the securitization of climate change61, and Coan et al. showing that simply the use of 
numbers in securitizing texts can affect the success of the securitization62. The efficacy of 
particularly emotional language has also begun to receive its own focus, with Van Rythoven 
arguing that the focus on emotions in securitization is still undertheorized but showing 
progress.63 The range of mediums that securitizing move-focused research has examined has 
also expanded, with images and video are now receiving much needed attention alongside text. 
This includes Hansen’s examination of how images played a powerful role in (de)securitization 
processes surrounding Abu Ghraib and Muhammed Cartoon Crisis64, and Caverley and 
Krupnikov’s study of how images with particular arrangements are more likely to make people 
support military policies than very similar images with simple differences.65  
While each of these works provides nuance and expansion on the original securitization 
formulation which focused almost exclusively on security utterances, they all nonetheless focus 
very tightly on how the characteristics of the securitizing move itself determine the success of 
the securitization. A second camp has also emerged that takes a different focus, instead looking 
at how the characteristics of the securitizing actor affect securitization success. This area of 
research has focused mostly on the social authority of the securitizing actors. Theiler has 
overviewed that “most theorists accept that…the securitizers must enjoy sufficient status and 
credibility among the audience,”66 while Baele and Thomson observe that much of the 
securitization field has acknowledged that securitization can only be done by certain social 
elites. Investigating the origin of this idea, they point out that “Bourdieu’s legacy on 
“authorized language” and symbolic power has been influential in shaping securitization 
theory’s recognition that not everyone has an equal probability of success in securitizing an 
issue”67  
While most research focuses on the domestic securitizing actors and their authority, 
Coan et al. have expanded their focus in order to treat terrorists themselves as securitizing 
actors and to compare audiences’ reactions to threatening messages that come directly from 
terrorists to warnings about terrorists that come from governments. Kahan et al. have added 
further detail to this line of research, demonstrating that the same securitizing actor will enjoy 
different images of legitimacy amongst different audiences within the same political space68. 
Thomson has further argued that a range of pioneering work from outside the securitization 
field should now be built upon by securitization scholars via experiment-based research, in 
order to demonstrate how the ethnicity, age, and gender of securitizing actors also affects 
securitization success.69 If such experiment-based research were to be taken up by more 
scholars, we would likely see a great depth of detail and nuance added to our understanding of 
how the characteristics of the securitizing actor influences the success of the securitization. 
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Nonetheless, continued focus on this influence runs a danger of further obscuring the audience 
in securitization theories. 
As previously outlined, despite the audience being regularly noted as central to 
securitizing theory several authors (including Balzacq, Stritzel, Léonard, Kaunert, Côté, 
Williams, Waever, and Salter) have lamented its under-theorization. As I will outline below in 
more detail, the question of the audience’s role in securitization has been asked by a number 
of authors, and I aim to build on their work. In doing so, I am not seeking to undermine or 
reject the validity of securitizing move- or securitizing actor-focused explanations of 
securitization success. Instead, I argue that the characteristics of the audience, the securitizing 
actor, and the securitizing move all influence the success of securitizations, and an over-focus 
or under-focus on any of these elements will result (and has resulted) in an insufficient 
understanding of securitization success. More specifically, I argue that the characteristics of 
the audience have a permissive/preventative causality on securitization success. Specific 
audience characteristics can prevent securitization success but not guarantee it. If favourable 
audience characteristics are present, then other factors including the characteristics of the 
securitizing move and securitizing actor will determine the success of the securitization, and 
all things being equal audience characteristics can make the difference between a successful 
and a failed securitization. 
 Before I go through my research and how it attempts to address shortcomings in the 
study of the audience in securitization, I will first overview these shortcomings and the existing 
attempts to address them which I build upon. I will start with the lack of clarity regarding who 
the audience in securitization is. 
 
The Unclear Audience 
A major factor undermining a clear understanding of why the audience comes to 
accept/reject securitizing arguments is the lack of clarity surrounding the nature of the 
audience. The initial securitization framework only loosely defined the audience as “those the 
securitizing act attempts to convince to accept exceptional procedures because of the specific 
security nature of some issues”70. Indeed, one of the earliest questions asked of the 
securitization concept was how to even identify who the audience is at any given moment. 
Scholars including Salter, Roe, Léonard and Kaunert have pointed out that different 
securitizations are likely to have different audiences71, such as public (which this thesis focuses 
on), elite, technocratic and scientific audiences, or even a multiplicity of audiences in a single 
securitization. These different groups can be relevant audiences who enable the adoption of 
new security practices or rationales for different reasons. Public audiences may sometimes 
provide moral backing for a securitization, while at other times powering the demand for direct 
action. Elite audiences such as parliamentarians may provide the legal permissions necessary 
to enact certain directives, and technocratic or scientific audiences may frame and provide the 
precise ways and means of such missions, although each of these audiences may play different 
roles depending on context. Roe even argues that single securitizations can be divided into 
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different stages, with the relevant audience changing from stage to stage. For instance, the 
relevant audience in Tony Blair’s securitization of the potential presence of WMDs in Iraq 
would initially have been the British public at large, while later being the British parliament 
itself.72  
This confusion over who the audience is becomes further complicated by a lack of 
clarity over when an audience has accepted a securitization proposition. As has been called out 
by McDonald, Salter, and Waever,73 under-theorisations of the politics of audience acceptance 
make it difficult to ascertain the “signs of acceptance” that might indicate the moment a 
securitization process has culminated in a certain group agreeing that a certain issue is a 
security concern. How to know when a securitizing argument has been accepted, and to what 
extent, was left particularly unclear by the initial securitization framework, and remains 
difficult to fully clarify, although (as I will detail below) this clarification is possible for certain 
audiences in certain situations. Consequently, without a clear understanding of who the 
audience is and when it has accepted a securitizing argument, the development of an 
understanding of why audiences are moved to make such acceptances was for some time 
overshadowed by these more preliminary questions. However, as I will outline below, progress 
has recently been made in this regard and my thesis seeks to builds on these developments. 
 
The Public Audience Omitted 
An additional problem that has deterred an understanding of the dynamics between 
public audiences and securitizations is that one major arm of the academic securitization field, 
namely the Paris School, along with several scholars that might be described as independent of 
scholastic categories, have largely omitted the public audience from their analytical framework. 
Instead, they relegate the “audience” to a closed and mappable group of individuals at the upper 
echelons of professional fields74. This relegation is a consequence of these scholars’ vision of 
the role of linguistics in securitization processes. The Paris School subsumes (though does not 
eliminate) the role of linguistics under the more overarching influence of praxis.75 Indeed, 
although the Paris School is often counted as a school of securitization its departure from a 
linguistically-based analysis of the processes that produce security rationales makes it more 
than a little detached from the original Copenhagen School framework.76  
Led mostly by works from Bigo, the Paris School centres its analysis on fields of 
practice located largely at the professional level of security management. In doing so, it sheds 
light on the bureaucratic and elite processes that lead to professionals categorising security 
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issues as such and developing subsequent policies. Emerging from the academic traditions of 
Foucault and Bourdieu, these studies utilise the concepts of habitus and dispositif to highlight 
how the everyday interactions, power relations, interests, and bureaucratic projects of different 
security professionals give rise to dominant security rationales at the higher ranks of 
professional fields which then have implications for the broader society77.  
As such, in this vision of securitization linguistics and linguistic receptions by public 
audiences play a much more secondary role in the allotment of an issue into the “security” 
category than does the practice of the immediate elite or professional “gatekeepers” in these 
high ranks of the security field. Audiences are therefore relegated to the technocratic and the 
elite, while identifications are subsumed under interests and perceived “knowledge”. This 
treatment of the audience is not exclusive to the Paris School, but emerges also in the works of 
several independent scholars including Bright, Curley, Piché, Vaugh, and Vuori who have 
largely focused on donors, bureaucracies, governments and experts and (not consistently but 
often) excluded public audiences78.  
As such, while clearly informative and enlightening as to securitization processes that 
take place at this “high” level, this vision of securitization focuses on elites and their knowledge 
bases at the expense of non-technocratic audiences and their identifications. Indeed, this vision 
has made the production of public audience-centred research even sparser, as it has deterred a 
portion of the securitization field from developing parallel theories of public audience 
acceptance. This is well highlighted by Balzacq, who argues that the practice turn in 
securitization has gained a great deal of scholarship as it circumvents the analytical problems 
of identifying the signs of public audience acceptance and tracing society-wide discursive 
landscapes79.  
 
The Public Audience Undercut By The Speech Act  
While the Paris School largely omits the public audience, the other two major “schools” 
of securitization, the Copenhagen and Welsh Schools, along with more “independent” 
securitization scholars such as Abrahamsen, Hansen, Hughes, and Roe, are largely open to the 
role of public audiences in securitization.80 The Copenhagen and Welsh Schools’ differences 
are found more in respect to normative attitudes towards securitization (anti-securitization vs 
open to its emancipatory potential, respectively), intellectual backgrounds (building on Austin 
and quietly Schmittian vs proudly Gramscian, respectively), and levels of objectivism 
(thoroughly viewing insecurity as a construct vs allowing for the possibility of both real and 
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illusory insecurity, respectively).81 However, while these schools and scholars allow public 
audiences into their analytical framework, their treatment of these audiences in turn suffers 
from a fundamental tension that exists in the original securitization framework and has 
persisted in several securitization strands. This is the tension between a vision of speech acts 
as performative and an understanding of security as intersubjectively constructed.  
As was noted above, securitization’s distinctiveness as a theory, despite its many 
strands and internal debates, arises from its core assertion that audience acceptance of a 
securitizing argument is what allows the non-objective concept of security to gain some 
transient and socially-situated meaning. This grounds the securitization field’s vision of 
security’s construction in an intersubjectivity between an audience and socially authorised 
“securitizing actors”, as these actors are making assertions about security issues which the 
audience may then accept and consequently legitimise.82 In other words, the necessity of 
security meanings being negotiated and mutually accepted makes securitization an 
intersubjective process between audiences and securitizing actors.  
However, the place of intersubjectivity in many (particularly in the Copenhagen 
School’s) securitization frameworks is often strongly undermined by a simultaneous, 
competing, and more thoroughly theorised emphasis on performative speech acts. Compared 
to the audience and its intersubjective relation with securitizing actors, the place of 
performative speech acts emerges in securitization theory in great detail. It also has a clearer 
sense of development from the performativity and decisionist theories of Austin and Schmitt, 
from research into the ability of language to create rather than merely represent reality, and 
from studies into social authority’s influence on arguments’ acceptability.83 According to this 
idea of performative speech acts, the act of saying “security” itself reorients the world by virtue 
of this very utterance. Security talk does not simply describe threats, it generates issues’ status 
as threats. This is because saying “security” is an act in and of itself, a performative utterance. 
Once “security” is invoked, the “logic of security” sets in and infuses subsequent assertions 
about security threats with an urgency and subsequent semi-immunity to cautious challenge. 
This immunity is bolstered and mediated via the social authority of the speaker which imbues 
these utterances with weightiness84. The speech acts themselves, therefore, create subsequent 
security rationales through their own performative power.  
It should be noted that the Copenhagen School’s utilisation of speech-act theory and 
pre-existing ideas of performativity is very selective here. They produce arguments about the 
performativity of security talk by explicitly building on the works of Butler, Arendt, and 
Derrida,85 but simultaneously ignore how these authors define as “linguistic” a range of social 
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actions and norms that go far beyond speech acts and instead encompass wider social contexts. 
Essentially, the authors who the Copenhagen School builds its theory on emphasise the 
productive symbolic power of non-speech and social context, but the Copenhagen School’s 
readings of these authors focus very heavily on speech acts themselves.86 This focus on the 
performative power of speech is more in line with the theories of Austin – who places the 
source of speech acts’ effects primarily with speech acts – an author whom Butler heavily 
critiqued and with whom Derrida has been deemed difficult to reconcile.87   
This selective reading of performativity theories and mixing of divergent authors’ 
perspectives helps to explain why there is an unignorable tension between the Copenhagen 
School’s idea that security conceptions only gain salience upon acceptance by the audience 
following intersubjective negotiations between securitizing actors and audiences, and the 
School’s more thoroughly theorised idea that the security utterance itself creates a new reality 
through its own performative power.88 Stritzel goes as far as to argue that the “performativity 
of security utterances as opposed to the social process of securitization, involving (pre-existing) 
actors, audience(s) and context(s) are so different that they form two rather autonomous centres 
of gravity”89 in securitization theory. This tension has stymied the production of a thorough 
and consistent treatment of the public audience’s role in securitization. On the intersubjectivity 
side of things, we have an audience that plays a direct and fundamental role in the creation of 
security issues, while on the performativity side we have an audience that at most receives 
security at the behest of securitizing actors who make the decisive performative speech acts. 
McDonald, Balzacq and Stritzel argue that solving this tension will require a 
downplaying of either the performative or the intersubjective side of securitization theory.90 
Different securitization scholars have reacted to this tension in different ways. Some, such as 
Peoples and Floyd, choose to downplay the intersubjective negotiation of security meanings 
between elites, audiences, and broader social landscapes by marginalizing the audience 
analytically and underplaying its active role.91 The Copenhagen School has acknowledged this 
tension and argued that – while intersubjectivity between elites, audiences, and broader social 
landscapes remains an important part of securitization, and audiences’ predispositions make up 
a part of what Buzan terms the “facilitating conditions” of securitizations – identifying the 
audience and how they accept security concepts is not only difficult but almost impossible in 
practice.92 As Balzacq critiques, this “suggests that securitization is an intersubjective process, 
one side of which is virtually impossible to pin down.”93 As such, it enables an outbalanced 
focus on the performativity of speech acts and deters a thorough study of why public audiences 
accept or resist securitizations. On the more extreme side of things, Floyd has even argued that 
in light of this tension audience activity should be analytically dismissed and audience 
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acceptance should be removed from securitization theory altogether and replaced with more 
tangible indicators of speech acts having real world effects such as policy changes94. 
We can also detect an implicit alignment with performative speech acts and 
downplaying of audience activity in the Welsh School. Both Wyn Jones and Booth (I qualify 
Booth’s inclusion here in this footnote95) have argued that international security projects are 
usually conducted by states and for states (for instance nuclearization). These, they argue, 
generate and maintain an outbalanced idea of the state as the referent object of security. In 
“reality”, it is the people within the states are those who are truly under threat, with states only 
being means to these peoples’ security. These people are distracted from the more pertinent 
threats of oppression and economic struggle that make life insecure for populations at large by 
these illusory state-centric threats which are generated by and for state activities.96  
These arguments suggest and indeed rely on a vision of securitization processes in 
which state authorities create security rationales which populaces then tacitly or even 
enthusiastically endorse at their own expense (or rather, a vision in which state authorities 
“appropriate” security from populaces). This is consequently a vision in which the audience is 
rather inactive or at least generally incapable of having their “true” security concerns expressed 
through state activity. However, it should be acknowledged that the Welsh School does not see 
the audience as completely and eternally passive in this process, as the School is in part 
motivated by a Gramscian normative drive to emancipate the public audience or humanity from 
statist projects and enable humanity as a whole to take more control over security policies and 
rationales. Nonetheless, the School is less than convinced that such a thing is a common 
occurrence. An active role for the public audience in securitizations is therefore striven for 
while implicitly recognised as generally lacking. 
 
Empirical and Theoretical Audiences 
On the other hand, there are several authors who – either explicitly through theory or 
implicitly through empirical examination (or both) – apply a more intersubjective view of 
securitization processes and afford a commensurate role to the audience in these processes. As 
noted above, many of these authors focus largely on technocratic or elite audiences, but some, 
such as Abrahamsen, Hughes, Hayes, Lupovici, and Salter take a broader perspective noting 
larger public audiences in various Western and non-Western settings.97 While these studies are 
not problematic in and of themselves, the majority of empirically-driven studies present 
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context-specific analyses of processes or events which occurred in very particular settings. 
These studies, while highly informative, do not in themselves provide a more broadly utilisable 
theoretical understanding of the dynamics between public audiences and securitization 
processes. However, they do offer a very good overview of the range of roles, which can be 
highly active, that audiences in securitizations can play depending on context. These include 
resisting98, greatly deterring99, even intensifying securitizations100.  
In the wake of such empirical studies into intersubjective securitization processes there 
have been moves to build a more generalisable and theoretical tenable understanding of how 
and why the audience assents to or resists securitizing moves. However, it has been well argued 
by Côté that their remains a tension between the data on audiences in these empirical pro-
intersubjectivity studies and the postulates regarding the audience in more theoretical pro-
intersubjectivity works. Côté demonstrates that the theory-driven studies, while including 
audiences and emphasising intersubjectivity, tend to treat audiences as “agents without 
agency”. In this sense, the audiences are portrayed as important yet passive modulators of 
securitization grammars who have the power to give their assent or refusal but do so based on 
wider contextual factors. While these factors do include more than just performative speech 
acts, these authors’ emphasis on contextual influences on audiences’ decisions still omits the 
possibility of the audience creating rather than merely processing security meanings. This 
contrasts with the demonstrated active agency on the part of audiences that we see in wider 
empirical works.101 As I detail below, this critique by Côté needs to be taken into account, but 
should also be balanced out and measured against the promise of contextual theories of the 
audience’s role in securitizations. 
Overall then, we have a series of tensions, mistreatments, omissions and a lack of clarity 
regarding both the audience in general and the public audience in particular in various strands 
of the securitization field. Despite the audience occupying a fundamental if not essential place 
in the idea that visions of security are flexible and socially constructed – the idea that remains 
at the core of securitization theory’s variants and provides them with their distinctiveness from 
other fields – the audience has proven to be an elusive and poorly theorised element of 
securitization frameworks. This has significantly impaired the production of a theory of why a 
public audience will assent to or resist a securitization process.  
How to identify when the audience gives its acceptance to such a process and even who 
the audience is have proven to be notable holes in the framework which have taken 
considerable effort to address (although, as I will outline below, progress is being made in this 
regard). One major arm and several independent scholars of securitization have relegated the 
audience to a closed and elite group of technocrats and professionals. While certainly 
informative and relevant, these studies exclude a broad swathe of audience forms and functions 
that have the potential to impact securitization processes. A fundamental tension underlies 
much of the remainder of the field’s treatment of the audience, which is pulled between 
intersubjective and performative visions of securitization processes. Some have reacted to this 
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tension by marginalising the public audience analytically or even theoretically. Many of those 
who have sought to emphasise the public audience and intersubjectivity have done so in an 
empirical way which, while illuminating the many modes of audience activity in 
securitizations, lacks an extractable theory of public audience acceptance. Meanwhile, the 
theoretical overhauls of audience dynamics have been critiqued as implicitly denying audiences 
the possibility of being active creators of security meanings, a critique which must be taken 
into account while balanced. As a whole, therefore, the role of the public audience in 
securitizations is significantly under-theorised, a situation I attempt to remedy with my study 
of the influence the public audience’s identifications have on securitizations. 
 
Stepping Stones 
In light of the significance and absence of a thorough understanding of how active 
public audiences affect securitizations through the intersubjective processes between 
securitizing actors and audiences, it is not surprising that some moves towards developing such 
a theory have been pursued – or at least the groundwork for them has been laid – by a few key 
securitization scholars, namely Balzacq, Bourbeau, Bubandt, Côté, and Stritzel. My step 
towards producing a systematic theory of the intersubjective dynamics between public 
audience identifications and securitizations builds from these scholars’ works but also critiques 
and seeks to balance some of their competing theoretical standpoints and concerns. Beyond 
synthesising these authors’ works, a core contribution I add to their research is the insight that 
by looking to the fields of identity and cognitive studies and extracting from them the concepts 
of identifications and schemata (which I will detail in the next chapter) we can translate these 
authors’ works into a concrete, applicable, and systematic theory and analytical tool. 
 
Côté, the Audience Defined, and Why The Public Can A Be Relevant Audience 
As has been outlined above, the issue of identifying the audience has been the subject 
of much scrutiny by securitization critics, and it has been argued by the Copenhagen School 
that any attempt to pin down the audience empirically is bound to flounder. An understanding 
of how public audience identifications influence securitizations cannot, therefore, comfortably 
stay afloat without being buoyed up by a developed notion that the public can be identified as 
a relevant audience. Côté provides the theoretical life raft for this102. Building on contributions 
from Vuori, Salter, Balzacq, Roe, Léonard and Kaunert, Côté identifies the audience in a 
manner that balances the concerns of practical applicability and theoretical holism. He takes 
into account the work done by Salter, Roe, Léonard and Kaunert in noting that several different 
audiences can play different roles in different stages of different securitizations. He then adds 
to Vuori and Balzacq’s “capabilities” definition of the audience, which sees the audience as 
that group which can enable the securitizing actor to enact their security practice. Côté critiques 
Balzacq and Vuori by arguing that the audience does more than just empower an actor to act; 
they also “sanction the view of the issue presented by the securitizing actor.”103 As such, 
audience acceptance enables both security views and practices, or, as Côté puts it, the audience 
is “the individual(s) or group(s) that has the capability to authorize the view of the issue 
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presented by the securitizing actor and legitimize the treatment of the issue through security 
practice.”104  
While challenging the Copenhagen School’s trouble with audience identification, this 
definition actually remains consistent with and even backs up the original Copenhagen 
School’s vision of securitization processes, which sees securitizations as generating not just 
security practices but more fundamentally security rationales and visions.105 This definition 
further avoids the pitfalls of essentialising the audience through over-specificity, while also 
providing the audience with an identifiable trait that can be used to note different relevant 
audiences in different securitizations.  
Following from Côté’s definition of the audience (those with the ability to authorize 
the views presented by the securitizing actor and legitimize the treatment of the issue through 
security practice) we can see that the public can be a relevant audience in certain 
securitizations. Of course, technocratic or elite audiences are often the ones that design and 
execute security practices, or provide the final domino in a long chain that enables these 
security practices. Nonetheless, I contend that the public will meet Côté’s definition of an 
audience in scenarios where two criteria are met. These criteria are (i) securitizations which are 
publicly visible and provocative106, and (ii) securitizations that require the approval of elected 
officials before security practices or laws can come into effect. 
If these two criteria are met, then the public view of an issue (whether or not the public 
believes the issue should be seen as a security issue and should be treated as such) will influence 
the authorization and legitimation of the proposed security rationale/practice. This is because 
provoked public’s view can directly impact elected officials’ chances of re-election, which will 
deter these actors from defying the public. Defying the public in such situations would result 
in security policies that the public passionately disagrees with and resents. It would additionally 
erode elected officials’ aura of legitimacy (which they depend on). Long-term losses of this 
perceived legitimacy threaten (if not ruin) these officials’ chances of re-election. In short, 
ignoring or defying the public view of a securitization (in scenarios in which the public is both 
aware of and provoked by the securitization) carries significant negative consequences for 
elected officials.  
As such, if the proposed security measures require elected officials’ approval then the 
view of this provoked public will influence whether or not the measures will go ahead. 
Consequently, the public will significantly influence the authorization of proposed security 
rationales and/or practices. Furthermore, defying a passionate public view of an issue is 
particularly likely to delegitimise any resulting security rationale/practice, particularly in 
democratic environments where the perceived “will of the people” is considered to be 
fundamental for legitimizing state action. In such environments, public support will not only 
influence the (de-)authorization but also the (de-)legitimation of the security rationale/practice. 
As such, (and perhaps most importantly, as this gets at the most commonsense idea of an 
audience), in these situations the securitizing actor will know that they must convince the public 
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to accept the securitization viewpoint, and as a consequence they will direct their speech (at 
least in part) towards the public. 
So, in certain situations the public view of the issue can influence the authorization and 
legitimation of security rationales and practices, and is a view that the securitizing actor is 
actively trying to influence. Therefore, the public can be identified as a relevant audience in 
securitizations if we adopt, as I do, Côté’s definition of the audience. Furthermore, in scenarios 
where the public is an audience the securitization could not be said to be successful if the public 
does not accept the securitization. Recall that a securitization aims to have an audience 
conceptualise something as an object of worth, agree that there is a threat to this object, and 
decide that this threat must and can be dealt with via certain means. Consequently, 
securitizations require both audiences’ views to be changed and measures to be adopted in 
order to be successful. As such, if the public is a relevant audience in a securitization but they 
do not accept the securitization, then the securitization has failed at least in part and likely in 
full. This is because the public’s rejection would signal a failure to influence the viewpoint of 
a key audience, and because the public’s rejection will likely mean that the proposed security 
measures will not go ahead. 
Admittedly, even in scenarios that meet my two criteria, securitizing actors may opt to 
avoid searching for public assent for their security rationales, or simply ignore public dissent. 
Such instances in which securitizing actors ignore public opinion and push on with their 
securitizations are not unheard of (Trump bombing Syria comes to mind) but for highly visible 
and politically charged security policies this is not a viable long-term strategy for securitizing 
actors (as Trump seemingly learned). Additionally, there are of course securitizations which 
do not meet my criteria, such as securitizations which largely escape media attention and/or 
are enacted by empowered technocrats rather than elected officials. I am not, therefore, arguing 
that the public is always a relevant audience for securitization. Instead, I am arguing that 
members of the public can be a relevant audience for securitizations, and when they are (as I 
will detail later) their identifications are key to the securitization’s success. 
If the public can have a significant impact on securitization processes, then 
understanding what moves the public in a securitization can impact the theory, practice, and 
consequences of securitizations. The significance of this impact emerges, firstly, from the 
possibility that a more holistic apprehension of the important factors influencing different 
securitization outcomes can enable these securitizations to be better managed/deterred, and 
secondly from the far-reaching consequences that well or poorly managed/deterred 
securitizations can have. Understandings of what powers securitization processes can enable 
us to monitor and potentially impact these processes through our awareness of what makes 
them pan out in different ways. In contrast to a performative understanding of securitization – 
which places responsibility for and power over securitizations in the hands of securitizing 
actors – and beyond a theory of the power relations within a restricted field of security 
professionals, an understanding of the role of the public audience can allow us to impact 
securitizations even after they have gained acceptance in a small group of high level 
technocrats or securitizing actors.  
This is a contribution of significance. Securitizations happen frequently. In fact, despite 
the securitization field’s regular assertion that security characterises a departure from the 
regular and ordinary, with Balzacq going so far as to describe securitization as the “politics of 
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the extraordinary”,107 security is one of the most basic, pervasive, consequential, and ordinary 
concerns of life. This has been well highlighted by both the Paris School and the somewhat 
related research building on “risk society” which have demonstrated how security logics are 
being infused into ever more sectors and aspects of modern life. From the basic architecture of 
modern cities and the rationales towards policing, to the typical mindset of consumers 
interacting with potential risks in society at large, risk and security are increasingly ubiquitous 
concerns.108 Each of these security logics are powered by different groups’ acceptance of 
security rationales, acceptances which happen via securitization processes. As the 
consequences of securitizations become increasingly ubiquitous across domestic and 
international societies, so too does the importance of understanding the factors influencing 
these securitizations throughout their development. As such, public audiences, how they affect 
securitizations, and how securitizations affect them, must be brought into a securitization 
framework in a more holistic and systematic manner. This is one of my thesis’ core aims.  
 
Balzacq and the Need to Look at Intersubjectivity and Orientations 
While Côté, by synthesising and critiquing other authors, provides a strong basis for 
identifying the audience, my hypothesis also builds directly on Balzacq’s work regarding the 
perlocutionary aspect of securitizing arguments and the consequent need to take audiences into 
account in securitization theory. It was noted above that several authors marginalize or 
downplay the role of the audience in securitizations as a result of the tension between 
performative speech acts and intersubjectivity in several (and the original) securitization 
frameworks. I take the opposite route, balancing out speech acts with an emphasis on 
intersubjectivity with the audience. In my hypothesis, as will be outlined in Chapter Two, 
securitizing actors make securitizing arguments but the effects of these speech acts are co-
dependent on the speech act and the character of the audience who process the speech act (or 
rather, are dependent on the relationship between the speech act and the character of the 
audience who process the speech act). In this regard I build from Balzacq, who has argued109 
that theories of the performativity of language as set out by Austin are not at all adequately 
captured by securitization theory.  
Balzacq demonstrates that speech acts entail both illocutionary utterances and 
perlocutionary effects, and these perlocutionary effects are crucial not only for theories of 
performativity but also for understandings of what makes securitizations successful. 
Perlocutionary effects are “the ‘consequential effects’ or ‘sequels’ that are aimed at evoking 
the feelings, beliefs, thoughts or actions of the target audience”, while illocutionary utterances 
concern simply the speech itself.110 It is only these perlocutionary effects, triggered by but not 
encapsulated in an illocutionary utterance, that entail the adoption of a new security rationale 
(through which adoption we see the performative power of speech acts at work).  
Both the perlocutionary and illocutionary elements of performativity must therefore be 
included in our analytical lens, and including them both means emphasising the intersubjective 
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dynamics between audiences and securitizing actors. This is because the perlocutionary effects 
of a securitization can only arise if there is some sort of relationship between the audience and 
the securitizing actor, as otherwise an illocutionary speech act would have no medium through 
which it could invoke a perlocutionary effect. The character of this relationship is not universal, 
rather it will differ from case to case. This relationship must therefore be ascertained rather 
than assumed, and subsequently taken into account. Taking into account the varying (which 
are, necessarily, shifting) relationships between audiences and securitizing actors demands 
treating securitizations as intersubjective processes. In Balzacq’s words, “the speech act view 
of security does not account for the relation between the persuasive power of an agent and a 
concomitant swing in the attitude of the target audience”.111  
In addition, Balzacq argues, accounting for the perlocutionary aspect of speech does 
not simply mean that we must see speech as something that moves an audience and leave it at 
that. Whether or not – and how – an audience will be moved by a speech (and consequently, 
whether or not the “desired” perlocutionary effects will come about) depends on more than the 
speech itself. Balzacq lays this out when he argues that “security as a speech act is highly 
problematic because it overlooks…the psycho-cultural orientation of the audience.”112 As such, 
the perlocutionary aspect of speech demands that we account for rather than marginalise 
intersubjectivity with the audience, and that we ascertain rather than assume the relationship 
between audiences and securitizing rhetoric. This further means that we must examine what 
characterises and effects this relationship, including the audience’s “psycho-cultural 
orientation”.  
Building on these insights, my hypothesis posits that utilising the concepts of 
identifications and schemata can allow us to analytically grasp this psycho-cultural orientation 
of the audience and show how it feeds into a security utterance’s perlocutionary effects by 
strongly influencing the shifting relationships between the audience and the securitizing actor. 
 
Bourbeau, Bubandt, and Context 
 This brings us to the position of context in my hypothesis. While the groundwork for 
this has been laid by several authors, I build most directly from the works produced by 
Bourbeau, Bubandt, and Stritzel, while accounting for how these works have been challenged 
by Côté113. Bourbeau actually downplays the audience’s role as an active agent in 
securitization, which Côté critiques him for. Nonetheless, Bourbeau’s argument114 that the 
audience occupies a position within the wider context of a securitization is one my hypothesis 
builds on. He contends that “linguistic utterances are always produced in particular contexts 
and that the social properties of these contexts endow speech acts with a differential value 
system”. He then presents “an analytical framework that understands the relationship between 
agents and contextual factors as mutually constituted”.115 He also argues that contexts can not 
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only facilitate, but also constrain and limit, securitization success, an argument that forms an 
important part of my work.  
Bubandt116 utilises a similar framework, which he uses to illuminate how Western-
derived notions of security unravel in their basic claims to universality when they encounter 
alternative local understandings of security, or “vernacular security.” Arguing that 
securitizations are “related to the political history of the local ontological ways in which danger, 
risk and (in)security are defined”117 he goes on to explicitly link security with notions of the 
self, stating that “securitization is a discursive device for community-building, for the rhetorical 
evocation and political realization of imagined communities at various scales”.118 My 
hypothesis builds on Bubandt’s linking of security with community-formation, as I take the 
link between securitization and imaginations of communities and theorise as to the two-way 
dynamics between them (rather than Bubandt’s more one-way vision of securitization as a tool 
for community-building). Additionally, both Bubandt’s and Bourbeau’s frameworks of 
mutually-constituted agents and contexts form part of the basis for my hypothesis. In these two 
approaches of securitization the audience is envisioned as embedded within and partly 
constituting a broader local context which must be inquired into, a vision I adopt into my 
hypothesis. Specific aspects of this context subsequently become key to understanding the 
audience and how it is moved by certain speech acts. While Bubandt looks largely at local 
political histories and Bourbeau at governmental practices and norms, I seek to illuminate the 
role of identifications and schemata (culturally/politically oriented and linguistically 
composed) in co-constituting these audiences and their contexts.  
 
Stritzel and Resonant Values 
Stritzel and his theory of security as translation has provided a strong springboard for 
this work.119 Stritzel argues that securitizations occur within sociopolitical and sociolinguistic 
dimensions, in that securitizations are embedded within broader social environments and 
operate under the dynamics of intertextuality. He forwards the thesis that for new security 
rationales or texts to be successfully adopted in new local settings, or for them to be “translated” 
and “localized”, they must be compatible with local sociopolitical and sociolinguistic 
environments. In being adopted in these new settings, these security rationales indeed 
transform the discursive landscape – and in this sense the speech acts involved maintain a level 
of performativity – yet they do so only if the pre-existing linguistic and social landscape is 
conducive to their adoption. “Resonant values” therefore become essential in the transmission 
of a security logic from one locale to another. As I will detail below, my hypothesis argues that 
an aspect of these sociopolitical and sociolinguistic contexts which is crucial to influencing a 
public audience’s effect on a securitization is the identifications and schemata 
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Balancing Côté and the Above 
At this point, Côté’s critique of Stritzel, Balzacq, and Bourbeau should be addressed, 
as my research seeks to balance his view of audience agency with the more context-oriented 
views of these scholars. Côté argues that while the treatment of the audience in these scholars’ 
works constitutes a commitment to the intersubjective side of securitization and a centralisation 
of the audience in securitization theory, the place of context in these works would seem to 
subsume the audience within a network of influences that denies them agency.120 Côté forwards 
evidence illustrating that “securitization audiences are not inextricably linked to their 
contextual circumstances but can instead act to create, reproduce, reappropriate, or transform 
these contextual circumstances through their interactions with securitizing actors” (emphasis 
in original).121 He emphasises that securitizations involve deliberative processes between 
securitizing actors and audiences, and as such the audience should be seen as more than the 
sum of their influences but rather as independent agents with agency.  
My research takes this critique of contextual considerations seriously. Audiences have 
agency and maintain the ability to reproduce and fashion themselves in the light of wider 
contexts, while also engaging deliberatively with these contexts to an extent. This “to an 
extent” is the important marker. My hypothesis allows for the audience to have the capacity in 
certain circumstances to deliberatively engage with securitizing arguments in a highly agential 
manner. Nonetheless, the extent to which this deliberative engagement can take place is 
affected by contextual factors directly tied to the audience’s identifications (rather than just the 
speech act), which can sometimes prohibit active deliberative engagement with ideas or 
arguments. I therefore afford public audiences a constant influence over securitizations (at all 
times maintaining the ability to reject or deter securitizations), but also only a conditionally 




To summarise, this thesis will present a hypothesis of how public audiences’ 
identifications influence securitizations. This is a meaningful contribution to the securitization 
field (and wider fields, as will be detailed in subsequent chapters) because the audience is 
simultaneously one of the most central elements of the securitization framework and one of the 
least understood parts of this framework. Examinations of how the public audience affects 
securitizations have been inhibited by preliminary questions of identifying the audience and its 
signs of acceptance, by a relegation of the audience to a closed group of professionals, by an 
undercutting emphasis on speech acts, and by mismatches between empirical and theoretical 
studies. This is a significant detriment, as public audiences can be a highly influential 
component of securitization processes, which are themselves processes of immense 
consequence. 
To address this, I build on Côté’s work on identifying the audience, Stritzel’s work on 
the need for new security rationales to be compatible with pre-existing discourses, Bourbeau 
and Bubandt’s vision of the role of context, and Balzacq’s emphasis on the perlocutionary side 
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of securitization, while balancing Côté’s push for greater levels of active agency to be attributed 
to audiences122. Synthesising these contributions, I introduce a theory that emphasises the 
importance of the public audience and its psycho-cultural orientation, as encapsulated in their 
identifications, in co-constituting highly important sociopolitical and sociolinguistic contexts 
in securitization processes. By demonstrating how these audiences and identifications – and 
these contexts they sit within and channel – significantly affect the intersubjective negotiation 
of security meanings, my hypothesis emphasises the intersubjective character of securitization 
and counters the previous emphasis on how the performative power of speech acts generates 
security rationales. My hypothesis treats the public audience as conditionally active agents 
capable to varying context-dependent degrees of deliberative moves, yet constantly affecting 
securitizations’ developments through their (sometimes non-deliberative) character. This takes 
into account and balances different concerns about audience agency and the role of context in 
securitization.  
My research ultimately aims to systematically illuminate how public audience 
identifications affect securitizations. In doing so, my work enhances our understanding of how 
and why securitization processes, outcomes, and consequences are affected by public audiences 
and does so in a way that builds on and contributes to existing securitization works. In my next 
chapter I will detail the hypothesis itself and how it also builds from and contributes to research 
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In this chapter, I lay out the hypothesis that my empirical research sets out to test. I 
begin by summarising my hypothesis concerning how identifications influence securitizations. 
I then unpack this hypothesis in more detail and fully define and detail the concepts of 
identifications and schemata. The hypothesis I lay out here is that the receptivity of the public 
audience to securitizing arguments is delimited by the public audience’s identifications. As I 
unpack this hypothesis, I detail how it builds on and contributes to fields of cognitive studies, 
identity research, and social psychology, and I outline how my research has entailed an 
identification tracking study which has produced a valuable dataset. Overall, this chapter seeks 




I will first present an abridged version of my hypothesis which omits the finer details 
of the hypothesis and its theoretical underpinnings. After I present this abridged version I will 
then go into the details of the hypothesis and its theoretical underpinnings, with the aim of fully 
clarifying what I quickly introduce here. The abridged version is as follows. 
Public audience receptivity to securitizing rhetoric is delimited by public audiences’ 
identifications. If the audience is unreceptive then the securitizing actor/rhetoric will have little 
influence over the audience. If the audience is receptive then the securitizing actor/rhetoric will 
be able to (but is not guaranteed to) influence the audience. Identifications affect receptivity, 
and as such identifications have a permissive/preventive influence on securitizations. 
In what way do identifications affect receptivity? As lay out in the table here, an 
individual’s identifications can be seen to have three characteristics relevant to securitizations: 
strength or embeddedness over time (they can be strong or weak), density (thick/usually 
thin/thin), and alignment of their content to the securitizing argument (aligned/non-aligned).  
 
Table 2.1 
Characteristic Strength Density  Alignment of Content 
Character Strong Thick Aligned 
Weak (Usually) Thin Non-aligned 
 
I argue that public audiences’ receptivity to a securitizing argument will 
increase/decrease if their identifications are in certain configurations, as illustrated in Figure 1 
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I will now quickly go through the hypothesis outlined in the above diagram, before 
getting into this hypothesis in more detail.  
Identifications are not identities. Rather, they are an individual’s multiple 
conceptualisations of their identity (i.e. they are the ways in which individuals conceive of 
themselves). Strong identifications are those that are highly embedded over time. These act as 
self-schemata. Self-schemata are resistant to change and prevent the individual who holds them 
from being receptive to any rhetoric that runs counter to their content. As such, if an 
individual’s identifications are strong then the individual will reject any securitizing rhetoric 
that misaligns with these identifications. Strong identifications therefore can decrease 
audience receptivity to securitizing rhetoric if securitizing actors do not align their rhetoric to 
their audiences’ identifications. This restricts the securitizing actors. 
 Meanwhile, weak identifications are open to change, and consequently the individuals 
that hold them are open to certain arguments even if these arguments contradict the individuals’ 
current identifications. Weak identifications therefore increase audiences’ receptivity to 
securitizing rhetoric and get a receptivity score of +1. This leaves the securitizing actor less 
restricted and make securitizations easier.  
Thin identifications are identifications that have less frequently primed content. As the 
amount of frequently primed content in identifications decreases, the range of securitizing 
rhetoric that this content can misalign with also decreases. As such, thin identifications filter 
out little rhetoric and therefore increase audience receptivity to securitizing rhetoric (they 
therefore get a receptivity score of +1). This leaves the securitizing actor less restricted, which 
consequently makes securitizations easier.  
Meanwhile, thick identifications are full of frequently primed content, which means 
that there is much more securitizing rhetoric that they could misalign with. This means that 
thick identifications narrow the parameters of acceptable securitizing rhetoric and 
consequently can decrease audience receptivity. This restricts securitizing actors. 
As such, when identifications are strong and thick they both resist change and narrow 
the parameters of acceptable securitizing rhetoric. If such identifications then misalign with 
securitizing rhetoric at hand, audience receptivity to this rhetoric will decrease (so a 
receptivity score of -1). However, if strong and thick identifications align with the securitizing 
rhetoric then not only with the audience be receptive to the rhetoric but also the rhetoric will 
ring true with the audience (i.e. resonate with them), so in this situation there is a receptivity 
score of +2. 
Finally, identifications that are usually thin but sometimes thick have inconsistent 
effects, sometimes acting as thick identifications and sometimes as thin ones. However, it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to conduct an investigation into whether or not they act as thick 
identifications often, rarely, or usually. As such, a reasonable way of taking usually thin 
identifications’ inconsistent effects (by which I mean, their inconsistent activity as thick or thin 
identifications) into account is to hedge our bets and posit that they will act as thick 
identifications 50% of the time and thin identifications 50% of the time.  
Consequently, we would give strong, aligned and usually thin identifications a 
receptivity score of +1.5. This represents these identifications acting as thick identifications 
50% of the time, consequently giving us strong, thick, and aligned identifications 50% of the 
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time (which would have a receptivity score of +2). The other 50% of the time they would act 
as thin identifications (hence gaining a receptivity score of +1). As 50% of the time these 
strong, aligned and usually thin identifications have a score of +2 and 50% of the time they 
have a score of +1, they have an overall score +1.5.  
Next, strong, misaligned, and usually thin identifications would be given a receptivity 
score of 0. This represents them acting as thick identifications 50% of the time, which would 
mean 50% of the time we would have strong, thick, and misaligned identifications (with a score 
of –1). The other 50% of the time they would act as thin identifications with a score of +1, 
hence giving them an overall score of 0.  
Overall, identifications will modulate the restrictions on securitizing actors by 
delimiting the parameters of acceptable securitizing rhetoric and the extent to which individuals 
are able to engage with arguments that run counter to their identifications. This hypothesis is 
illustrated in Figure 1 above. I will now unpack this hypothesis in clearer detail and outline its 
theoretical underpinnings.  
 
Receptivity, Schemata, and Identifications 
Receptivity and Schemata 
What is the meaning and place of receptivity and schemata in this framework? Let’s 
start with the meaning. By an “audience’s receptivity to an argument” I refer to the extent that 
an audience will deliberatively engage with the argument’s information, rather than reject it 
outright. This extent is determined by the individual’s multiple schemata. Schemata are the 
individual’s fundamental, organised, and organising structures of knowledge regarding the way 
everything “is.” This includes information about the worldly and the personal, the physical and 
the metaphysical, the normative and the value-free. Schemata organise information into certain 
relational laws regarding how things relate to each other and can be conceptualised (e.g., “rain 
is water,” “killing is wrong,” “the Japanese are from Japan”). In doing so, schemata provide 
the individual with automatically referenceable rules for how the world works, for what “is” 
and “is not,” and what is and is not “acceptable.”123 As such, these linkages are fundamental 
and operative – fundamental in the sense that they are deeply embedded in the individual and 
often appear to be natural or undeniably true to them, and operative in the sense that they will 
organise the structures of knowledge that the individual develops and holds. 
While embeddedness (defined in terms of relative stability or persistence over time) is 
the key characteristic of schemata124, automation is one of their key functions. Physiological 
studies into schemata have argued that schemata are one of the primary cognitive devices that 
enable learning and deter cognitive processual overload. They do this by rendering very well-
embedded relational laws about the world as automatically referenceable. Once well 
embedded, we no longer deliberatively engage with the information encapsulated in a schema. 
Rather, we simply access it and apply it to explain situations, process new information, and 
                                                          
123 Markus, “Self-Schemata and Processing Information about the Self.”; Davis, “Self-Reference and the 
Encoding of Personal Information in Depression”; Davis and Unruh, “The Development of the Self-Schema in 
Adult Depression.”; Kelley, “Causal Schemata and the Attribution Process.” 
124 Davis, “Self-Reference and the Encoding of Personal Information in Depression”; Davis and Unruh, “The 
Development of the Self-Schema in Adult Depression.”; Markus, “Self-Schemata and Processing Information 
about the Self.” 
37 
 
categorise the objects we encounter, but particularly to cope with information that seems 
ambiguous or non-sensical. This reduces cognitive overload and makes the world far more 
cognitively manageable, and further enables individuals to accumulate knowledge over time 
and learn. As newer, more complex information about the world is introduced to us, we can 
process it and store it by relating it our pre-existing schemata.125 While there are clearly positive 
outputs to such a cognitive device, it does come with some troublesome drawbacks. The 
application of automatically referenced and non-deliberative conceptual laws to the processing 
of information can certainly make the world a more manageable place, but it has been 
evidenced that schemata cause us to interpret and even rewrite and misremember ambiguous 
information in ways that simply fit with our pre-existing world view.126  
This is because automatic rejection of contradictory information is another key function 
of schemata.127 These schemata act as filters; any information that does not fit within the 
relational laws of the schemata will be filtered out as “impossible” or “wrong” or “completely 
unknown.” The individual will not comprehend such information as true or indeed may not 
comprehend it at all. For instance, the idea that the shortest distance between two points is not 
a straight line, or – for Islamic fundamentalists – the idea that Christianity is the one true 
religion. The audience will not engage with (be receptive to) information that schemata filter 
out, and they are even likely to quickly forget it. This process of rejection becomes all but 
instantaneous and invisible to the individual deliberating. The audience will be receptive to 
information that is not filtered out, but once this information is engaged with it still may not be 
agreed with.128 Schemata might be thought of as the “nets” around the individual’s cognitive 
“boxing ring”; they determine who can compete in the arena but do not decide exactly who 
will win. The ultimate winner will depend on other factors including the active deliberation of 
the individual and the performativity of the securitizing rhetoric. As will be outlined in the 
Tracking Identification Strength section later in this chapter, sometimes these schemata can 
be changed, but generally they are stable and spell-binding to the individual that holds them. 
While the study of schemata emerged within the field of cognitive research – with their 
initial study largely taking place in laboratory settings before being applied more generally in 
the analysis and treatment of depression129 – the effects of schemata have been the subject, 
directly and inadvertently, of political theory and social psychology. For instance, studies into 
the “politics of memory” examine the actual social processes, taking place on a wider scale, 
through which people negotiate historical narratives and construct contexts of meaning in 
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which they can situate their own group.130 While these processes are socially enacted and 
indeed their development is socially dependent, they are additionally facilitated by the 
cognitive filtering mechanisms surrounding schemata. Through this filtering effect, schemata 
act as one of the prime cognitive facilitators of narratives which explain the past in terms of 
coherent, flowing, and relatively comprehensible collections of events that all makes sense in 
relation to each other. It is only by systematically rejecting (to the point where we do not 
deliberate on, seriously acknowledge, or even remember) information that does not fit with our 
basic historical narrative, we are able to maintain such an attribution of coherence to the social 
world, which is in fact far messier than narratives would portray it to be.  
Social psychological research into confirmation bias131 and intergroup relations132 also 
observes the actual individual processes and group dynamics that are partly powered by 
cognitive schemata. Again, these processes are socially dependent, and cannot be reduced to 
the cognitive understandings that are schemata. Schemata simply provide part of the fuel and 
tools that enable these socially situated processes to take place. Understandings of schemata 
therefore enhance, but do not encapsulate, understandings of these social processes. The 
sociological concept utilised in securitization research which perhaps most closely relates to 
schemata is the Bourdieusian concept of doxa. Utilised by the Paris School, doxa describes the 
sense that certain orders are self-evident and that there are certain limits to what is conceptually 
or socially possible. Doxa therefore delimits what one considers to be the self-evident “rules 
of the game”, beyond which activity is seen to be simply not feasible.133 Works such as 
Berling’s and Bigo’s have used the concept of doxa to partly explain why high level security 
professionals follow certain security practices and not others simply because, within their own 
professional field, they only see a certain range of professional activities as feasible, and as 
such they never challenge the limits of these perceived professional rules.134 
 
Identifications 
Identifications are not identities. Rather they are an individual’s multiple 
conceptualisations of, or relational laws regarding, their identity135. In other words, 
identifications are an individual’s internal understandings of what they believe to be their 
identity. Identifications are to identity as securitizations are to security. As nouns, both an 
identification and a securitization represent a vision of something that seems objective but 
rather is the result of societal, psychological, and linguistic constructions. As verbs, they both 
represent the processes of attaching or relating one core concept (identity or security) to another 
arbitrary object or concept. In the same sense that we “securitize” something (anything) by 
attaching the label of security to it, we identify with something (anything) by attaching the 
label of identity to it. Such attachments – particularly when developing en masse – that link 
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identity to cultural or political objects partly build the psycho-cultural orientations of audiences 
and the sociopolitical/sociolinguistic landscapes mentioned in the previous chapter.  
These attachments are continual, shifting, and reinforcing processes beyond simple 
“acts” or events signified and completed by the act of saying “identity” or “security”. In light 
of these attachments we come to see that which we call identity or security as real, denoting 
something actual in the world, and undeniable. It can be as difficult for me to deny that I am 
Irish as it was for many Americans to deny that communism was a security threat. Yet these 
both remain constructions, socially and linguistically generated and culturally and politically 
oriented. They nonetheless, by virtue of how powerful a motivator or drive they can be, have 
extensive consequences for individual behaviour and the social world.  
As having identifications requires cognitive ability and self-awareness, individuals can 
hold them, while constructs such as states and organisations cannot. However, these constructs 
can have identities thrust upon them by others. In this sense, they have a “Me” (a social self or 
externally assigned description of what is seen by others to be their identity) but no “I” (a 
reflexive self or an internally sensed idea of their own identity, which is an identification).136 
Indeed, it is by fundamentally building the “I” that identifications become such a powerful 
social force. When asked “who are you?”, “what are you?”, or “how would you describe 
yourself?” the answer “I am…” contains nothing more than your identifications; the 
attachments and relations you have derived between various aspects of the world and what you 
are calling “yourself”.  
Individuals have both Me’s and I’s, and these may often be incompatible in the sense 
that someone may not feel that they are who society tells them they are. This tension between 
the social self and the reflexive self can be a significant source of anxiety. This anxiety can be 
dealt with by reconciling the two selves via the pursuit of authentic living (externalising the 
“I” reflexive self), or conversely an attempt to live up to society’s expectations and demands 
(internalising the “Me” social self)137. The latter route, in which identifications weaken or 
change, enables social and state elites to alter individuals’ identifications, as will be discussed 
in the “Forces Weakening Identifications” section later in this chapter. Particularly in the 
modern era, with its proliferation of roles available to participants in society, the tension 
between social and reflexive selves has become more prevalent and with it identifications have 
grown as a topic of central importance to people’s everyday lives.138  
Strong identifications act as self-schemata, or in other words identifications that are 
very well embedded and do not change act as schemata regarding the self (recall that schemata 
are relational laws defined in terms of embeddedness or relative stability/persistence over 
time). When strong or well embedded, these identifications or self-schemata determine what 
kinds of information about themselves individuals will be receptive to139 (I will detail more on 
identification strength later in this chapter). Consequently, examining an individual’s strong 
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identifications provides an access point for understanding certain ranges of information about 
themselves which they are not likely to engage with. 
Furthermore, recall from the previous chapter that I am building on authors whose 
works argue that we should take into account contextual factors in securitizations including the 
sociopolitical and sociolinguistic landscapes which host and are co-constituted by audiences’ 
psycho-cultural orientations. As I will further detail later in this chapter, examining public 
audiences’ identifications where these identifications are politically oriented (e.g. “as a British 
citizen, I stand for democracy”) does precisely that. It provides us with an access point to these 
psycho-cultural orientations and sociopolitical landscapes on a societal level, as identifications 
are readily identifiable and core aspects of these orientations and landscapes. My research 
therefore translates calls to account for these securitization components into a concrete 
analytical tool. This will be fully detailed below. 
 
The Place of Receptivity, Schemata, and Identifications 
As such, schemata are the individual’s automatically referenceable relational laws 
about the way the world “is”, and self-schemata or strong identifications are those same laws 
that concern the self. The individual will not engage with, or be receptive to, information that 
does not fit within these schemata. This brings us to the place of receptivity, schemata, and 
identifications in my hypothesis. Strong identifications or self-schemata delimit the range of 
conceptualisations of themselves (and, with certain identifications, of their relationship to their 
polity) that audience members will be receptive to. I will show that this range is directly 
relevant to securitizing arguments. In doing so, I argue that certain self-schemata filter in/out, 
and consequently modulate audience receptivity to, the precise kinds of information that are 
contained in securitizing arguments.  
As such, I argue that public audiences’ identifications – which partly constitute, 
generate, and express contexts of pre-existing psycho-cultural orientations and 
sociopolitical/sociolinguistic landscapes – delimit public audiences’ receptivity to securitizing 
arguments. If securitizing arguments are made that the public is receptive to, then the public 
will gain the agency required to deliberate and engage with the argument in a way that is more 
commensurate with Côté’s outlining of audiences as agential and deliberative processors of 
information. If, on the other hand, the audience’s self-schemata automatically filter out the 
information in a securitizing argument then this agential deliberation will not take place, the 
securitization will have been prevented (as the audience did not even engage with the 
securitizing argument), and the audience will have acted in a more knee-jerk manner.  
I therefore balance out Côté’s, Balzacq’s, Stritzel’s and Bourbeau’s works on context 
and audiences’ agency in securitization, allowing instead for conditional audience agency that 
is dependent on contextual conditions which are modulated by identifications. Note that in 
either situation (high or low audience receptivity) the securitization remains an intersubjective 
process in which the meaning of security is negotiated via the viewpoints and subjectivities of 
both the securitizing actor and the audience. When audiences are receptive to the securitizing 
rhetoric their side of the negotiation is done in a deliberative manner that opens up the 
possibility of agreement with the securitizing rhetoric or some kind of halfway point being 
found. When they are unreceptive their side of the negotiation is done automatically and closes 
off the possibility of pre-existing understandings of security being altered by the securitizing 
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actor. In both situations both sides still hold viewpoints, and the (dis)agreement of these 
viewpoints is crucial to the success or failure of the renegotiation of security meanings which 
the securitization entails. 
 
Important Note 
Identifications can be seen to have varying characteristics that are relevant to 
securitizations, namely density, alignment of their content to the securitizing argument, and 
strength. How do these characteristics affect individuals’ receptivity to securitizing arguments? 
The following paragraphs, up until the section titled Strength and Receptivity, all describe 
the effects different identifications’ characteristics have if these identifications are strong and 
consequently act as self-schemata. In fact, identifications can also be weak, in which case they 
will not act as schemata. This scenario will be accounted for in the section titled Strength and 
Receptivity. For now, though, I will discuss how the characteristics of strong identifications 
or self-schemata affect receptivity. 
 
Group Orientation and Receptivity 
National Identifications 
Before we get into the main three characteristics of identifications (density, alignment, 
and strength) there is a fourth characteristic which I will quickly overview. This is group 
orientation. Our identifications are, in part, derived from our perception of the groups we see 
ourselves as being a part of. That is, when we identify with a group we imagine that the group’s 
fundamental characteristics and identity are intertwined and in tandem with our own.140 We 
cling to group identifications because they provide access to group-belonging,141 through 
which one receives self-esteem (a core human drive), a relative sense of security, intimacy 
potential, and the material benefits emerging from established relationships.142 This can make 
control over group identity a coveted resource for certain elites, as group members can conform 
quite steadfastly to ideas which are painted as being fundamental to the group. An individual’s 
group orientation affects their receptivity to a securitizing argument because securitizing 
arguments assert that a particular group – or, more specifically, a particular group’s object of 
worth – is under threat. National identifications are one such group orientation.  
National identifications are not identifications held by the nation, but rather are 
identifications which concern the nation and are held by individuals in the nation.143 They tell 
me that I am not just part of a nation, but that the nation is an extension of myself and that 
something that happens to the nation is something that happens to me. Indeed, individuals are 
often encouraged to derive self-esteem through the successes and character of their nations. 
The content of national identifications additionally tells me what my nation is and what its 
fundamental characteristics are. There are, of course, non-national group identifications, for 
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instance familial, local, regional, ethnic, or civilizational identifications. Most individuals will 
feel several different group identifications which are primed at different times. A public’s 
national identifications are therefore a psycho-cultural orientation that make up an important 
component of the sociopolitical/sociolinguistic landscape, as they partly encapsulate and 
express (and contribute to the generation of) how a people conceptualise their nation. 
 
The Public and the Politically Relevant Majority 
Recall that our definition of the audience, taken from Côté, is “the individual(s) or 
group(s) that has the capability to authorize the view of the issue presented by the securitizing 
actor and legitimize the treatment of the issue through security practice.” Recall also that I 
delineated the criteria in which the public will meet Côté’s definition of the audience and have 
relevance for the securitization. Note also that “members of the public” are defined here as 
citizens of the state, irrespective of professional status, social authority, or military/security 
rank. As such, if the public is the audience then the public has this authorizing and legitimizing 
capability, and this capability cannot be derived through the professional status, social 
authority, or military/security rank of any member of the public – as the public is not defined 
in these terms. It emerges instead from the moralising facility and legitimising force wielded 
by a politically relevant majority of citizens. Numbers of people, not the status of these people, 
is what is fundamentally important here144. Again, the public is not a unitary entity. It neither 
functions nor acts as a whole. However, when the number of members of the public assenting 
to a securitization – individuals who may belong to several distinct groups – seems to reach a 
politically relevant majority of that public, then the views and practices proposed by the 
securitizing actor can gain whatever authorisation and legitimation that comes with the 
perceived “will of the people” (which is precisely what the securitizing actor is seeking when 
the public is a relevant audience, as was outlined previously).  
“Seems to reach” is important here, as outside of elections or referendums the precise 
number of people holding one view or another will be difficult to identify. Additionally, the 
precise number of people who would be required to hold one view or another before the 
securitizing argument can be deemed accepted is equally if not more difficult to ascertain, and 
would be different in different political contexts. Depending on the polity or the issue at hand, 
the “politically relevant majority” may possibly refer to simple majorities, proportional 
majorities, or the majority of citizens in the majority of constituencies. However, while the 
exact amount of public assent required and whether or not it has been reached can be difficult 
to identify with precision, instances in which it has clearly (not) been reached can certainly 
arise, not least through strong majorities in favour or against a clearly stated securitizing 
proposition being observed through polling.  
 
Invoking the National 
As such, when we say that the public is a relevant audience we necessarily mean that 
the “success” of the securitization depends on a politically relevant majority of that public 
assenting to the securitizing argument. In such securitizations, the securitizing actors need to 
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invoke either national identifications or identifications that are national in scope.145 Why do 
they need to do this? Such securitizations are typically made by (aspiring) state officials who 
are arguing for the government to take a certain course of action or adopt a certain vision. This 
is because final decisions on security practices are usually the jurisdiction of state authorities, 
albeit with the demand, design, and enactment of these practices coming from both private and 
public sectors (and the lines between these sectors blurring within the security/industrial 
complex). State-level security activities visible to the public incur national costs, create 
nationwide moods of anxiety, use national resources of public interest, and will likely colour 
the image of the nation as a whole. Additionally, as outlined above, these securitizations seek 
the approval of the politically relevant majority of citizens in order to authorise and legitimise 
these views and practices.  
As such, the securitizing actors are proposing that the entire citizenry incur costs, and 
simultaneously they need the relevant political majority of the public to back them. If everyone 
is to take on the costs, and everyone or most must agree to this, then the securitization will only 
be successful if it is proposed that the object under threat is an object of worth for all or most 
of the public. In other words, in order for a politically relevant majority of the public to agree 
with the securitizing argument, this majority must feel that they (or an object of worth to them) 
are under threat (or would be vulnerable to a threat if they did not take a certain action). 
Proposing that the politically relevant majority of citizens are party to the object under threat 
can only be done by arguing that the threatened object is valuable to the nation as a group or to 
a group that is national in scope. A prerequisite for securitizations that require public audience 
approval is therefore to invoke national identifications or identifications that are national in 
scope.  
Consequently, the public audience will only be receptive to the argument if they see 
themselves as being members of that national group or group that is national in scope. Members 
of the public will not always necessarily do so. Take for instance Mohammed Ali’s famous 
remark outlining why he refused to fight in the Vietnam War, in which he argued that fighting 
against the Viet Cong would be “simply to continue the domination of the white slave masters 
of the darker people the world over.146” Here we see an example of an individual identifying 
far more strongly with a racial group rather than the ideological (capitalist), national 
(American), or civilizational (Western) groups invoked in the securitization of communism. If, 
like Ali, members of the public audience do not have the requisite identifications, then their 
receptivity to the securitizing argument will decrease, as their group self-schema will filter 
out/prevent an engagement with the claim that “my group is under threat.” Conversely, if they 
do have these identifications, then their receptivity only has the potential to increase. In order 
to know if receptivity will increase, we now need to examine these identifications’ density.  
In sum, if the public is a relevant audience then securitizing arguments will need to 
convince the politically relevant majority of the public that one of their objects of worth is 
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under threat. They will consequently need to argue that the group whose object is under threat 
is the nation or a group that is national in scope. Therefore, if a public audience member’s 
identifications’ do not hold such a group orientation, then their receptivity to the argument will 
decrease. However, simply having identifications that are national (in scope) will only 
potentially increase receptivity. Any subsequent increase will depend on identification density. 
 
State-Centric Criticism 
Before we cover identification density, however, a potential criticism should be 
addressed. It could be said that by focusing on how securitizations are influenced by the 
politically relevant majority of citizens – who require addressing in terms that are national or 
national in scope – this becomes a state-centric study. Several securitization scholars have 
focused on decentralising the state as a locus of security studies. This is particularly true of the 
Welsh School, which has argued that the state is not so much an appropriate locus for security 
practices as it is one of the primary generators of security problems.147 Transnational causes of 
securitizations have also been a significant element of securitization studies, particularly 
amongst the Paris School, and have highlighted how forces operating independently of national 
borders can be significant influences on securitization processes.  
I do not seek to deny any of these works’ validity.148 Transnational forces are highly 
likely, if not certain, to play a significant role in the formation of the security rationales and 
identifications that I am studying. Even national identifications have their roots in transnational 
developments, and states and security professionals always operate in a transnational and 
international context where public and private influences beyond their own borders must be 
acknowledged and incorporated into security policies and rationales. However, none of this is 
to deny the central argument that securitizations often require public approval and when this 
happens transnationally-generated security rationales and identifications impact sections of 
securitization processes which play out within national institutions. Amongst other concerns, 
leaders and elected representatives often if not usually take into account the viewpoints of 
constituents which are specific to their own state. Additionally, while the Welsh School 
powerfully argues that the state should be reconsidered as the referent object in need of securing 
(with humanity as a whole being a more appropriate referent object in the School’s views), the 
School does not deny and indeed emphasises the way in which states are often (again, 
inappropriately in their view) the centre of gravity in securitizations, with most security 
practices and rationales being conducted for and largely by the state149. As such, states’ roles 
may well have been overemphasised and overvalued in traditional security studies, but the 
balancing out of state-centrism does not require us to ignore how state-specific activities, or at 
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Density and Receptivity 
Identifications have content with varying density, ranging from thick to thin. “Thin 
identifications” refer to identifications that are rarely primed, evoked, or expressed. Thick 
identifications are those that are more frequently primed, evoked, or expressed. Identifications 
can also be usually thin but sometimes thick, in that they can go through long periods of 
infrequent priming or evocation and then go through short periods of regular priming and 
evocation. Density is directly related to how relevant an identification is to an individual’s 
everyday life – not just their functional or active life but also their political life as they perceive 
their place in a political universe. Additionally, if an identification is discussed or primed 
frequently it will usually become more densely packed with information and content points. 
For instance, someone could feel “American” or “Parisian,” but if these identifications are thin 
or rarely primed then they would likely not have a specific collection of attributes which they 
will list as defining America or Paris. On the other hand, as they are discussed much more, 
“thick” identifications are more likely to be full of specific content. For instance, “I am 
American, and that means I am democratic, Christian, capitalist, and anti-gun control.”  
How does density relate to receptivity? As thin identifications are only rarely primed 
and tend to contain a lower number of information points or relational laws, they only act as 
sparse filters of incoming arguments, tending to reject less arguments than thick identifications. 
They might be thought of as a fence with a very low number of panels. These panels will also 
not be particularly sturdy. This is because a key element in the cognitive construction of 
schemata is repeated exposure to relational laws. The more an individual encounters the same 
basic information or has that information invoked in their environment, the more embedded 
this information becomes, the more it will function as a schema, and the sturdier the panels in 
the fence.150 Consequently, most information attempting to fit within thin self-schemata will 
encounter little resistance as a result of the low number of panels most of which are unsturdy. 
Without many pre-conceived ideas of what “Britain” is, or just ideas that are rarely reinforced, 
the individual is likely to be more open to a broader range of well-argued and collectively 
backed information about Britain and Britain’s objects of worth. This means that if thin, 
identifications will broaden the parameters of acceptable securitization rhetoric. As such, 
identifications that are strong, national, and thin will allow individuals to be receptive to more 
securitizing arguments. Note that this is still an iteration of identifications delimiting the 
parameters of acceptable securitizing rhetoric. In this case, it acts to broaden these parameters. 
Thick national identifications have a less straightforward relationship with receptivity, 
as they could cause receptivity to increase or decrease. As the filters in the individual’s self-
schemata become denser, it will be required that the specific details of the arguments the 
individual encounters align with these filters before receptivity to these arguments will 
increase. This constrains the parameters of acceptable securitization rhetoric and restricts 
securitizing actors. For instance, someone may feel British, but believe that Britain is and 
should always be a defender of international law. They then encounter a securitizing argument 
which claims that Britain is under threat, but needs to break international law to tackle the 
                                                          
150 Hopf, “The Logic of Habit in International Relations”; Lieberman, “Intuition”; Kelley, “Causal Schemata and 
the Attribution Process”; Markus, “Self-Schemata and Processing Information about the Self.”; Davis, “Self-
Reference and the Encoding of Personal Information in Depression.” 
46 
 
threat. In this case, the individual’s receptivity will decrease, as their identifications’ content is 
not aligned to the argument. The restricted securitizing actor will then need to amend their 
argument so that the breaking of international law is no longer included therein. However, if 
the argument does align with these strong, thick identifications, then this means that the 
argument actually runs parallel to the individual’s pre-existing fundamentally held schemata, 
and as such the argument will ring true or resonate with the individual. Strong, thick and aligned 
identifications therefore provide both receptivity and resonance.  
There is then the issue of usually thin but sometimes thick identifications. Usually thin 
identifications are not regularly invoked, as they go through long periods of quiet, so 
classifying them as simply being thick seems insufficient. However, treating them as simply 
thin is also problematic, as they do go through periods of regular invocation and even intense 
bursts of invocation. If we take this into account, we can posit that usually thin identifications’ 
periods of regular invocation or intense bursts may make them more relevant – more “at the 
mind’s forefront” – for some members of an audience in certain periods. In other words, the 
fact that the identification recently went through a period of regular or intense invocation may 
have primed it enough to temporarily render it of great importance to some audience members’ 
current conceptual landscape. This would mean that, so long as these identifications are also 
strong, any securitizing rhetoric would need to fit within these primed barriers before being 
accepted, as they would with thick identifications. However, this priming effect would not be 
as reliably prevalent as it is for persistently thick identifications, and for many audience 
members the identification would likely still act as a thin one. In other words, identifications 
that are “usually thin but sometimes thick” may act as “thick” identifications for some people 
and as “thin” ones for others. 
However, we could not feasibly argue that usually thin identifications will have similar 
effects as thick ones always and for everyone. Additionally it would be beyond the scope of 
this thesis to conduct an investigation into whether or not they act as thick identifications often, 
rarely, or usually, or for all, some, or a few members of the audience. As such, a reasonable 
way of taking usually thin identifications’ inconsistent effects (by which I mean, their 
inconsistent activity as thick or thin identifications) into account is to hedge our bets and posit 
that they act as thick identifications 50% of the time and thin identifications 50% of the time.  
 
Alignment and Receptivity  
Why is it the case that thick identifications’ content could be disruptively misaligned 
with or contradictory to securitization rhetoric? Might not thick identifications be populated 
with information that is irrelevant for securitizing arguments? This brings me to a key tenet of 
the argument that a public audience’s receptivity to a securitizing argument is delimited by 
their national identifications. The tenet is as follows: the types of schemata that filter in/out the 
key information points in a securitizing argument are the same types of schemata that thick 
national identifications can be seen to consist of. I will now lay out why this is the case. 
 
Schema Types in Thick Identifications 
Part of this tenet concerns “the types of schemata that thick national identifications can 
be seen to consist of.” As such, to demonstrate this tenet I need to provide an overlay of the 
content categories (schema types) in thick national identifications.  
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These schema types are typically coded in terms of the historical narratives we carry, 
the affiliations we hold, and the roles we play151.That is to say, we derive our national self-
descriptors from our perception of the characteristics our nation inherited from its historical 
narrative,152 our perception of the characteristics of the nations we affiliate with,153 and our 
perception of the characteristics of our nation’s roles.154 We therefore form our national 
identifications by asking “what is our nation’s history?”, “where are its affiliations/ 
estrangements?”155, and “what role does it play?” I will break the question “what role do we 
play?” into its constituent parts. 
Roles provide us with a socially recognised category defined in terms of repeated action 
and carrying a level of status. Consequently, they give us the appearance of distinction, purpose 
and worth, all of which contribute to self-esteem156. Roles are therefore, in part, behaviours, so 
the first constituent part of the “what role do we play?” question is “what do we repeatedly 
do?” This question can be further broken down, as we tend to judge what we do both in terms 
of our aims and our abilities. We seek to do a certain something, and have a certain level of 
ability to do this thing. “Defender of democracy” and “world guardian of democracy” are 
therefore two different roles with the same aim, whereas “defender of democracy” and 
“defender of meritocracy” are different roles with the same level of ability.  
This makes “what do we repeatedly do?” both an aspirational question and a present 
continuous question. In its aspirational sense, it refers to what we represent, stand for, or seek 
to achieve/maintain. It is thus a question of what our values and intentions are, and can be 
rephrased as “what norms guide our actions?” In its present continuous sense, it concerns what 
we believe we actually can do in action; what our ability to actually conduct certain roles is. It 
can therefore be rephrased as “what is our level of influence?” This entails an implicit question 
of how much influence others have over us. It also enables identifications such as “leader” or 
“declining power.” Combining our self-perceived norms and influence, we envision our role’s 
rights and responsibilities. 
The second constituent part of “what role do we play?” is “how is what we do perceived 
by others?” This is because roles come with status packages which are usually arranged in a 
more or less hierarchical manner.157 These status packages are part of the incentive for 
performing roles, as they provide the holder with self-esteem. Status, by definition, requires 
recognition of status by others, or at least the perceived recognition of others (we can fool 
ourselves into imagining how others see us). Consequently, when asking “what role do we 
                                                          
151 Lebow, National Identities and International Relations. 
152 Friedman, “The Past in the Future.” 
153 Goldstein and Cialdini, “The Spyglass Self.” 
154 Burke and Reitzes, “The Link Between Identity and Role Performance”; Reitzes and Mutran, “Multiple Roles 
and Identities”; Turner, “The Role and the Person.” 
155 By “estrangements” I am referring to the relationships characterised by a sensation of detachment and 
mutual negativity. If I feel my nation is estranged from nation X, then I feel my nation has little in common with 
nation X and also that we dislike them, even distrust them, in fundamental ways. This is in contrast to a nation 
that we affiliate with, which is a nation we see as quite similar to us in important ways and as a nation we 
fundamentally like and trust. 
156 Biddle, “Recent Developments in Role Theory”; Burke and Reitzes, “The Link Between Identity and Role 
Performance.” 




play?”, the questions of “what norms guide our actions?” and “what is our level of influence?” 
are followed by questions of “how are our norms and influence perceived by others?” 
Overall then, thick national identifications consist of schemata pertaining to what norms 
the nation holds, what influence it has, who it has affiliations/estrangements with, its history, 
and its perception in the eyes of others.158 I will now show that these are the schema types that 
are relevant for filtering securitizing arguments’ key information points. I do so keeping in 
mind that, as was outlined earlier, a securitization process leads towards a group 
conceptualising something as an object of worth, agreeing that there is a threat to this object, 
and deciding that this threat must and can be dealt with via certain means. As such, in order for 
securitization to be successful it must establish an object of worth, a threat to it, and an 
appropriate and feasible course of action to deal with this threat.159 
 
Alignment of Norms with Objects of Worth and Appropriate Missions 
As noted above, securitizing arguments involve an assertion of what we deem to be a 
national “object of worth.” This is the thing that we are willing to expend resources in order to 
secure. Deliberations on what qualifies as a national object of worth are therefore deliberations 
on what the nation values. As was outlined above, a public audience’s strong and thick national 
identifications include normative schemata, i.e. schemata regarding the nation’s values. These 
schemata will therefore strongly delimit which arguments pertaining to objects of worth the 
individual will be receptive to or reject outright.  
Similarly, the potential for deliberation on what qualifies as an appropriate mission will 
be constrained by a public audience’s normative system. This is because these norms will 
delineate the parameters of acceptable security practice and of how many resources (other 
objects of worth) are worth spending/sacrificing in order to secure the threatened object of 
worth. As such, receptivity to the objects of worth and appropriate mission elements of the 
securitizing argument is delimited by the public audience’s normative schemata. These 
schemata make up a part of the individual’s national identifications, so by examining these 
national identifications we gain an access point to specific information that will illuminate what 
kinds of securitizing arguments an audience is likely to reject or actively deliberate on. 
In this arena, the distinction between interests and norms becomes less relevant. It may 
well be the case that the object that is denoted as an object of worth may be an “interest” 
grounded in physical or material desires, rather than a more abstract normative ideal such as 
the spread of democracy. Either way, the object of worth will still be categorised as such within 
and with reference to a nation’s value system, which may well attribute more worth to the 
physical than the abstract. By definition, the relative worth of even basic resources (and hence 
our willingness to expend other resources to secure that resource) is assigned by a value system. 
Some may wish to argue that certain interests, such as basic survival or economic prosperity, 
will always trump certain other interests (and all abstract ideals). Proponents of such an 
argument should note that it is our normative system that will determine whether or not we 
value economic prosperity less than we value anti-imperialism (and hence whether we will 
                                                          
158 While thick identifications that are national in scope consist of schemata pertaining to what norms the 
group holds, what influence it has, who it has affiliations/estrangements with, its history, and its perception in 
the eyes of others. 
159 Roe, “Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the UK’s Decision to Invade Iraq.” 
49 
 
forego economic gains that would be attained through imperialistic acts), or our lives over our 
way of life (and hence whether we will give our lives in order to maintain our cultural 
character). The choice between peace and righteousness is still a choice that different nations 
have made differently. 
As such, in order for an individual to be receptive to the “object of worth” and 
“appropriate mission” elements of a securitizing argument, that individual’s national normative 
schemata (which is part of their thick national identifications) must be aligned with the 
information in the securitizing argument pertaining to the proposed worth of the object and to 
the appropriateness of the mission, so that this information is not automatically rejected. 
  
Alignment of Levels of Influence with Feasible Missions and Threatening Capabilities 
 When deliberating on the feasibility of the proposed mission, we are considering our 
potential for success. This is, by definition, a consideration of our nation’s level of influence. 
If the public audience’s schemata pertaining to the nation’s level of influence is not conducive 
to the idea that the nation can succeed in its mission, then the audience will filter out the mission 
as infeasible and this deliberation will not take place. To use a simplified example, if the 
audience had a schema that said “we are an ineffectual nation” or “the Middle East is 
uncontrollable” then they are not likely to see a mission that has to do with specifically 
influencing the Middle East as feasible. Conversely, if they had a schema saying “Britain has 
great influence in the Middle East” then they would be receptive to the idea that the mission is 
feasible.  
Indeed, if they had a schema saying “Britain has great influence in the Middle East” 
they would likely filter out information arguing that the mission was infeasible. This brings us 
to the role of identifications in delimiting public audience receptivity to “anti-securitizing” 
rhetoric. For every major securitization aimed at the public, there is likely to be a dissenting 
“anti-securitizing actor” arguing that the securitizing actors are misinformed, mistaken, or 
worse160. Public audiences’ identifications play the same role in delimiting public audiences’ 
receptivity to this anti-securitizing rhetoric as to the securitizing rhetoric, in that these schemata 
will automatically reject and prevent deliberative engagement with elements of the anti-
securitizing argument that misalign with these identifications. As will be laid out in more detail 
in my Methodology Chapter, I have also empirically examined this relationship between public 
identifications and anti-securitizing rhetoric for this thesis. 
Additionally, our schemata regarding our relative level of influence will affect our 
receptivity to arguments that we are under threat. Arguments about threats are divided into two 
parts: one part concerning the threatening capabilities of another entity, the other part 
concerning the threatening intentions of that entity if the entity is an actor161. Specifically, our 
receptivity to the argument that another entity has threatening capabilities will be strongly 
affected by how much influence we attribute to ourselves in relation to others. If we see 
                                                          
160 I use the term “anti-securitizing” as opposed to the more common “desecuritizing” to emphasise that the 
anti-securitizing actor may not be trying to desecuritize something that has already been securitized, but may 
indeed be trying to prevent the securitization of something that has not already been securitized. 
161 The entity may indeed be non-agential, for instance if the threat is climate change or HIV/AIDS, in which 
case intentions have less bearing. 
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ourselves as relatively weak (or weak if we adopt a certain stance), we will be more receptive 
to arguments that others threaten us (or could threaten us if we adopted that stance). 
As such, in order for an individual to be receptive to the “feasible mission” and “threat” 
elements of a securitizing argument, that individual’s national influence schema (which is part 
of their thick national identifications) must be aligned with the information in the securitizing 
argument pertaining to the proposed feasibility of the mission and to the presence of the threat, 
so that this information is not automatically rejected. 
 
Alignment of Estrangements, Histories, and Perception with Threatening Actors and 
Feasible Actions 
 Believing that we are under threat is not just a case of believing that another actor has 
the physical capability to threaten us. It is also a consideration of that actor’s willingness to use 
their capabilities against us162. This, by definition, is a consideration of our estrangements and 
perception in the eyes of others, or more simply our negative relationships. Our schemata 
regarding these elements of the sociopolitical universe will therefore delimit our receptivity to 
arguments about the threatening intentions of other actors. These elements of our self-schemata 
also impact our sense of how much we can feasibly achieve in cooperation with or against other 
actors, based on their perceived willingness to work with/against us.  
Additionally, our estrangement and perception schemata (and to an extent every 
element of our self-schemata) are built by frequent practices and historical narratives of 
interaction. In this sense schemata both enable the construction of and are reinforced by 
historical narratives. Historical narratives, being largely described in terms that are linear and 
causal, often generate expectations of being repeated or continuing into the future.163 
Consequently, if we believe that we have a long-standing history of conflict or tension with a 
certain group, then we will be receptive to the assertion that this group is now actively 
contemplating ways to get the better of us. On the other hand, our schemata will likely reject 
any assertions that groups that we have long been friendly with are now suddenly and 
purposefully threatening us in some way.  
These conceptual co-locations and potential (mis)alignments are illustrated in Figure 2 
on the next page, which can be overlaid on the two “Alignments” boxes in Figure 1.  
 
                                                          
162 This is, again, less applicable for securitizations regarding non-agential entities such as climate change or 
disease. 
163 Somers, “The Narrative Constitution of Identity: A Relational and Network Approach.” 
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Recall, however, that the last few sections have all concerned situations in which 
identifications are strong. We must now account for the issue of identification weakness. 
 
Strength and Receptivity 
The above situations, in which securitizing arguments’ content points must align with 
the identification content points that they complement, all rely on an implicit rule: if the 
securitization rhetoric does not align with its complementary identification point then the 
individual will maintain the identification point and reject the rhetoric. This steadfastness of 
identifications is not necessarily a given; identifications can change. Recall that identifications 
are an individual’s conceptualisations of their identity, and only strong or very well embedded 
identifications act as self-schemata.164 Weak identifications are those that are not well 
embedded, in that they change easily and frequently, to the point that they may even be open 
to manipulation. Being changeable or open to manipulation, weak identifications accommodate 
the performative power of securitizing rhetoric. Met with weak identifications, security talk is 
less obstructed in its reorganisation of the linguistic and material landscape, due to the 
audience’s lack of obstructively steady pre-existing conceptualisations of the nation. 
Securitizing actors are consequently afforded the possibility to manage audience 
identifications. Therefore, weak identifications loosen restrictions for the securitizing actor, 
and do not bring the audience member to reject securitizing rhetoric in the same way that strong 
identifications do. This means that the possibility of the audience being unreceptive to the 
securitizing argument decreases as identifications weaken.  
 
Hypothesis Summarised 
Overall then, so long as an individual’s identifications are strong and thick, the 
individual’s receptivity to information regarding objects of worth, threats to that object, and 
courses of action to secure that object that are feasible and appropriate (a securitizing argument) 
are largely delimited by the individual’s pre-existing schemata regarding the nation’s norms, 
influence, estrangements, histories, and perception in the eyes of others (the individual’s pre-
                                                          





existing strong, thick, national identifications). A misalignment of the securitizing argument 
with the content of these identifications should therefore greatly decrease the individual’s 
receptivity to the argument. Meanwhile, neither weak nor thin identifications decrease audience 
receptivities, and usually thin identifications have inconsistent effects.  
If receptivity is low then the individual will not engage with the securitizing argument, 
and consequently the securitization will be prevented. If receptivity is high then the individual 
will be receptive to the argument, in which case the securitization is possible but still not 
guaranteed (other factors such as the securitizing actor and securitizing move will now be 
important in determining securitization success). As such, identifications provide the 
permissive/preventive conditions for securitization success, and all things being equal 
identifications will make the difference between a successful/failed securitization. 
This hypothesis – which was illustrated in Fig. 1 earlier in this chapter – looks to the 
fields of identity and cognitive studies and extracts from them the concepts of identifications 
and schemata. It then synthesises these concepts with Côté’s vision of audience agency and 
with Balzacq, Bourbeau, Stritzel, and Bubandt’s165 visions of the role of sociopolitical contexts 
and the psycho-cultural orientations of the audience in securitizations. In doing so, the 
hypothesis highlights identifications as specific and identifiable aspects of these orientations 
and landscapes which, if examined in different and unique cases, can reveal how and why 
certain securitizations are facilitated/deterred by the character of the public audience.  
We see that an audience member’s ability to actively engage with the different elements 
of a securitizing argument (rather than automatically reject them) is delimited by their national 
identifications. These identifications emerge from individuals’ repeated exposure to cultural 
and political visions of their nation. By taking alignment of audience identifications to 
securitizing rhetoric into account, we acknowledge the importance of the relationship between 
audiences and securitizing rhetoric and we highlight identifications as an identifiable and 
influential aspect of this relationship. We further build on Stritzel’s166 work on the need for 
new security rationales to be compatible with pre-existing discourses. This relationship is 
treated as varying and shifting, with my hypothesis only highlighting which aspects of this 
relationship (identification strength, density, and content alignment) need to be examined in 
different cases, hence maintaining a wider applicability across disparate and unique 
securitization cases.  
Building on Balzacq, we see audiences as holding an influential psycho-cultural 
orientation which effects their relationship with the securitizing rhetoric, and we highlight 
identifications as a specific entry point for an investigation of this orientation. In relation to 
Stritzel and Bourbeau167, we see securitizations as taking place within sociopolitical and 
sociolinguistic contexts and highlight that a key element of these are identifications which 
facilitate, constrain, and limit the adoption of security rationales in specific locales. In relation 
to Bourbeau and Bubandt168 we see these contexts and audiences as co-constitutive, as these 
                                                          
165 Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond”; Balzacq, Securitization Theory; 
Bourbeau, The Securitization of Migration; Bubandt, “Vernacular Security”; Côté, “Agents without Agency: 
Assessing the Role of the Audience in Securitization Theory.” 
166 Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond.” 
167 Stritzel; Bourbeau, The Securitization of Migration. 
168 Bourbeau, The Securitization of Migration; Bubandt, “Vernacular Security.” 
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contexts are actualised in audiences who hold certain orientations which are partly developed 
through their environment. Balancing Côté,169 these audiences are seen as having conditional 
agency to actively deliberate on arguments, and even without this deliberation the character of 
the audience maintains a powerful constraining influence on securitizations by bringing about 
the rejection of securitizing rhetoric. Through this hypothesis, the role of public audiences and 
their relationship with the securitizing actor (through which they intersubjectively negotiate 
security meanings) is emphasised, and the factors influencing this relationship are identified 
and presented for investigation in different cases. In doing so, we enhance our ability to 
understand how this public audience guides the far-reaching effects and consequences of 
securitizations.  
 
Tracking Identification Strength 
Incorporating varying identification strength into my work requires that I do not assume 
identification strength or weakness, but instead conduct an empirical study into identification 
changes over time in order to ascertain identification strength/weakness in specific contexts. 
Aside from being necessary for my research, this empirical study has produced data on the 
tendency of identifications to strengthen or weaken. This is a valuable dataset. Currently, 
different research shows identifications as being both persistent and changeable in short time 
frames170, and the existing literature on this subject is contradictory. Some schools of thought 
argue that once identifications become strong they are practically immovable in the short term 
– only changing slowly over time – and that security rhetoric does not just arise because it fits 
within these identifications but rather it perpetuates for these identifications’ very 
maintenance.171 Meanwhile, others have argued that at specific moments even previously 
strong identifications can undergo rapid shifts, particularly at times of heightened security 
anxiety.172 The empirical study into identifications which I have conducted goes some way 
towards contributing hard empirical data that can inform this debate. 
                                                          
169 Côté, “Agents without Agency: Assessing the Role of the Audience in Securitization Theory.” 
170 It should be kept in mind that the securitization attempts under study in this thesis (my case selection 
criteria are outlined in the upcoming Methodology Chapter) took place over the course of several 
weeks/months, rather than years/decades. This time frame is important, as over larger time frames macro-
historical developments can see identifications shift more extensively, whereas I am more concerned with how 
persistent identifications are across shorter time frames. 
171 Snow, “Habitual Virtuous Actions and Automaticity”; Lieberman and I. Eisenberger, Conflict and Habit: A 
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I will now unpack some of these contrasting arguments in order to outline that 
identifications are, theoretically, affected in the short term both by forces that make them 
persistent and forces that make them changeable. This outlining will be by no means 
comprehensive. It serves merely to highlight that there is currently differing information 
regarding whether identifications are generally strong or weak and regarding whether or not 
securitizations affect identifications. This debate has two consequences. Firstly, I cannot use 
theory to assume identification strength or weakness in my cases; instead I must incorporate 
the possibility of both. Secondly, the data regarding identification strength outside of and 
during securitizations which my empirical identification tracking study has unearthed can 
contribute to scholarship surrounding this debate regarding identification strength. On this 
point, I must emphasise that my study has only unearthed data from one highly modern context. 
I do not claim to have definitively shown whether or not identifications are generally strong or 
weak, or whether or not securitizations do affect their strength. Nonetheless, the data I have 
unearthed is noteworthy and can be taken up, built on, or challenged by scholars elsewhere 
engaged in the debate regarding identification strength in the face of larger forces such as 
securitizations. 
 
Forces Strengthening Identifications 
Physiological studies have provided considerable evidence supporting the idea that 
humans perceive and categorise themselves in a way that is much more habitual than 
conscious.173 These unreflective thoughts form neural pathways in the brain which enable 
categorisation of events as event-types and of new situations as the latest version of old ones.174 
This gives our identifications a cognitive stickiness that makes it very difficult for us to re-
evaluate them in the light of new evidence or even to recognise new situations as truly new.175 
This habitual thinking is not only how we go through our day-to-day lives, but also (and even 
more so) how we deal with stressful decisions, as habituation is in fact a form of cognitive 
simplification for coping with mental overloads.176 Habits can therefore deeply hardwire the 
visions that come with our identifications into our cognitive conceptual landscape. This would 
seem to make identifications more persistent and difficult to ignore than changeable. 
 Psychological studies have further shown that rethinking, ignoring or changing our 
identifications can come at a significant cost to mental well-being (although this rethinking can 
also enhance mental well-being in certain situations which will be outlined below). Stable 
identifications enable group membership,177 through which one receives self-esteem, a relative 
sense of security, as well as material benefits emerging from stable modes of interaction.178 
Changing one’s identifications in such a way that might result in ejection from the group 
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consequently engenders psychological resistance, although one could change identifications in 
order to ensure group membership is maintained or solidified.179 Some studies have even 
shown that humans have evolved in such a way that we process sudden breaks in sensations of 
group belonging with the same part of the brain that processes actual physical pain.180 We 
therefore tend to resist this change, initially at least. The psychological cost of breaking with 
our pre-existing group identifications would therefore also seem to contribute to national 
identifications being persistent and difficult to ignore.  
Indeed, both theoretical and empirical work has asserted and evidenced that 
psychological motivations can bring identity groups to often forego material benefits or more 
traditional notions of security (defined in terms of physical safety and quality of life) in order 
to maintain or even manufacture conflicts geared primarily towards identity maintenance. 
Ontological security theorists in particular181 argue that group members can become so 
psychologically dependent on their conceptions of their group’s character and of their place 
within the group that giving up these conceptions becomes all but impossible. Such group 
members can actually generate and uphold conflicts with other groups as a means of 
maintaining their group identity, even if these conflicts cause their own group significant 
material harm, a primary example being the Troubles in Northern Ireland182. This would mean 
that identification strength can be so high that identifications do not simply modulate 
securitizations but can actually generate and maintain them. 
  Political practices provide similar barriers to identification change. Practices, like 
discourses, often act as information points for the “negotiation of meaning” in a community. 
As a result of communal repeating of acts, the meanings of these acts appear to be natural by 
virtue of their common adherence and persistence. Practices therefore exemplify much of what 
the group sees itself as being and how it derives meaning in itself.183 As such, although slow 
and gradual change is always going on, a sudden large change to the established practices can 
be seen as a threat to the group’s existence. Practices are therefore limited out of loyalty to the 
group, fear of the breaking of solidarity, and hope of gaining benefits from acting as group 
champion. All of these forces can combine to create dynamics of groupthink, whereby practices 
are rarely deviated from or questioned. This leads to sensations of invulnerability, moral high-
grounds, and ultimately a persistence of positive self-image.184 As practices, like discourses, 
“educate” the group members as to what is possible and what is legitimate, this limitation on 
practice significantly reduces the potential for identifications to change, as it reduces the 
group’s information about viable alternatives or about the unviability of their current beliefs. 
                                                          
179 Eidelman and Crandall, “Bias in Favor of the Status Quo”; Moshinsky and Bar-Hillel, “Loss Aversion and 
Status Quo Label Bias”; Samuelson and Zeckhauser, “Status Quo Bias in Decision Making.” 
180 Eisenberger, “Does Rejection Hurt?” 
181 Mitzen, “Ontological Security in World Politics”; Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity; Kinnvall, 
“Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity, and the Search for Ontological Security”; Kay, 
“Ontological Security and Peace-Building in Northern Ireland”; Steele, “Ontological Security and the Power of 
Self-Identity: British Neutrality and the American Civil War”. For a summary and critique of the ontological 
security field see Lebow, National Identities and International Relations. 
182 Kay, “Ontological Security and Peace-Building in Northern Ireland”. 
183 Wenger, Communities of Practice. 
184 Janis, “Groupthink: The Desperate Drive for Consensus at Any Cost.” 
56 
 
The key ingredient to this mix is repetition over time. With repetition, identity practices 
and discourses become more engrained into the habitual systems of the brain and the individual 
becomes more psychologically and materially dependent on them.185 This in turn leads them 
to externalise these practices and discourses again and again in a reinforcing circle of sorts 
which leads to increasing strength of identifications over time. Overall, this engenders a deeply 
hardwired tendency in individuals to maintain preconceived ideas about identity. This acts to 
suppress the ability of interruptive securitizing rhetoric to generate newly perceived and acted-
upon realities that are incongruous with previous identifications. 
 
Forces Weakening Identifications 
On the other hand, much research has been done into identification shifts. Socialisation 
is an ongoing process which, when viewed over macro-historical periods, produces substantial 
changes in identifications.186 However, this thesis, which is looking at securitization attempts 
that took place over several weeks and months, is more concerned with short time frames in 
which conditions or events allow for a manifestation of latent change potential. 
One such condition/event is when the multiplicity of identifications present in a nation 
becomes too apparent and conflictual to sustain itself. Within a single nation there will be very 
different conceptualisations of what the nation is. These multiple identifications may rarely 
come in contact with each other, instead being shielded from mutual criticism by virtue of the 
self-segregation of different groups. However, in times of national debate about extreme issues 
such as security (including the question of war) previously self-segregated groups come into 
frequent discursive contact as a result of the search for national consensus. This contact can 
allow for the multiplicity of identifications to become highlighted, and consequently 
individuals can be explicitly asked to think about what the nation is and stands for (whereas 
usually one’s ideas of the nation will not be directly challenged or will simply be considered 
to be self-evident)187.  
Additionally, the dynamics of such inter-group debate can force different groups to hear 
each other, which can lead to a highlighting of the incoherence of identifications held by either 
side.188 This undermines the stability of pre-existing discourses, a destabilisation which makes 
each identification easier to change and creates an environment conducive to identification 
manipulation by elites.189 This manipulation becomes possible because in times when schemata 
– which allow us to operate habitually in order to consume little cognitive energy – are 
destabilised, cognitive simplicity is also under threat.190 Consequently, cognitive simplification 
is sought for. One way this simplification can be rebuilt is via adherence to a new direction 
given by the environment, possibly an authority figure. People consequently open up to new 
possibilities without overly reflecting on them or their implications. This is a common coping 
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strategy of decision-makers in times of significant stress accompanied by (and possibly 
resulting from) important beliefs being challenged.191 
A further, and linked, condition/event leading to identifications being changed or 
ignored is when widespread loyalty to a leader results in that leader being seen to embody, 
represent, or be prototypical of the group itself. In this case, the very forces that usually work 
to deter deviation from the group – loyalty to the group, fear of group disintegration, 
opportunities presented by supporting the group, etc. – can actually work to promote even 
further loyalty to a leader. This affords the leader leeway to deviate from standard norms 
without being labelled as a deviant, and subsequently for the group’s norms to change to 
accommodate the leader.192 The issue of securitization is particularly pertinent here, as in times 
of perceived national threat the “rally around the flag” effect can, for a limited time,193 bolster 
the amount of authority given to a leader and consequently their scope to deviate in this manner. 
Group members may defer to leaders out of fear of being labelled as traitorous if they do not, 
out of unwillingness to abandon their side and give power to their traditional opponents, and 
also as a coping mechanism for the unsettling time that is insecurity. Either way, what is highly 
important here is that after individuals defer superficially for long enough, new identity 
practices and discourses may be allowed to develop, gain frequency, and take on a life of their 
own. This is particularly so if the course of action deviant leaders take proves to be successful, 
which can engender an “in hindsight this was right” manner of thinking and an adherence to 
the new mode of operation. 
 Not just well-established leaders, but also popular new leaders can gain substantial 
leeway to deviate (and with it the ability to shift identifications), as their deviances tend to be 
treated as more situational rather than attributional given their lack of history.194 In times when 
the policies initiated by old leaders – who the people handed agency and responsibility to – 
fail, new and emerging leaders can gain significant authority (and old leaders lose it). Repeated 
failures of policies force the nation to experience losses of some kind. This can be particularly 
painful and emotionally stressful if the failure was a failure of security policy, or one that 
seemingly led to a new security threat developing. Realising that the losses are too painful to 
sustain, the individual will seek ways out of the interaction that is causing the pain. In this case, 
the individual may change their world view if they are informed that this world view is the root 
of their pain.195 Such instances of identification reworking can be led by new authorities who 
seek to take advantage of prolonged failures, but can also happen organically.196  
  
A Framework For Strength and Its Use 
Overall, heightened loyalty to new or established leaders and periods of significant 
stress, including perceived incoming threats, failed security policies, and a highlighted 
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multiplicity of identifications, all have the potential to weaken identifications, which 
physiological and psychological research would suggest have otherwise ever-growing strength. 
What is important to note is that these weakening conditions are those that are very likely to 
accompany a securitization attempt, although sometimes they are precisely what a 
securitization attempt is trying to (possibly unsuccessfully) generate. A theoretical framework 
for incorporating identification strength into my research should therefore allow for the 
possibility of securitizations to weaken identifications while not guaranteeing this outcome. 
As such, synthesising and building on the research outlined in these sections, I adopt 
and forward a theoretical framework that conceptualises identifications as existing along a 
continuum of strength. Their place on this continuum is not set in stone, but with time 
uninterrupted by destabilizing forces they gravitate to the strong (or self-schemata) end of the 
continuum. It is also possible that they could be destabilized so far to the weak end of the 
continuum that they cease to be schemata-like at all, instead simply being weak identifications. 
These forces include but are not limited to periods of heightened stress that may accompany 
certain securitization attempts, but that are not necessarily encapsulated or triggered by the act 
of saying “security.” This framework therefore facilitates and encourages an empirical tracking 
study of identification strength in different periods by allowing me to incorporate varying 
identification strength into my research. 
As such, I do not seek to provide a “universal” answer to the questions of how often 
identifications are strong/weak or whether or not securitizations affect identification strength. 
As I lay out in more detail in my Methodology Chapter, trends of identifications’ strength will 
be different in different contexts. Rather, my empirical tracking study – which is necessary for 
answering my research question – simply provides data that is noteworthy for and contributes 
to the above outlined research concerning identifications’ changeability and manageability in 
two meaningful ways. The first is by providing empirical data regarding identifications’ 
strength (and how this strength is affected by securitizations) in a specific and important 
context. The second is by providing a continuum perspective on identification strength which 
can be used to track identification strength in other contexts as well and consequently bolster 
this dataset.  
Additionally, my empirical study has traced both the detail and the prevalence of the 
national identifications of the modern British public during recent securitizations. In and of 
itself, this research has provided a vast swathe of data regarding the content and trajectory of 
modern British national identifications, data which is highly informative for scholars of 
identity and international relations who are concerned with Britain’s current direction. If 
similar identification tracking studies utilising my framework were to be conducted in other 
contexts then multiple context-specific trends and tendencies concerning identification strength 
during securitizations could be established. As such, my work provides specific empirical data 
contributing to our understanding of identification strength, while also providing a continuum 
framework for identity and social psychology scholars to further contribute to this research. 
 
Research Aims, Implications, and Hypothesis Summarised 
Overall then, the direct aim of this thesis is to illuminate how public audiences’ 
identifications affect securitization processes, and consequently to illuminate how these 
identifications bring different securitizations to different outcomes and consequences. This aim 
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is embodied in the research question “How do the public audience’s identifications influence 
the success and failure of securitizations?” Additionally, although not a core aim, the empirical 
research I have done has produced a dataset which contributes to the debate on identification 
changeability and manageability.  
By combining the theoretical and empirical research that this work requires, I have 
produced evidence for a hypothesis on how public audience identifications affect 
securitizations. This can provide information of use to both modern theorists and policymakers 
concerned with (the deterrence of) securitizations – which are of ever-increasing significance 
for broader societies – not least by providing a clearer and more holistic picture of why different 
securitizations play out in different ways. My hypothesis holds that the receptivity of the public 
audience to securitizing arguments will be strongly influenced by the character of that 
audience’s identifications. These identifications can be strong or weak, thick or (usually) thin, 
and aligned or non-aligned to the securitizing argument. Depending on the status of these 
identifications, the audience will either be receptive or unreceptive to the securitizing 
argument. Low receptivity prevents the securitization by having the audience reject the 
securitizing argument outright, while high receptivity results in audience deliberation and 
consequently the possibility but not the certainty of a successful securitization. Identifications 
therefore provide permissive/preventive conditions for securitization success.  
By focusing on identifications, and by not assuming the strength or content of 
identifications in any particular context, this hypothesis provides access to and maintains a 
general applicability across disparate and unique case studies. It does so, firstly, because by not 
assuming identification strength or content it guides an examination of specific elements of a 
local situation, rather than imposing predetermined configurations onto particular cases. While 
the specific manifestation of the elements in the framework (identification density, strength, 
normative content, perceptions of estrangement, etc.) will vary from case to case, the relevance 
of these elements to securitization processes is maintained across cases. Secondly, by focusing 
on the components of identifications, which are in the modern era increasingly prolific 
(whereas securitizing rhetoric is temporary, particularly cases of failed securitization), we gain 
access to widely present elements of the psycho-cultural orientations and sociopolitical/ 
sociolinguistic environments that regulate securitization attempts. This produces a more 
broadly applicable theory that takes theoretical understandings of the role of context in 
securitizations and enhances their practical edge.  
Additionally, beyond both the fields of securitization and identification research, my 
work can also have broader implications for the study and practice of the formation and public 
communication of any international policy that seemingly reflects the character of the nation. 
In my proposed hypothesis, national identifications modulate public audiences’ receptivity to 
securitizing arguments because securitizing arguments contain information or assertions that 
directly relate to the character of the nation. Consequently, these assertions are filtered in and 
out by public audiences’ self-schemata or strong identifications, specifically their national 
identifications. This same dynamic would therefore apply to arguments made by elites 
regarding any policy that reflects the character of the nation. This would include commitments 
to international institutions, normative frameworks underpinning international affiliations, and 
varying sides of moral debates such as migration and interventionism. Specifically, this 
dynamic’s direct implications concern the strategic communications of these policies and 
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rationales by elites to public audiences. An enhanced understanding of this dynamic could 
therefore allow for more effective strategic communications of such policies to the public. This 
could in turn make these policies more sustainable in the long term or deter the formation of 
these policies altogether by highlighting the potential for their communication to be quickly 
rejected by the public. As such, these insights into the relationship between public audiences 
and security policies/rationales can enhance the study and practice of strategic communications 
of policies beyond the security realm. This enhancement can directly produce more politically 
feasible, and hence sustainable, policy output. 
In sum, my thesis aims to produce an evidenced hypothesis of how the public 
audience’s identifications affect securitizations. This hypothesis can enhance modern theorists’ 
and policymakers’ understanding of what brings different securitizations to different outcomes, 
address shortcomings in the securitization field, contribute to existing research on 
identifications’ strength, and is applicable in disparate and unique cases. My research builds 
from and contributes to the study of securitization and identifications, has provided extensive 
data on the status and trajectory of modern British national identifications, and holds 
implications for the field of identity studies, the formation of policies that seemingly reflect the 
character of the nation, and the strategic communications of such policies. 
 
Next Steps  
Overall then, in this chapter I have attempted to outline my hypothesis and to show how 
my work builds from existing research in the fields of identity, cognitive studies, and social 
psychology, how it accounts for tensions in these fields, and how it aims to contribute to both 
these and wider areas of study. In the next chapter I will outline the methodology that guided 






























In this chapter I lay out my methodology and provide examples of how my research 
exercises have worked. I begin this chapter by outlining my case study method and its 
underpinnings. I then go through my case selection criteria and subsequently outline my 
research activities, which were divided into two phases. The first phase involved tracking 
identifications across my two cases via an interpretive analysis of discourse. In the second 
phase I ascertained the alignment of identifications to securitization rhetoric, which then 
enabled me to evaluate my hypothesis regarding how identifications affect securitizations. My 
primary aim in this chapter is to show how these methodological choices are both 




To begin, I will outline which cases I have examined and why. I take the identifications 
of the British public as units of analysis. As this public is not unitary but rather internally 
divided, my units of analysis are more properly described as the multiple identifications of the 
citizens of Britain. I have examined these units in two separate and vertically (temporally) 
comparative cases, which are the British securitization phases during and preceding the Syrian 
Crisis in the summer of 2013 and the Syrian Crisis in autumn/winter 2015 (precise dates and 
the reasons for my case limits are outlined later in this chapter). For reasons outlined below, I 
consider the two cases to form a series, with the first having had direct consequences for the 
second. As such, what we essentially have is a series concerning a single set of units, as is 
represented in the following table. 
 
Table 3.1 
Units of Analysis Cases in Which These Units Were Studied 
Identifications Widespread 
among British Citizens 
2013 Securitization Phase 
Proposing Airstrikes in Syria 
2015 Securitization Phase 
Proposing Airstrikes in Syria 
 
 I now address the logic behind this choice of method, which stems from a specific set 
of case selection criteria.  
 
Individual Understanding, Context, and Causation 
I aimed to ensure that these criteria emerged from an explicit, coherent, and developed 
perspective on how individuals understand their environment, and what implications this has 
for context and causation. This perspective is, in brief, that individuals interpret environments 
in an infinitude of shifting ways, which means events are caused by interacting causal chains 
consisting of a wide-range of contextual factors.  
To elaborate, I take individuals as generators and interpreters of meaning. People can 
ascribe meaning in an infinite variety of ways through varying modes of interpretation and 
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conceptual boundary drawing. The modes they use are both agency-based and culturally-
dependant/learned. Consequently, agents are sitting within, interpreting and simultaneously 
creating environments and communal norms. These environments are subsequently affecting 
the development of these agents’ modes of interpreting these environments.197 As a result of 
this two-way dynamic, modes of interpretation can fluctuate in response to changes in 
communal norms, which are non-linear and lacking in stable development,198 but agents may 
or may not change with these developments.199 Overall, this means that neither environments 
nor individuals’ modes of interpreting these environments are fixed or universal. Individuals 
are essentially developing or adopting an existing but shifting set of lenses, which rise and fall 
in relevance as a function of context and priming.200 What they are going to see in the world 
(and how they are going to react) is, therefore, dependent on a very large number of contextual 
factors, which include not only their present environments but also those they have historically 
passed through and developed within (hence engendering a degree of path-dependency).   
Consider what this means for the importance of context in all its forms. As “events” in 
the social sciences are dependent on a very large number of contextual factors, and all aspects 
of all social contexts are unfixed, this makes it likely that events are not the result of single 
efficient causes, but rather events are the result of the convergence of several lines of 
causation.201 Additionally, once an event comes about via the convergence of several lines of 
causation, it then results in the divergence of several more lines of causation which we call 
consequences. The overall dynamic of causation is therefore of interacting causal chains which 
are non-linear, unstable, and diverse, yet which holds a flow and trajectory that moves 
“forward” in time202 through which each event has a consequence for another event. Having 
said this, I accept that causation itself is an artificially constructed concept that may not mirror 
anything “real” in nature. Nonetheless, causation is a useful tool with which to analyse certain 
events and extract from them observations that may assist us in understanding our 
contemporary world. This is so long as we do not seek to create any law-like or general 
statements but instead limit social “rules” as applying only to specific developments in specific 
contexts.  
As I will now detail, this view of causation, context, and individual understanding 
produces two significant criteria for my case selection: a low-N case study with cases from a 
similar setting, and a temporally comparative case study of stretched cases in a series.  
 
Low-N Case Study with Cases from a Similar Setting 
First, as events are the result of the convergence of several lines of causation (as I 
outlined in the last section) I am highly sensitive to the problem of case comparability. The 
more cases we have, the more context variables are likely to be different between the cases. 
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Additionally, the more different the cases in terms of general context, the more our ability to 
highlight the impact of any one change within the cases becomes impeded. As such, due to the 
heavily context-dependent nature of social processes, I have not aimed to examine several 
fundamentally different and hence less comparable settings, instead choosing to use a low-N 
case study method focusing on cases from a highly similar setting.  
The cases I have examined therefore needed to be aligned in terms of culture, political 
system and other important contextual aspects outlined below. Aside from aiding 
comparability, minimising broader contextual differences was necessary for a further very 
important reason. As I outlined in Chapter One, existing research on the causes of securitization 
success have focused heavily on the influence of the securitizing move and the securitizing 
actor. While I accept that these factors no doubt influence the success of securitizations, my 
aim is to highlight the influence of the audience and their characteristics, specifically their 
identifications. In order to focus on the impact of audience identifications, I needed to reduce 
as many variations in the securitizing move and the securitizing actors between my cases as 
possible. Doing so left me with cases in which the securitizing actors and the securitizing 
moves (along with the broader contexts of culture, political system, and media landscapes) 
were broadly the same, and what was fundamentally different between the cases was the 
audience’s identifications. This much better highlighted the impact of audience identifications 
on securitization success.203  
 
Stretched Cases In A Series 
Second, as the interacting causal chains described above have trajectory, attempting to 
isolate and examine a “freeze-frame” of a certain time period would inevitably lead to 
something being missed (for instance, there is a significant difference between a politician 
whose approval rating is at 60% and falling rapidly and another whose rating is at 60% and 
rising rapidly). Admittedly, it is almost methodologically impossible, particularly in a case 
study methodology, not to place chronological and conceptual boundaries around a situation in 
order to call it an “event” and hence freeze-frame things to an extent.204 However, ideas of 
trajectory can still be developed somewhat if one studies a unit of analysis as it evolved over a 
period of time. To do this, I engaged in a temporally (vertically) comparative case study 
involving cases that are stretched so as to encapsulate a time period broader than just the core 
securitization moment in question. Aiming to capture an idea of trajectory through this method 
aided my study in two important ways. 
Firstly, engaging in a temporally comparative case study meant that I studied connected 
cases, without significant time gaps between them, which occurred in a series. Doing so 
allowed the identification tracking I conducted for my cases (described below) to produce an 
idea of longer-term identification trajectories between cases. By “in a series” I am referring to 
events that were not only chronologically subsequent to each other but that also can be said to 
have had direct consequences for each other. By comparing the differences between the events 
in the series we can get an idea of where things were going and indeed where they might go 
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after the last case. This can aid our understanding of certain events’ development and can be 
informative for short-term forecasting. Essentially, my findings will serve as a starting point 
for telling narratives of how things played out and where they may be headed within a certain 
context. Seeing as my specific series ends right at the present day (or what was the present day 
when I began this thesis) understanding where this series may be headed will be directly 
relevant to modern theorists and policymakers (more on this below).  
Secondly, stretching my cases meant that I set the limits of my cases beyond what 
would be the beginning and end of the period in which the securitization in question occurred 
“in earnest”. By the “securitization taking place in earnest” I refer to the period in which a 
“full” securitizing argument was deployed almost on a daily basis. Before and after this period, 
preliminary and partial securitizing arguments may still have been made irregularly, as I will 
detail later in the Research Data Chapter. Doing so allowed my identification tracking to 
monitor the direction of identifications over broader periods and consequently provide an idea 
of identification trajectory within cases. Very importantly, this allowed me to compare the 
trajectories of identifications both during and outside of core securitization periods. This 
provided “control” data on identification weakness outside of securitizations, which 
significantly aided my investigation of whether or not securitization processes can be seen to 
weaken identifications. 
 
Cases of Securitization Success and Failure 
A further criterion for my case selection is to examine both cases of securitization 
success and failure. This criterion emerges from two separate concerns. The first is the need to 
illustrate how a change in the relationship between identifications and securitization rhetoric 
can actually contribute to the difference between a successful and a failed securitization. 
Comparing two cases of securitization which occurred in very similar settings yet which 
produced both success and failure is clearly more favourable in this regard than only studying 
either securitization success or failure. The second is to contribute to broader securitization 
scholarship. Studying failed securitization can address this concern because, as is outlined in 
detail by Jan Ruzicka205, an empirical bias towards cases of successful securitization has for 
some time impacted not only the field’s empirical findings but also its theoretical 
frameworks.206  
This bias is not simply accidental; it emerges from an explicit focus on cases of 
successful securitization set out in the theory’s original formulation by Buzan, Waever, and de 
Wilde. These scholars stated that “security analysis is interested mainly in successful instances 
of securitization…[because such cases] constitute the currently valid specific meaning of 
security”. They emphasised that studying what “security” does requires looking at instances in 
which it is doing something.207 Consequently, studies of failed securitizations have been few 
and far between. Notable exceptions to this, such as Salter’s look at the attempted securitization 
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of counter-terrorism and McDonald’s examination of an attempted climate change 
securitization, have made their outlier status explicit.208  
However, if we look at securitizations as processes we can see the problem with 
ignoring instances in which these processes stop short. Ruzicka209 outlines that investigating 
when and how certain securitizations fail allows us to understand not only why others succeed 
but also of how often they actually do so. Furthermore, the performative power of securitizing 
rhetoric cannot be understood – and indeed is likely to be exaggerated – until we correct the 
current empirical bias towards securitization success. A range of complicating factors 
(including and beyond the social capital of securitizing actors) which render securitizing actors 
rather impotent could be uncovered via investigations of failed securitizations. The 
examination of these factors could be utilised not only to fundamentally challenge 
securitization theory, but also to speak broader studies of international relations concerning the 
(low) ability of high-level “elites” to control and direct events of major concern. By 
concentrating on failed securitization, my research contributes to this examination. 
 
Further Criteria 
Four further criteria for case selection emerge upon inspection. First, as I will outline 
in more detail below, my research has involved directly engaging with securitizing arguments 
in order to examine the potentially interpretable meaning within these speeches. Essentially, 
this involved conducting an interpretive analysis of discourse, and as such it meant that I 
required cases that are conducive to an interpretive discourse analysis. Second, as noted in 
previous chapters, among the intended contributions of my thesis is the provision of findings 
that will be directly relevant to modern theorists and policymakers, and consequently I required 
cases that could provide such findings. Third, for reasons of feasibility I required cases in which 
the relevant data was readily accessible. Finally, as this thesis focuses on the role of public 
identifications in securitizations, I required cases in which the public was a relevant audience 
for the securitization. 
 
My seven criteria for case selection are therefore (i) cases that are conducive to an 
interpretive discourse analysis, (ii) cases in a similar setting, and (iii) a temporally comparative 
study of stretched cases in a series, (iv) cases directly relevant to modern theorists and 
policymakers, (v) cases in which the public was a relevant audience for the securitization, (vi) 
cases that can provide me with instances of both securitization success and failure, and finally 
(vii) cases in which the relevant data is readily accessible. How did these seven criteria lead 
me to select the above-mentioned cases? 
 
Criterion I: Cases Conducive to Interpretive Discourse Analysis 
As my research entailed in-depth analysis of discourse, which will be more fully 
outlined below, the subtle and precise use of language in the texts I examined was exceedingly 
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important. This meant that I needed the documents I analysed to have been written in a 
language in which I am fluent. I accordingly chose to focus on English-speaking countries.  
 
Criterion II: A Comparative Study Across Cases in a Similar Setting 
The first part of this criterion – the “comparative” component – meant that I required 
multiple cases, but in an effort to prevent the data under study from becoming unmanageably 
large I restricted the study to two cases. Next there is the “in a similar setting” component. As 
I outlined above, the key condition under study here is audience identifications. One of my 
aims in using a most similar setting design is to allow variation in this condition while reducing 
the variation in other conditions I am not studying, particularly securitizing move and 
securitizing actor conditions. This better highlighted the effect differing identifications had on 
securitization processes. 
Opting to study two British cases without large time gaps between them significantly 
reduces variation in several contextual conditions, given the cultural, economic and political 
continuity that these two cases offer. Additionally, both of my cases involve the same political 
regime and broadly the same securitizing actors (in both cases Prime Minister David Cameron 
and the Conservative party were the main securitizing actors). Furthermore, as outlined in 
Chapter One a major factor affecting securitization processes that other securitization scholars 
have studied is the social authority or favourability of the securitizing actor.210 As the same 
securitizing actor may have different levels of approval or authority at different times, 
maximising the most similar setting element of my study required two cases in which we had 
not only the same securitizing actors but also in which these actors’ had similar approval 
ratings. My two cases satisfy this criterion, as Cameron held a 39% approval rating during the 
first case and a 43% approval rating during the second, while the Conservative Party held an 
approval rating of 29% during the first case and a 35% rating during the second211. Finally, the 
securitizations I studied not only took place in highly similar environments with the same 
securitizing actors, but also consisted of highly similar securitizing moves. In both cases, the 
securitizing move portrayed Syria in the midst of a civil war as the location of the purported 
threat being securitized and proposed to solve the purported threat in Syria via targeted 
airstrikes without the commitment of ground troops.  
While there are of course key differences in the conditions in Syria between 2013 and 
2015, pairing two cases in which the same government with the same approval ratings in the 
same country is proposing the same mission type to solve a securitized issue in the same 
country in a state of crisis leaves us with a very similar setting for both cases. This greatly 
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reduces variation in securitizing actors and securitizing moves, and thus much better highlights 
the impact of varying audience identifications. Indeed, it is difficult to think of two 
international securitizations conducted by an English-speaking country in the 21st century that 
are as similar to each other as these two cases are. This allowed my work to more closely 
examine the effect that audience identifications may have had on these securitization processes. 
 
Criterion III: A Comparative Study Across Stretched Cases in a Series 
“Cases in a series” refers to events that were not only chronologically subsequent to 
each other but that can also be said, to a reasonable degree of certainty, to have had direct 
consequences for each other, or to have been stages in the development of a single unit. The 
unit is, in this instance, the identifications of certain groups of people. This criterion is satisfied 
by the fact that the events I have chosen can be seen to have fed into each other, with the first 
case and its outcome being highly influential for the development of the second. In the 
aftermath of the failure of the first securitization, which resulted in Britain declining 
participation in a seemingly imminent airstrike on Syria, a heightened national discussion 
evolved in the British media regarding Britain’s role in the world. While contributions to this 
discussion ranged from lamenting Britain’s retreat from world affairs, to celebrating Britain’s 
new found international caution, to reflections on what the legacy of the Iraq War had done to 
Britain’s place in the world,212 the debate regularly concerned and indeed affected imagery of 
Britain’s international character. In other words, the first case was a stage in the development 
of British identifications, identifications which went on to influence the second case.  
Moreover, when the second securitization took place in 2015 both securitizing and anti-
securitizing actors extensively referenced the first case in order to support their own arguments. 
Securitizing actors repeatedly argued that Britain’s refusal to get involved in the Syrian crisis 
in 2013 had directly contributed to the subsequent deterioration of the Syrian crisis and the rise 
of ISIS, as summarised in the following quote from MP McCreagh213: 
 
“We voted against action in 2013, after the sarin gas attacks—a vote I regret and now 
believe to be wrong. We now have the largest refugee crisis since World War Two. The 
war in Syria has no end and no laws, and ISIL is expanding its caliphate there. We have 
had no strategy for Syria, and now we have no easy choices.” 
 
Meanwhile anti-securitizing actors regularly appealed to the idea that the securitizing 
actors were simply embarrassed by the outcome of the 2013 securitization and were seeking to 
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get back to the “big boys table” by getting involved in a major international military operation, 
a view summed up by MP O’Hara214: 
 
“Let us be honest, Mr. Speaker. The UK Government’s desire to take part in the 
bombing of Syria is less a military contribution than a political statement. Since 2013, 
the Government have felt that they have been left on the sidelines, and have been itching 
for a piece of the action. As with so much of the UK’s thinking, this has more to do with 
how the UK will look to others than with our asking what good we can do.” 
 
Additionally, in the aftermath of the second case (which resulted in Britain joining an 
international airstrike campaign in Syria) a further discussion of Britain’s international role 
developed. This can be seen as another stage in the development of these identifications, with 
the series therefore stretching into the present day. As the first case had clear effects and 
influence on the second, and as these events taken together can be seen as stages in the 
development of these publics’ identifications, these cases satisfy the criterion of being “cases 
in a series.”  
I then stretched these cases’ limits so as to capture the trajectory of identifications both 
before, during, and after the securitizations occurred in earnest, and to allow me to compare 
how weak identifications were both during and outside of these securitizations. While the 
securitization in the 2015 case can be said to have happened in earnest between the 14th of 
November and the 2nd of December, I have tracked the surrounding identifications and 
securitizing rhetoric from the 1st of October to the 18th of December. This makes the case 78 
days long in total, and captures six weeks of identifications developing (and 
strengthening/weakening) without the influence of concerted securitizations. To keep my two 
cases comparable, the 2013 case is also 78 days in length. The 2013 securitization took place 
in earnest between the 21st and 29th of August, and I have tracked both the identifications and 
securitizing rhetoric surrounding this case from the 27th of June to the 13th of September. This 
provides sufficient “control” data on identification weakness outside of securitizations to then 
gauge whether or not short securitizations (lasting roughly two weeks in each case) can be seen 
to shift identifications more than these identifications normally fluctuate outside of 
securitizations. 
 
Criterion IV: Cases Relevant to Modern Theorists and Policymakers 
While several reasons for why my overall work is relevant to modern theorists and 
policymakers are outlined in previous chapters (and will be discussed further in the 
Conclusions Chapter), my case selection can also assist my thesis in this regard. This criterion 
is satisfied by my case selection because the highly recent and indeed ongoing nature of my 
cases means that my identification tracking study over these periods (described below) can 
have implications for our contemporary era. As stated above, examining cases that occurred in 
a series can provide an idea of where things were going after the last case. This allows us to 
develop short term forecasting, or at least provide theorists and policymakers in the near future 
with a reference point for the recent status and trajectory of public British identifications. By 
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taking cases that are this recent and indeed ongoing (with the question of British military 
involvement in the Middle East unlikely to be over), the resultant short-term forecasting and 
reference points pertain to our contemporary concerns and are directly relevant for modern 
theorists and policymakers. As such, by studying this series of events which encapsulate the 
development of British identifications (and the relationship of these identifications to the 
securitization of Syrian developments) up to the modern day, I am able to provide modern 
theorists and policymakers with information directly relevant to their ongoing efforts to 
study/produce the highly consequential policies in this arena. 
 
Criterion V: Cases Where the Public Was A Relevant Audience 
Recall that in Chapter One I laid out that I am following Côté’s definition of the 
audience (“those with the capability to authorize the view of the issue presented by the 
securitizing actor and legitimize the treatment of the issue through security practice”), and I 
outlined my criteria for when the public meet this condition. These criteria are (i) 
securitizations which are publicly visible and provocative, and (ii) securitizations that require 
the approval of elected officials before security practices or laws can come into effect. These 
criteria are satisfied in both of my cases, as in both cases securitizing actors were appealing for 
parliamentary permission to authorise high profile military activities, an appeal which 
dominated the news cycle for prolonged periods and generated widespread and impassioned 
societal debate (as is outlined in depth in Chapter Four).  
As I outlined in Chapter One, in such a scenario where the securitization is publicly 
visible the public can play a direct role in influencing parliamentarians to vote one way or 
another. This is because the public’s perception of the justifiability of a politicians’ pro/anti-
securitization stance (particularly post-Iraq) can come with an emotional charge and a 
prolonged news coverage that can significantly affect a parliamentarian’s popularity. 
Parliamentarians who have to decide to authorise security policies are aware that authorising 
them against their constituents’ will can make their future positions less tenable, which assigns 
the capability to authorise the action partly with the public. They furthermore understand that 
the action will not be seen as legitimate if it goes against the public will. Consequently, in both 
2013 and 2015 we see securitizing actors making numerous public securitizing arguments, 
parliamentarians extensively referencing the opinions of the public when justifying their stance 
on the issue, and in 2013 a significant portion of the overall anti-securitizing argument was that 
the British people were against the action (as is detailed in the Research Data Chapter). While 
the public was certainly not the only relevant audience of these securitizations, to say that they 
were not a relevant audience would be to ignore specific and significant concerns of both the 
British government and parliamentarians. 
 
Criteria VI and VII: Cases of Securitization Success and Failure with Available Data  
My cases satisfy criterion (vi), cases that provide instances of both securitization 
success and failure, as in 2013 the securitization failed with only 22% of the public accepting 
the securitization proposition and 61% believing that if the proposition was authorised and 
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acted upon the situation would actually worsen.215 Meanwhile, in 2015 the securitization 
succeeded with 59%216 of the British public endorsing the securitization proposition. Finally, 
criterion (vii), cases in which the relevant data is readily accessible, was satisfied by the fact 
that these are cases that concern public speech acts and public responses to these acts in 
English-speaking countries during the internet age. Consequently, the relevant documents 
(which I detail below) were not only in the public domain but were also accessible online.  
 
To summarise, by studying these cases from a highly similar setting I have highlighted 
the relationship between identifications and securitization processes by reducing variation in 
other conditions such as cultural context and securitizing actors. Additionally, by studying a 
highly modern series of events I have produced findings that modern theorists and 
policymakers could utilise in the study of modern identifications and their implications for 
policies. The cases under study also provided instances where the public was a relevant 
audience, instances of both securitization success and failure, and data that was readily 
accessible and conducive to interpretive study. 
 
Research Phases 
Having selected cases for study, I then extracted and analysed specific data within each 
case. This research was divided into two phases.  
In the first phase the aim was to track identifications across each case. As outlined in 
Chapter Two, tracking identifications over time was necessary for me to gather the data I 
required to test my hypothesis. This hypothesis posits that the strength, density, and 
(mis)alignment of identifications’ content to securitizing rhetoric determines what kind of 
securitizing rhetoric is filtered in or automatically rejected by the audience. As such, I needed 
to track identifications over time in order to ascertain their strength, density, and content. This 
research phase also provided data on identification strength (particularly during securitizations) 
that is noteworthy for broader fields, as outlined in Chapter Two. In the second research phase 
I began by tracking securitizing rhetoric in both my cases and then combining it with the 
identification data gathered in the first phase. This allowed me to gauge the (mis)alignment 
between securitizing rhetoric and identifications during my cases. At that point I had enough 
data to test my hypothesis. I will now detail these two research phases.  
 
Phase One: Tracking Identifications 
When uncovering and tracking identifications, what exactly was I looking for? As 
outlined in previous chapters, identifications are schemata, specifically self-schemata. They 
have three major characteristics relevant to this study: strength, density, and content217. Thick 
national identifications typically consist of certain content categories/schema types, namely 
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norms, influence, affiliations, and perception in the eyes of others.218 The objective of this 
research phase was, therefore, to ascertain the strength, density, and content of public British 
identifications over time in terms of norms, influence, affiliations, and perception in the eyes 
of others. These were the only pre-conceived content categories/schema types that I 
commenced this identification tracking study with. Beyond these, I used an open coding 
method which allowed data types to emerge from the data I analysed. 
 
Schemata and Articulations 
How can a person’s schemata be ascertained? Recall from previous chapters that 
schemata are an individual’s organised and organising structures of knowledge that take the 
form of laws which relate signifier X to signifier Y via an associative linkage (e.g. “X is Y” 
relations such as “killing is wrong”). These linkages are fundamental and operative – 
fundamental in the sense that they are deeply embedded in the individual and often appear to 
be natural or undeniably true to them, and operative in the sense that they will organise the 
structures of knowledge that the individual develops and holds. I posit that an individual’s 
internally operating schemata can be detected in their discourses, for the following reasons. 
I hold that when authors speak they can only do so via the use of a signifying symbol, 
but signifiers are always imperfect tools for communication. Their imperfection arises because 
signifiers link to other signifiers, which results in a network of extended linkages between 
signifiers. This network is neither natural nor stable, but rather historically constructed through 
discourse, socially contingent, and constantly shifting. It can never serve as a perfect means of 
communicating due to the multiple and shifting possible linkages between different 
signifiers.219 However, by engaging in common discourse, communities develop approximate 
mutual understandings of how this network and its linkages look; indeed, this shared 
understanding is one of the bases of their community status. Despite being merely a perception, 
the arrangement of linkages in this network appears natural and undeniably true to the 
individuals in the community.220 The shared understanding of this network enables 
communication between community members by providing common access to signifiers 
whose linkages to other signifiers are roughly communally agreed upon. These linkages can 
consequently act as pillars, on which ideas of the meaning of words can be developed and 
organised.221  
As such, the communally perceived linkages in this communicative network serve as 
fundamental and operative organisers of what appear to community members to be structures 
of meaning communicators. I call these linkages “articulations,” which I define as fundamental, 
operative, communally shared, explicit or implicit statements of laws in the form of linkages 
relating signifiers to each other. I use the term “articulations” because a major component of 
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the concept of articulation refers to “the practice of creating and temporarily fixing meaning 
through the contingent connection of signifying elements.”222  
To return to schemata, if individuals order their conception of the world in terms of the 
associative linkages between signifiers contained in their internal schemata, then they would 
not subscribe to a communicative network that consists of linkages between signifiers which 
are contrary to the linkages in their schemata. Therefore, the associative linkages in the network 
that individuals in a community communicate through (i.e. an individual’s articulations) must 
mimic or closely approximate the linkages these individuals hold internally (i.e. their 
schemata). They may come to mimic each other as such because the individual consumes and 
internalises the communicative network and consequently builds their schemata around it, or 
because the individuals simply reject networks that do not match their pre-existing schemata, 
or through other mechanisms. Regardless of the mechanisms building this mimicry, the 
individual’s internal schemata should consist of associative linkages between signifiers that 
mimic the linkages in their articulations. As such, ascertaining an individual’s schemata can 
be done via an interpretive analysis of discourse specifically aimed at uncovering articulations.  
 
Keeping in mind that such an approach has inherent trade-offs which I will outline 
below, how would such an analysis of discourse work? Essentially, I identified articulations by 
noting conjoiners which link signifiers to each other, and then checking if these linkages were 
operative and fundamental by seeing if they were frequent, rarely contradicted, generally 
implicit, and passionate when explicit.  
 
Conjoiners 
To elaborate, I examined certain texts (which texts and why will be detailed below) for 
articulations pertaining to the relevant schema types listed above. This was an interpretive 
exercise which did not search for a pre-conceived list of articulations, instead allowing 
articulations to arise from the texts.223 It also did not assume any inherent or natural meaning 
in words, instead seeing the meaning of words as socially and contextually contingent.224 This 
stance made more quantitative approaches such as computer-aided content analysis 
inapplicable to my study.225 
It should be noted that I do not believe I can ever know what the author intended by 
their iterations. The exercise of finding articulations is simply based on the idea that the 
associative linkages between signifiers can be spotted by (firstly) noting conjoining signifiers 
(e.g. “X is Y,” “X produces Y,” “X and Y,” “X does not accompany Y”, etc.).226 Once spotted, 
these linkages can be interpreted/rephrased into simpler forms which still approximate the 
original linkage. However, this interpretation is still an operation in which something will be 
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lost and which requires the interpreter to have a strong understanding of the sociolinguistic 
context in which the articulation was made.227 
How did I identify articulations that were signalling certain schemata? Articulations 
indicative of normative schemata linked a certain national activity type228 or institution to a 
value (for instance, positive, or negative, or conditionally positive). Articulations indicative of 
influence schemata linked a national activity type or institution to a likelihood of its ability to 
affect an entity as it intends (likely, unlikely, or conditionally likely). Articulations indicative 
of affiliation schemata linked the relationship between the nation and another nation to a value. 
Finally, articulations indicative of perception schemata linked the perception of the nation in 
the eyes of others to a value.  
An example of how this worked is in order. A simple example of a sentence that could 
be interrogated for articulation content would be “our country’s military is a force for good,” 
although it should be noted that articulations may not just appear in closed sentences but also 
across paragraphs or whole texts.229 Articulations can link signifiers through simple 
synonymising, but also through the use of analogies, metaphors, or causal inferences. This 
example sentence consists of several relational linkages between concepts, which signal a set 
of schema types and arrangements. Firstly, linking “our” and “country” is a linkage of members 
of a country into a single shared space. This is an explicit statement of a relationship between 
subjects and a nationwide group. It also attaches a positive value to this relationship, detectable 
in the possible (see next paragraph) positive connotations in the use of the word “our” which 
invokes imagery of joint ownership and community. As such, it is a linkage that signals a group 
orientation schema which is national. We can also detect, through the linkage of “good” and 
“military,” a normative schema that attaches positivity to the use of military force. The 
statement also implies a schema pertaining to national influence via a linkage of “is” and 
“force” which reifies and affirms the power of the nation’s military.  
It should be noted that the power I attribute to the imagery in the word “force,” along 
with the positivity I attribute to “our” may well be shown to be inappropriate attributions upon 
reading the rest of the text or further texts. As such, this interpretive exercise involved reading 
back and forth between texts as I ascertained a clearer idea of this discourse’s set of rules and 
consequently its attribution of imagery/value to certain words.230 Consequently, both cases 
were given two full sweeps of articulation examination in order to fully utilise the clearer idea 
of these discourses’ rules as I developed this understanding over time, with each individual 
sweep consisting of several back and forth readings of different texts.  
 
Operative and Fundamental 
However, these linkages might just signal highly transitory and inactive opinions, rather 
than the more persistent principles of knowledge that are schemata. To distinguish whether we 
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have found an opinion or a schema, we need to see if this set of relational laws is not just 
transitory but operative. We could see this if it were sticky and actively organising, which 
would be indicated if it frequently appeared and was rarely contradicted, with all other 
information assertions building from these laws rather than competing with them. More 
importantly, however, we need to see if it acts as a fundamental principle of knowledge. 
Fundamental principles have a sense of undeniability for the individual that holds them, and 
this sense could be identified via two indicators: firstly, a passion or emphasis attached to these 
principles when they are used explicitly, and secondly, a general tendency to use these 
principles implicitly.  
The implicit or assumptive use of articulations indicates their place in the unchallenged 
communicative network shared between author and reader, or barely even acknowledged by 
either. For instance, the articulation “if we increase military activity, we could achieve 
democratisation” contains the implicit statement that it goes without saying that “democracy is 
good.” However, there is a problem with analysing implicit statements in that their lack of 
explicit outlining can render them particularly ambiguous. In order to deal with ambiguity, I 
analysed particularly ambiguous explicit or implicit statements through multiple possible 
interpretations. As I continued through the texts, I eliminated those interpretations that hardly 
appeared at all in the rest of the text or that were directly and repeatedly contradicted by the 
rest of the text. This further contributed to the back and forth nature of the interpretive analysis 
and the utility of the double sweep through both cases. As for spotting passion or emphasis in 
articulations’ explicit use, this was done by spotting associations between articulations and 
evocative imagery, emotional language, and explicit highlighting such as “it should be at the 
forefront of our minds that…”.  
By detecting these operative and fundamental linkages in the author’s structures of 
communication, I coded them as articulations indicating at least one active set of schemata at 
work in the text. I acknowledge that the interpretive nature of this articulation analysis lowers 
the replicability of this study. Despite this, I hold that the interpretive nature of this analysis is 
necessary to uncover the richness of the shifting sands that are underlying identifications. 
Familiarising myself with the intertextually developed meanings of specific attributions in this 
discourse allowed for a much more nuanced insight into the organising principles of knowledge 
at work here than any computer-generated analysis of specific words could have. In order to 
provide a richer understanding of securitization that is directly useful to theorists and 
policymakers, these are approaches I needed to make and consequently I accepted the trade-
offs inherent in them. 
 
From Articulations to Identifications 
Once these raw articulations were gathered, however, they were too numerous and 
individually specific to serve as usable data points with which to examine identifications. As 
organising principles of knowledge, schemata take the form of simple building blocks on which 
broad swathes of information can be placed and upheld. Articulations, as expressions iterated 
in individual contexts regarding precise objects, are far more specific. Resolving the overly 
numerous nature of these articulations and ascertaining the simpler/broader principles of 
knowledge evoking these specific expressions was done by grouping these articulations under 
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higher categories, categories which illustrated the underlying identification point that these 
articulations oriented themselves around and expressed.  
For instance, an identification point might be “Britain’s Deference to International 
Institutions,” which encompasses normative identifications of Britain’s position relative to 
international institutions (should these international institutions supersede British 
autonomy/sovereignty or not?). All articulations regarding Britain’s deference to international 
institutions (for instance the articulations “Britain must respect UN decisions” and “Britain 
should disregard international treaties”) were grouped under this identification point.231 These 
identification points were not pre-conceived but rather emerged from the data based on 
entities/concepts (such as deference to international institutions) that numerous articulations 
commonly regarded.  
While an identification point only refers to the entity/concept that articulations regard, 
identifications refer to both the entity/concept and how this entity/concept is regarded. For 
instance, under the identification point “Britain’s Deference to International Institutions,” we 
have the associated identifications “Britain should defer to international institutions” (under 
which all articulations expressing that Britain should defer were grouped) and “Britain should 
not defer to international institutions” (under which all articulations expressing that Britain 
should not defer were grouped). This is illustrated in the following table. 
 
 Table 3.2 
Identification Point  
“Deference to International Institutions” 
Identification  
“Britain should defer 
to international institutions” 
Identification  
“Britain should not defer 

































A dominant identification is defined by the content balance of articulations grouped 
under an identification point at a given moment. If, at a certain moment, articulations 
expressing that Britain should defer to international institutions far outweigh those that express 
that it should not, then this reflects that the dominant identification for this identification point 
in this moment is that Britain should defer to international institutions. 
This brings me to how I ascertained identification strength and density. An 
identification’s strength is defined by how changeable this content balance is over time. If this 
balance never wavers or changes (i.e. if the “should defer” articulations steadily outweigh the 
“should not defer” articulations) then we have one dominant identification (the “Britain should 
defer to international institutions” identification) and it is deemed very strong. If the content 
balance wavers but does not change (i.e. if the “should defer” articulations always outweigh 
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the “should not defer” articulations but the extent to which they do so shifts noticeably over 
time), then we still have only one dominant identification and it is still strong but not very 
strong. On the other hand, if this content balance changes sides over time (i.e. if at one point 
the “should defer” side outweighs the “should not defer” side, but at another this is not the 
case) then this would indicate that at different times we have dominant “should defer” and 
“should not defer” identifications, but they are both weak identifications. Finally, if the balance 
changes more than once then at different times we have dominant “should defer” and “should 
not defer” identifications, but they would both be very weak identifications. Meanwhile, as 
identification density concerns how often an identification is expressed or primed (as was 
outlined in Chapter Two), I ascertained identification density by examining the amount of 
articulations that oriented themselves around a common identification point in different 
periods. The details and reasoning behind these analytical processes, along with the resulting 
identification data, are fully laid out in the Research Data Chapter.  
Finally, so as not to lose the raw articulations that, once analysed and grouped, revealed 
identifications content, strength, and density, I have included Articulation Graphs in my 
Research Data Chapter that display the exact articulations from which each identification point 
was extracted. By doing so I have simplified the data we are working with at the higher levels 
of identifications while preserving and illustrating the raw data underlying these higher points.  
 
Text Type Selection 
 Before conducting this analysis, I needed to decide which texts I would apply it to. Part 
of my text selection criteria was to ensure that the articulations I uncovered in my texts were 
as representative as possible of wider British public discourse and articulations. Furthermore, 
as I aimed to gather data concerning the wide-ranging content of identifications, I also needed 
to examine discourses that were rich with articulation content. Additionally, as this was a study 
of cases in recent history, I could not interview modern subjects as a means of gauging their 
previously held identifications (due to problems of hindsight and memory). Rather, I needed 
readily accessible historic documents. As I was conducting an identification tracking study, I 
required texts that steadily encapsulated identifications concerning the British nation during 
and across very specific time periods. This meant that I required texts that frequently discussed 
“the nation,” whose readership remained largely steady, and whose audience were likely to 
receive them quite quickly after they were published.  
These requirements immediately disqualified the use of polls. Polls simply lack the 
richness and range required to reveal the spread of articulations that come naturally to people 
as they discuss themselves and their nation in an open-ended way. Instead, polls often (though 
not always) direct their respondents towards simple yes or no answers, or ask them to agree or 
disagree with statements that prime specific elements of a person’s identifications. As such, at 
best they can only reveal the identifications that they prime. The only identification 
characteristic that polls were able to illuminate for my study was the group orientation of the 
British public, with the British Social Attitudes [BSA] survey conducted by the NatCen Social 
Research institute having consistently asked the British public each year whether they felt 
primarily British, jointly British and something else, or exclusively/primarily something else. 
The BSA survey revealed that as my cases began the vast majority of British people held British 
identifications, with 83% of British citizens resident in England and 77% of British citizens 
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resident in Scotland (who combined make up 73% of the UK population) holding a British 
identification either exclusively or in conjunction with a more local identification.232 For more 
specific identification content I instead required open-ended texts, which tend to have richer 
content and are more likely to reveal the dialogical self.233 While micro-level diaries or primary 
accounts from ordinary citizens would have satisfied this richness requirement, the extent to 
which they would have been representative of the broader public would have been too low.  
To balance these requirements, I opted to study all discourse concerning Britain’s 
character and place on the international stage that was published in newspapers read by 0.1% 
of the British public or more during my cases. This methodological decision builds on and 
closely approximates Ted Hopf’s methodological outlining of how to operationalise identity. 
In Making Identity Count, Hopf addressed the question of how to make constructivist research 
robust, replicable, and numbers oriented (how to quantify, as much as is possible, identity)234. 
Here, Hopf argues that the best way to operationalise and gauge national identity is through 
“discourse analysis of a broad range of relevant texts”235 which he lists as being newspapers, 
novels, textbooks, and movies.236 Hopf argues that analysing these texts is a strong way of 
gauging mass identities because through these texts we “let the subjects speak” and observe 
the identities that guide their information consumption and make up their everyday, habitual, 
all-pervasive social landscape.237 Allan, a co-author of the volume, explicitly justifies this move 
by arguing that “the theoretical warrant for this is that the categories which people use to make 
sense of both themselves and the world are drawn from intersubjectively shared stocks of 
knowledge.”238 Under this justification, Hopf and other authors who contributed to the volume 
then use this method of “inductively recovering”239 identities from newspapers, novels, 
textbooks, and movies through open coding. Hopf then adopts an “interpretivist 
epistemology”240 and reconstructs identities by “contextualising them within the texts and 
relating them intertextually to the vast variety of other texts”241 from that period, before finally 
combining them into discursive formations. This is an almost identical methodological process 
to the one I adopted in my research (which I have outlined over the last seven pages since the 
section title “Phase One”, and, to briefly recap, involved me searching newspaper texts for 
articulations via an interpretive and open coding, the interpretation of which was guided by 
                                                          
232 Source British Social Attitudes, http://www.bsa.natcen.ac.uk/latest-report/british-social-attitudes-
30/devolution/trends-in-national-identity.aspx. Data for the group orientation of residents of Northern Ireland 
is more complex as a result of the many different group identities salient to the population there, and data for 
the group orientation of residents in Wales was not included in the BSA survey. However, given that the total 
population of Northern Ireland and Wales combined is only 10% of the population of the UK as a whole this 
does not undermine the overall finding that the vast majority (at least 73%) of British citizens resident in the 
UK held British identifications during my cases.  
233 Hubert J.M. Hermans, “The Dialogical Self: Toward a Theory of Personal and Cultural Positioning”; Laura 
Stoker, “Is It Possible To Do Quantitative Survey Research In An Interpretive Way?”. 
234 Hopf and Allan, Making Identity Count, 7 
235 Hopf and Allan, 15. 
236 Hopf and Allan, 4. 
237 Hopf and Allan, 7, 32; Hopf, Social Construction of International Politics, 23. 
238 Hopf and Allan, 32 
239 Hopf and Allan, 16. 
240 Hopf, 23. 
241 Hopf, 24. 
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intra- and inter-textual considerations of context, and then combining these articulations into 
higher categories which I termed identifications and identification points). 
As such, my methodology closely reflects Hopf’s outline of how to operationalise and 
track mass identity. This decision to track identity via newspapers (as opposed to Hopf’s 
broader tracking of newspapers, movies, textbooks, and novels) was born mainly out of 
necessity. As I outlined above, one of my criterion for text selection was “texts whose audience 
were likely to receive them quite quickly after they were published”. Textbooks and novels did 
not meet this criterion, as both may be on the shelf/available for quite a while before they 
become widely read. Additionally, visual analysis of movies was beyond the scope of my 
research. However, this drawback is compensated for in two ways. Firstly, as is outlined in the 
“Text Selection” section below, I analysed a very broad range of newspapers (every paper read 
by 0.1% of the British public or more), and in doing so generated extremely detailed and 
extensive data on identities on a very large scale. This goes some way towards making up for 
the lack of other text types. Secondly, modern newspaper articles provide an even nicer middle 
ground in terms of representativeness and richness of content than Hopf’s older newspapers 
may have (almost all of Hopf’s research came from sources from the 20th century). This is 
because extensive research into the role and increasing ubiquity of narrowcasting in the 21st 
century holds that the conceptual framework of modern media articles is more and more likely 
to mirror the conceptual framework of that publication’s audience.  
This is the result of several mechanisms. Firstly, news publications in the 21st century 
are increasingly internet-based. This affords them with a growing ability to keep track of 
precisely what types of articles and authors are popular amongst their readers via click-through 
rate and retention tracking of their online users. This much-enhanced market data allows these 
newspapers to produced highly tailored content that mirrors the content they know their users 
already like (a trend exacerbated by social media)242. Furthermore, the media landscape has 
self-segregated into separate “mini-markets” of news consumers. This, accompanied with the 
decline of the news readership generally and in younger markets especially, is creating a 
narrowcasting environment where (instead of broad ranges of people receiving the same news 
relatively simultaneously) small markets are targeted with individual news catered just to 
them.243 Modern newspaper articles, particularly editorials and opinion pieces, are therefore 
quite representative of their audiences, while still being content rich and open-ended. They also 
qualify as readily accessible historic documents which frequently discuss “the nation” with a 
steady audience who received them quickly after they were published.244 As such, examining 
                                                          
242 Matthew Mendelsohn and Richard Nadeau, “The Magnfication and Minimization of Social Cleavages By The 
Broadcast and Narrowcast News Media”; Beretta E. Smith-Shomade, “Narrowcasting in the New World 
Information Order: A Space for the Audience?”; Lincoln Geraghty, Popular Media Cultures Fans, Audiences and 
Paratexts.  http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=2057777. 
243 Beretta E. Smith-Shomade, “Narrowcasting in the New World Information Order: A Space for the 
Audience?”; Scott H. Clarke, “Created in Whose Image? Religious Characters on Network Television”; Lincoln 
Geraghty, Popular Media Cultures Fans, Audiences and Paratexts.  
http://public.eblib.com/choice/publicfullrecord.aspx?p=2057777; Matthew Mendelsohn and Richard Nadeau, 
“The Magnfication and Minimization of Social Cleavages By The Broadcast and Narrowcast News Media”; Silvo 
Lenart, Shaping Political Attitudes: The Impact of Interpersonal Communication and Mass Media. 
244 Having an audience that received the text quickly after they were published also disqualified bestselling 
books from this study, as the extended time period it can take for books to become bestsellers would make it 
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the articulations therein provides access to specific aspects of modern British discourse relevant 
to my study- to a similar if not even greater extent than it did for Hopf’s large scale 




To maximise the extent to which the articulations I uncovered from this interpretive 
analysis of media discourse represented British public discourse, I included in my study all 
newspapers that were read by 0.1% or more of the British public during my cases. Note that 
this meant I was not only including publications based and read in the UK, such as the Daily 
Mail, but also publications read in the UK while based elsewhere, such as The New York Times. 
Consequently, I needed to compile a list of publications read by 0.1% or more of the British 
public during my cases. I have included this list (which shows each individual publication’s 
UK readership along with this data’s sources) as Sheet One in the Appendix, with full links to 
this data’s sources included in Sheet Two in the Appendix. Note that the readership data in 
Sheet One does not refer to any publications’ non-British audience. For instance, in 2015 The 
New York Times’ average online readership in the US was 10.23million, but I only took note 
of its average British online readership, which was 928,714.  
The corpus of texts analysed was divided into UK and non-UK based publications, and 
included national, regional, and local papers (from The Guardian and the Daily Mail to the 
Teeside Evening Gazette and the Bristol Post) as well as specialist magazines such as The New 
Statesman and The Economist. Readership data for each publication was divided into online 
readership and print circulation. This was a result of the true audience number not being 
available for many of the publications I examined, while the average print readership and the 
average online readership was available.245 These two data points (which certainly would have 
overlapped) could not be de-duplicated in all cases, so I opted to list them separately and rank 
the publications based on their online readership. This figure was always much higher than the 
print readership, and likely to be more representative of the true audience figure. This is 
because a single purchased print edition of a publication is often read by several people, 
whereas a unique browser hit (which is how online readership is measured) is more likely to 
reflect one reader. When I analysed articulation data from different newspapers I took this 
online readership into account and weighted articulations from more widely read newspapers 
accordingly. 
As such, I needed to ascertain the online and print British readership of all UK based 
publications and the online British readership of all non-UK based publications246 in order to 
identify and rank all publications with a readership of 0.1% of the British public or more. For 
data on UK based publications’ print and online readership I went to the Audit Bureau of 
Circulation [ABC]. ABC provided the names of all UK-based publications available in 2013 
and 2015 along with the UK print circulation and online readership for almost all of them (I 
                                                          
difficult to use them as gauges for widespread identifications developing during and across specific time 
frames. 
245 For all non-UK-based publications the online British readership was available, but in most cases their British 
print circulation numbers were unavailable and likely very low given that they were published abroad. 
246 As their print readership in the UK would have been either very low or not available. 
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had to go to Quantcast for data on some publications’ web traffic). For a full and precise list of 
sources on readership data, see Sheets One and Two in the Appendix. This data was extensive 
enough to include publications with too few readers to be included in the study.  
For data on non-UK based publications’ online readership I first went to SimilarWeb, 
which had compiled a publicly available list of the 300 news, politics and media websites most 
accessed from the UK (from mobile or PC) each year. This list was extensive enough to include 
websites with too few readers to be included in the study. To identify the exact readership for 
the websites on this list I ran each website individually (eliminating sites irrelevant for my 
study, such as those exclusively to do with auto news, published exclusively in a foreign 
language, etc.) through Quantcast and SimilarWeb. The online readership of non-UK 
publications’ in 2013 was not available in precise numbers, but anything indicated as having 
over 100,000 UK readers was included in the study. A small number of data pieces which were 
still missing were then filled in via reference to other data sources including the NRS, 
comScore, and, in one case, PWC.247 Finally, a small number of publications with inaccessible 
or non-existent archives had to be eliminated from the study, but none of these had a readership 
of over 0.2% of the British population. 
As the Reuters Digital News Report 2015248 showed that the one market with a low 
likelihood of using the internet as a news source was the local newspaper market, I also used 
the ABC print circulation data to check that I had not missed any local publications with a high 
print circulation but low online readership. Surprisingly, I had not. Looking at my compiled 
list of news sources read by 0.1% of the British public or more, the most surprising thing about 
it is that there are so few surprises. Given that I did not restrict the publications I examined to 
any category (purely print, purely online, traditional, new, etc.), instead allowing for any 
newspaper of any age accessed via any platform to emerge as one with a significant British 
audience, an unexpectedly low proportion of the publications that emerged would be 
considered non-traditional, and most of these are aimed at a younger market (for instance Vice). 
This is despite the SimilarWeb list being extensive enough to bring up non-UK based websites 
with audiences of less than 10,000 British people. In the age of social media and the resultant 
changes in the media landscape, I had expected more lesser-known news sources to emerge.  
This is partly explained, however, by the 2015 Reuters Report, which outlines that the 
rise of social media has engendered a significant shift in how people get to the news (a shift 
which has numerous and far-reaching consequences for the industry as a whole), but not in 
where they ultimately get it. The Report shows that social media is on the rise as a source of 
news, with 40% of the population using social media as a source of news and 6% using it as 
their main source of news (although, social media is still the second-least used news source in 
the UK)249. However, this represents a significant shift in the popularity of referral sites, rather 
than in the popularity of newsbrands; a shift in user journey, rather than a shift in user 
                                                          
247 For details, see Sheets One and Two in the Appendix. 
248 Available at 
https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Reuters%20Institute%20Digital%20News%20Repor
t%202015_Full%20Report.pdf 





destination. Consumers used to read The Guardian by buying the paper, then they read it by 
googling “The Guardian,” now they are reading it by following links on their Facebook page 
or with the “The Guardian” app. To quote the Reuters report, “although audiences still consume 
the majority of their online news from familiar and trusted brands, the way they access that 
content is changing.”250 
 
Article Selection 
 Having gathered this data on which news sources were commonly read by the UK 
population, I decided on which articles from these sources I would apply my articulation 
analysis to. The number of news sources in this list and the very low market share of many of 
them indicated that the total amount of content these publications produced during my case 
studies was, firstly, too high to analyse, and, secondly, unnecessary to analyse. As such, I 
analysed every second historic day of content from daily publications with an online readership 
of more than 640,000 (1% of the UK population) and every historic day of content for 
publications only published on a weekly/monthly basis. As for publications with a smaller 
online readership, I analysed a random 25% of these publications on each given historic day 
being analysed, changing the sample each day. I ensured that the random sample 
proportionately contained publications from each publication category (i.e. some regional UK-
based newspapers, some national UK-based papers, some non-UK publications, etc.) For each 
source I analysed, I selected a random 100 articles published by that source on the historic day 
in question and coded relevant material from relevant articles in that sample, along with every 
relevant article appearing on the front page (as identified through Kiosko251). 
To ensure efficiency of time spent, relevant articles were considered to be articles 
discussing or reflecting an idea of Britain’s character and place on the international stage. Such 
articles were more likely to include articulations which reflected the identifications regarding 
Britain’s national norms, influence, relationships, and perceptions in the eyes of others that I 
needed to track in order to test my hypothesis. They would also exclude such schema that 
would be irrelevant for my cases due to being unlikely to align or misalign with securitizing 
rhetoric that regarded international issues, international actors, and purported international 
threats, and was ultimately concerned with international action on the international stage. 
Consequently, British identifications that were more domestically focused, such as Britain as 
the country of the NHS or the royal family, were not relevant for this study. For instance, 
articles discussing Britain’s character as reflected in British minimum wages or British film 
culture (excluding films about international issues) were excluded, while articles regarding 
Britain’s character as reflected in duties to migrants or relationships with the EU or Russia 
were included. To additionally enhance efficiency, I would eliminate articles that only 
glancingly or overly vaguely discussed such national identifications, instead only including 
articles that discussed these identifications in a codable way. This made the coding work more 
manageable and dealt with issues of data saturation.  
                                                          
250See p75 of 
https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Reuters%20Institute%20Digital%20News%20Repor
t%202015_Full%20Report.pdf  
251 Kiosko.Net, http://en.kiosko.net/uk/2013-05-22/. 
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Over the course of this thesis, I analysed 1749 articles which totalled 1,303,191 words. 
Each of these articles can be found in their original raw form, along with links to their sources, 
via Sheet Three in the Appendix. Due to the volume of articles and words, it is not feasible to 
attach the articles themselves to this Appendix. Consequently, I have collected these articles in 
two documents (one for each case) which I have uploaded to an opensource website. Links to 
these documents can be found in Sheet Three in the Appendix. 
 
Data on Identification Strength 
At this point, having tracked identifications across stretched cases that included time 
periods both before, during, and after securitizations, I had data regarding public British 
identifications’ strength/weakness over time. This data was necessary for answering my 
research question, but was also noteworthy for the wider debate regarding identification 
strength over time and particularly during securitizations. This is not a core finding of my 
thesis, but remains a noteworthy dataset that can be taken up and utilised elsewhere by scholars 
examining identifications’ persistence/changeability in the face of broader forces.  
To make this dataset clearer and of higher value for wider scholarship, I then collated 
information on various identifications’ strength and mapped this data onto a continuum, 
highlighting which (and what proportion of) identifications approached the strong and weak 
ends of this continuum. While the identification analysis within cases provided a picture of 
identification weakness over shorter periods of time, I also highlighted cross-case comparisons. 
Through this analysis, I noted which identifications were so strong as to be present in both 
cases, and additionally noted the differences in the strength of these identifications between 
cases. Furthermore, by analysing the direction of shifts in identifications between cases I was 
able to gain an idea of their broader trajectory, noting which displayed a solid strength over 
long periods and which seemed to change (and how they were changing). This provided data 
on the status and trajectory of modern British identifications, a further datapoint of note to 
wider scholars. 
In addition to highlighting certain potential trends of identification weakness, I made 
modest attempts to explain these trends and to provide the basis for future study into the 
explanation of such trends. It was not my aim to conduct in-depth analyses into causal 
mechanisms linking specific trends of identification weakness to specific events, as causal 
networks are likely to be highly complex, non-linear, and (if possible to reveal at all) beyond 
the scope of this study. Instead, in accordance with what was outlined previously about the 
importance of context, I have sought to provide a practical understanding of identification 
weakness in this setting in the form of empirically derived historic trends and to examine 
possible contextual influences on these trends. These examinations are discussed in the 
Research Data Chapter. 
 
The result of this phase was the production of a very broad swathe of identification data 
on modern British identifications regarding Britain’s place on the international stage in terms 
of strength, density, norms, influence, relationships, and perceptions in the eyes of others over 
two recent periods of time. This provided a picture not only of modern British identifications, 
but also of how these identifications seem to be shifting, particularly during securitizations. In 
and of itself, this data – which is laid out in the Research Data Chapter later in this thesis – is 
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highly informative for researchers and policymakers looking at British identity and concerned 
with Britain’s future international direction. This data also paved the way for Phase Two of my 
research. 
 
Phase Two: Evaluating the Hypothesis 
Having tracked identifications, I began evaluating my hypothesis – which I laid out in 
Chapter Two – regarding how identifications affect securitization success. Before detailing 
how I completed this phase, I will here provide a quick overview of it. In this phase, I gathered 
texts in which the key securitizing and anti-securitizing actors publicly outlined their 
arguments. Key (anti-)securitizing actors were taken to be high level government officials, 
including technocrats, executive figures, and elected officials, arguing for or against 
securitization. Securitizing texts could range from press releases, parliamentary debates, 
manifestos, party rally speeches, to any manner of public discussion. These texts are fully listed 
and links to each of the original texts can be found in the Research Data Chapter later in this 
thesis. I then analysed these texts to see if they would have been filtered in or rejected by 
audiences holding the identifications found to be widespread in Phase One, under the 
assumption that these audiences were operating under the rules posited in my hypothesis. Then, 
recalling that in 2013 the securitization failed while in 2015 it succeeded, I noted if the reactions 
of my hypothesised audiences in these cases (filtering in or rejecting securitizing and anti-
securitizing arguments) would have been conducive to a failed securitization in 2013 and a 
successful one in 2015. In doing so I evaluated the validity of my hypothesis and addressed my 
research question, which was “How do the public audience’s identifications influence the 
success and failure of securitizations?” I will now elaborate on and clarify this overview.  
 
Alignment 
I began Phase Two by ascertaining whether or not the audiences’ identifications 
revealed in Phase One aligned with the (anti-)securitizing arguments. This needed to be done 
because my hypothesis asserts that three components of identifications will contribute to the 
success of securitization attempts: strength, density, and content alignment to the (anti-
)securitizing argument. While the findings from Phase One will clearly show the strength, 
density, and even the content of the identifications at play, they have not yet revealed the 
alignment of this content to the securitizing argument. In order to evaluate my hypothesis, I 
needed to fill in this piece of information. 
By “alignment to the argument” I am referring to the extent to which the identifications 
do not contradict the information being presented in the argument and consequently filter it 
out. In order to ascertain alignment, I first gathered the (anti-)securitizing arguments made, all 
of which were available via publicly accessible government records, primarily Hansard and 
gov.uk (these sources are also detailed in the Securitization and Identifications Data Chapter). 
Dividing these arguments chronologically, I examined each text to see how it would have been 
interpreted by someone holding the identifications tracked in Phase One. 
To do this, I kept in mind the relevant Claim-Identification co-locations outlined in Fig. 
2 in Chapter Two. Recall from Chapter Two that securitizing arguments make four core claims: 
that there is (i) an object of worth, (ii) a threat to this object, and a means of dealing with this 
threat that is (iii) appropriate and (iv) feasible. Anti-securitizing arguments attempt to discredit 
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these claims. Also outlined in Chapter Two was that claims about objects of worth need to 
align with normative identifications in order for receptivity to increase. Similarly, claims about 
threats need to align with influence, affiliation, and perception identifications. Feasibility 
claims need to align with influence identifications. Appropriateness claims need to align with 
normative identifications. 
With this in mind, I coded the claims made in each (anti-)securitizing text, searching 
for assertions (which were made across paragraphs, whole texts, or simply implicitly) that 
argued as to what the proposed object of worth was and why, what the threat was and why, 
what the means of dealing with this threat were and why they were appropriate and feasible. I 
then asked whether or not these assertions would have aligned or misaligned with the public 
identifications uncovered in Phase One. This resulted in a series of data points encompassing 
the (anti-)securitizing arguments made and whether or not they would have aligned or 
misaligned with the public  audience’s identifications. 
For instance, suppose a securitizing actor made the statement “we need to join this 
conflict in order to defend political freedom.” One of the claims being made here refers to the 
proposed object of worth that is under threat, which is explicitly “political freedom.” I would 
then check what widespread normative identifications were at play at the time (as objects of 
worth need to align with norms). If I found that the widespread normative identifications 
included “political freedom is a human right” and “our responsibility is to defend human 
rights,” then I could make certain inferences. I could firstly infer that this audience would have 
interpreted this statement as a statement about defending human rights. Then I could infer that 
the statement that the nation must defend human rights would have aligned with the audience’s 
identifications. As such, this would signal alignment of identifications to this claim of the 
securitizing argument. This is not to exclude the possibility that the same securitizing actor 
may have also made claims about threats, appropriateness and feasibility which the audiences’ 
identifications may not have aligned with. Alignment was therefore measured on a scale; the 
more claims that the identifications aligned with, the greater the alignment.  
Note that I conducted all of these exercises for anti-securitizing rhetoric as well. I coded 
the anti-securitizing rhetoric that emerged in the cases in terms of why the anti-securitizing 
actors thought the object of worth and/or threat had been misrecognised, and/or why the 
proposed mission was not feasible and/or appropriate. I then examined if these anti-securitizing 
arguments aligned or misaligned with the identifications ascertained in Phase One. Overall, 
this showed me the receptivity of public audiences to both the securitizing and anti-securitizing 
arguments during my cases. 
I took this route (looking at securitizing and anti-securitizing arguments and comparing 
the receptivity they would have garnered if they were subject to the dynamics I have 
hypothesised) for two reasons. First, to say that a securitizing argument succeeded/failed is also 
to say that it was more/less effective than the anti-securitizing argument with which it 
contended. Second, the dynamics governing audience receptivity to securitizing arguments 
should apply in equal measure to the dynamics governing audience receptivity to anti-
securitizing arguments. Combining these two premises, it would seem that testing if the 
winning argument in a securitization would have garnered higher receptivity than its opposing 
argument if audience receptivity is subject to the dynamics I have hypothesised, is a more 
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robust means of empirically validating my hypothesis than simply testing if the winning 
argument would have garnered high audience receptivity. 
Essentially then, what I seek to test here is whether or not the dynamics I have 
hypothesised would indicate that the failed securitizing argument of 2013 would have suffered 
from lower audience receptivity than the successful anti-securitizing argument of 2013. I 
additionally seek to test if the successful securitizing argument of 2015 would have enjoyed 
higher audience receptivity than the unsuccessful anti-securitizing argument of 2015. If this is 
the case, then it would show that my hypothesis can help explain real-world phenomena of 
securitization success and failure. It would do so because it would show that, in two 
securitization attempts that were highly similar in most basic characteristics252, my hypothesis 
can explain how different identifications can generate higher/lower audience receptivities to 
(anti-)securitizing arguments, and that these relative levels of receptivity explain different 
outcomes of securitization success and failure.  
As such, if my hypothesis holds true and encapsulates influential real-world processes, 
then we should see the cross-case differences in British identifications being less conducive to 
a successful securitization in 2013 than in 2015. Specifically, by applying my hypothesis (as 
illustrated in Fig. 1 in Chapter Two) to my identification data we should see that the 2013 
identifications should have resulted in a much lower receptivity to the securitizing rhetoric than 
to the anti-securitizing rhetoric (hence being conducive to a failed securitization). Meanwhile, 
in 2015 the identifications should have resulted in a much lower receptivity to the anti-




To summarise, by studying these cases I produced evidence with which I could 
empirically test my previously outlined hypothesis, and consequently address my research 
question. In addition, although this was not a core aim of my thesis, my research produced a 
broad swathe of data on modern British identifications, along with data on identifications’ 
strength over time and during securitizations. I do not claim that this data definitively captures 
identification strength in general or during securitizations, but I include this data in this thesis 
as it remains a valuable dataset of note for researchers and policymakers looking at 
identification strength and at modern British identity. Overall, my research produced empirical 
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 Chapter Abstract 
 In this chapter I detail the major news stories that dominated the media discourse I 
have analysed and lay out the rationale for doing so. I quantitatively demonstrate which stories 
received prolonged media coverage in each of my cases before unpacking this data and 
detailing how each story was covered by different groups of newspapers. These major stories 
include the 2013 uprisings in Egypt and the progress/failure of Arab Spring more widely, the 
NSA spying scandal, the 2015 refugee crisis, Britain’s relationships with Russia and the EU, 
the Syrian civil war, chemical weapons usage in Syria, and ISIS. I focus on the broad points of 
agreement and disagreement of different media outlets’ coverage of these stories so as to 
highlight the broad discussions that the British public were immersed in during my cases. 
Doing so grounds the identification data I later lay out in the Research Data Chapter in its 




In this chapter I detail the major news stories that dominated the media discourse I have 
analysed. Why do this? As I outlined previously, it is from these news stories that I have 
extracted articulations and identifications. In the next chapter (the Research Data Chapter) I 
will present my precise data on these articulations and identifications. However, these 
articulations and identifications sat within and co-constituted specific historic discursive 
contexts. It is within these discursive contexts that these identifications held meaning in relation 
to the wider world and were invoked in relation to specific objects. To present the 
identifications without presenting these broader discursive contexts which they cannot exist 
independently of would be like analysing the ingredients of a cake without looking at the cake 
itself.  
Consequently, by overviewing these news stories here, the subsequent Research Data 
Chapter in which I present the extracted identifications will be grounded in the tangible and 
relevant discursive contexts from which these identifications were extracted. Essentially, this 
chapter presents the relevant environments in which the later outlined identifications held 
meaning and gained salience. By presenting this environment here, I place the data outlined in 
the next chapter in relation to the wider world, rather than leaving it floating in a vacuum. 
Furthermore, by outlining the major elements of these news stories here I show the broad 
discussions that the British public were immersed in for the duration of my cases. This 
highlights a major contextual influence on the changing content of British identifications 
during my cases.  
 As such, my overview of these news stories aims at highlighting the relevant discursive 
or textual context in which my articulations and identifications emerge and sit. This discursive 
context does not consist of “realities” or historical events. Rather, it consists of visions and 
constructions, manifested specifically in the textual form of media reports and commentary 
supposedly regarding events in the real international world. My recounting of these reports is 
not intended in any way to represent an accurate history of what “really” happened in, say, the 
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Egyptian uprisings of 2013 or the refugee crisis of 2015, but simply to show how these events 
were reported. Additionally, for reasons of space and efficiency, I will not be describing every 
news story that I analysed but simply the major ones that gained prolonged coverage from a 
broad swathe of papers. I quantitatively justify my selection of “major” news stories in tables 
below. 
As for the stories that I do detail, note that I am highlighting the points of focus and the 
themes of commentary that were overarchingly common between various groups of 
newspapers’ takes on these events. Within these broad strokes – under which several different 
papers’ takes on events were grouped and between which they were divided – there were of 
course still several smaller differences in how different events were reported. For instance, 
reporting in both The Daily Mail and The Daily Express would broadly warn that mass 
migration was likely to cause a reduction in social cohesion. As such these papers were grouped 
in a fundamentally different camp than say The Herald Scotland and The Independent. 
However, this warning would tend to appear in The Daily Mail via highlights of the seemingly 
extensive but generally unspecified “cultural and social differences”253 between Britain and 
migrants’ home countries, while The Daily Express would more often focus explicitly on the 
idea that migrants tended not to be Christian.254 For reasons of space I do not cover such smaller 
distinctions in this chapter. Instead, through overviews of persistent general commentary and 
specific illustrative quotes typifying this commentary, I highlight the major points of focus 
around which media discourse gathered. This reveals the broad discussions in which the 
British public were immersed during my cases, while the minute details of this discourse where 
they relate to British character are presented in the Research Data Chapter. 
 Finally, a quick note on referencing. As I analysed over 1,300,000 words of newspapers 
articles, it is not possible to include those articles here in their raw form. As such, to make it 
possible to overview these articles, in Sheet Three of the Appendix I have included links to 
opensource documents which contain each of these articles in their original full form. 
Consequently, in this chapter I reference these original articles in terms of their location in 
Sheet Three of the Appendix. These articles are filed firstly chronologically and secondly by 
publication. For instance, to find an article referenced in this chapter as “11-07-2013: The 
Guardian” you should go to Sheet Three in the Appendix, use the link to the 2013 articles, use 
Ctrl F or Command F to jump to the section labelled “11-07-2013”, and then within this section 
see the “The Guardian” sub-section, which includes all the articles published in The Guardian 
on the 11th of July 2013 which I have analysed.  
 
2013 
In this section I will detail the persistent news stories that arose during the 2013 case. 
During this case, which stretched from the 27th of June to the 13th of September 2013, five 
major stories received persistent media coverage. These were the uprisings in Egypt and the 
progress/failure of Arab Spring more widely, the NSA spying scandal, Britain’s relationships 
with Russia and the EU, and the civil war and chemical weapons usage in Syria.  
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 The following data outlines which stories were covered to what extents in 2013, hence 
revealing which broad news foci the British public was most exposed to in this period. In Table 
4.1 below succinctly I lay out and rank the number of days and documents in which different 
stories were covered, while in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 I provide more detailed coverage data. These 
tables also include coverage data for every other story that received more than three days of 
coverage during the 2013 case, but which were still too infrequent to be detailed in this chapter. 
This quantitatively justifies why I categorised some stories as “major” (as they received 
persistent coverage) and others as minor (as they received infrequent coverage). These more 
minor stories include coverage of Iran’s potential nuclear capabilities and what to do about this 
development, Britain’s relationship with China, British tensions with Spain over the status of 
Gibraltar, Britain’s relationship with Germany, and debates over the future of the Trident 
weapons system.  
In Table 4.1 “Number of Documents Covered In” refers to the total amount of outlet 
issues in which a story was covered during the 2013 case. For instance, if a story appeared in 
three issues of The Guardian, four issues of The Independent, and two issues of The Daily 
Mail, the total “Number of Documents Covered In” would be nine. It is by this measure that I 
ranked the stories in terms of coverage.255 In Table. 4.1 “Number of Days Covered On” refers 
to how many days during the 2013 case the story was covered in at least one paper. Table 4.1 
also contains two red columns. The red column on the left shows the number of paper issues 
during the case in which a story was featured on the front page. For instance, if a story appeared 
on the front page of The Guardian two times, the front page of The Independent once, and the 
front page of The Daily Mail four times, it would receive a 7 in this column. Meanwhile, the 
red column on the right shows the number of days on which the story was featured on at least 
one front page. 
 
 Table 4.1   Summary of Coverage 2013 
Story Number of Documents 
Covered In    (On Front Page) 
Number of Days  
Covered On    (On Front Page) 
Syrian Civil War and Chemical Weapons 248 76 40 15 
Egyptian Uprisings and Arab Democracy 197 37 37 16 
Russia Relationship 132 7 32 3 
EU Relationship 91 14 33 9 
NSA Scandal 30 2 22 2 
China Relationship 26 0 15 0 
Iran Nuclear Capability 23 0 18 0 
Gibraltar Tensions 15 0 4 0 
Germany Relationship 9 0 7 0 
Future of Trident 7 0 6 0 
 
 Tables 4.2 and 4.3 provide more detailed coverage data displaying the number of issues 
a story appeared in for each day of the 2013 case. For instance, if on the 27-07-2013 a story 
                                                          
255 However, over the course of this chapter I detail these stories in a different order than their coverage 
ranking, so as to allow for their clearest explication. For instance, the NSA Scandal story has implications for 
the Russia Relationship story, so I detail the NSA Scandal story before the Russia Relationship story, even 
though the Russia Relationship story has a higher ranking in terms of coverage. 
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appeared in that day’s issue of The Guardian, The Independent, and The Daily Mail, the story 
would be assigned a 3 for that date. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 also show in red the number of paper 
issues on a specific day in which a story featured on the front page. They also highlight in white 
days where the story did not appear at all.  
 
Table 4.2  Coverage of Major Stories Each Day 2013 
 Number of Documents Story Was Covered In On This Date (On Front Page) 
Date Syrian Civil War and 
Chemical Weapons 
Egyptian Uprisings 







27-06-2013 4 0 2 4 1 
29-06-2013 3 3 1 1 5 3 0 
01-07-2013 3 5 1 1 8 1 1 
03-07-2013 4 7 3 5 2 5 1 
05-07-2013 3 8 2 0 5 3 
07-07-2013 4 6 7 3 2 1 3 
09-07-2013 3 10 5 1 3 1 1 
11-07-2013 4 2 6 2 2 4 0 
13-07-2013 9 6 0 3 0 
15-07-2013 6 5 0 2 0 
17-07-2013 4 7 4 2 1 
19-07-2013 7 3 1 8 3 1 
21-07-2013 5 4 2 2 0 
23-07-2013 1 6 1 7 0 
25-07-2013 3 1 7 0 2 0 
27-07-2013 4 8 1 3 1 0 
29-07-2013 4 9 1 1 6 0 
31-07-2013 6 5 0 4 1 1 
02-08-2013 4 7 7 0 3 1 
04-08-2013 2 6 3 1 1 
06-08-2013 7 4 2 0 1 
08-08-2013 2 5 1 4 4 1 1 
10-08-2013 1 2 1 2 5 2 1 
12-08-2013 2 1 3 1 2 1 
14-08-2013 3 13 1 1 1 1 
16-08-2013 4 13 6 0 1 1 1 
18-08-2013 3 5 3 0 0 0 
20-08-2013 3 8 1 0 3 0 
22-08-2013 12 6 3 5 0 1 
24-08-2013 13 3 4 6 1 1 
26-08-2013 14 10 4 9 1 0 
28-08-2013 15 11 1 8 0 1 
30-08-2013 14 13 3 6 0 0 
01-09-2013 10 5 1 7 1 0 
03-09-2013 10 5 3 1 2 1 1 
05-09-2013 10 7 0 9 1 0 
07-09-2013 12 6 2 9 3 0 
09-09-2013 11 3 4 1 0 0 
11-09-2013 8 2 1 9 2 1 1 1 
13-09-2013 11 1 0 9 1 1 0 





Table 4.3  Coverage of Minor Stories Each Day 2013 
 Number of Documents Story Was Covered In On This Date (On Front Page) 








27-06-2013 1 0 0 1 0 
29-06-2013 0 0 0 1 0 
01-07-2013 0 0 0 3 1 
03-07-2013 0 0 0 1 0 
05-07-2013 0 0 0 0 0 
07-07-2013 2 1 0 0 0 
09-07-2013 0 0 0 0 0 
11-07-2013 1 0 0 0 0 
13-07-2013 0 0 0 0 0 
15-07-2013 0 0 0 0 1 
17-07-2013 2 2 0 0 0 
19-07-2013 0 0 0 0 2 
21-07-2013 0 1 0 1 1 
23-07-2013 0 1 0 1 1 
25-07-2013 0 0 0 0 0 
27-07-2013 0 1 0 0 0 
29-07-2013 1 0 0 0 0 
31-07-2013 0 0 0 0 0 
02-08-2013 1 0 0 0 0 
04-08-2013 0 0 0 0 1 
06-08-2013 0 0 0 0 0 
08-08-2013 0 2 0 0 0 
10-08-2013 0 1 5 0 0 
12-08-2013 0 0 6 0 0 
14-08-2013 0 0 0 0 0 
16-08-2013 0 1 1 0 0 
18-08-2013 0 1 0 0 0 
20-08-2013 0 0 3 1 0 
22-08-2013 1 0 0 0 0 
24-08-2013 2 1 0 0 0 
26-08-2013 4 4 0 0 0 
28-08-2013 2 1 0 0 0 
30-08-2013 4 1 0 0 0 
01-09-2013 2 1 0 0 0 
03-09-2013 1 1 0 0 0 
05-09-2013 0 1 0 0 0 
07-09-2013 1 1 0 0 0 
09-09-2013 0 1 0 0 0 
11-09-2013 0 0 0 0 0 
13-09-2013 1 0 0 0 0 
SUM 26 0 23 0 15 0 9 0 7 0 
 
The above tables show that while the Syrian Civil War and Chemical Weapons story 
was by the far the most covered in terms of appearances in different issues, being covered 248 
times, both it and the Egyptian Uprisings and Arab Democracy stories received the most 
persistent coverage over time, with 40 and 37 days of coverage respectively. Table 4.2 shows 
that the Egyptian Uprisings and Arab Democracy story actually received persistently high 
coverage for much longer than the Syria story. However, from the 22nd of August onwards the 
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Syria story received such intense coverage that it overtook the Egyptian story in terms of 
coverage throughout the case, being covered in over twice as many issues and front pages.  
Next in coverage were the Russia Relationship and EU Relationship stories. These were 
covered almost to the same extent, with 32 and 33 days of coverage respectively. While the 
Russia story appeared in more issues and the EU story featured on more front pages, both 
stories received roughly the same coverage over time until the last week in August when the 
Russia Relationship story, buoyed up by the Syria story, gained extra coverage. The NSA 
Scandal story was the least covered story that still made front page news. Nonetheless, it was 
covered persistently in the first and third quarters of the 2013 case, receiving 22 days of 
coverage overall and appearing in 30 issues. The more minor stories in Table 4.3 were covered 
far more sporadically, with only the China Relationship story and the Iran Nuclear Capability 
story receiving steady coverage in certain periods as a result of being buoyed up as side 
conversations to the Syria story. 
 
Uprisings in Egypt and Arab Democracy 
For the majority of the case the Egyptian crisis received coverage from a very broad 
swathe of papers from every category (tabloids, specialist magazines, local papers, national 
papers, and publications based outside the UK). Media attention began to focus on the situation 
in Egypt on the 29th of June, at which time coverage centred around mass protests in Cairo 
calling for President Morsi’s resignation. On the 3rd of July, with reports that the Egyptian 
military had ousted President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood government, the media focus 
on Egypt became intense, drawing attention from every category of British media. Coverage 
of the story brought to the surface several arguments and attitudes (from which relevant 
articulations and identifications could be extracted) regarding Britain’s ability to assist Middle 
Eastern paths to democracy, impressions of the wider Arab Spring’s potential to lead to 
functioning civil states, and British ideas of powerlessness in the face of a complex 
international environment.  
From the day the military took over the government, it was rare to find a single positive 
or optimistic piece of discourse regarding the implications of these reported events. The 
overarching tone and analysis was one of worry and pessimism. Across the spectrum of 
newspapers, it was frequently argued that the situation was likely to deteriorate and that this 
was not the start of a promising new era for the Egyptian people. As early as the 5th of July 
Michael Burleigh’s report in The Daily Mail stated that “Egypt faces a deeply uncertain future 
and possible civil war as the Brotherhood — which will not easily give up power — plans its 
next move.”256 On the 7th analysis in The Economist stated that “we regard the events of the 
past few days with trepidation. Mr Morsi’s ouster by a combination of street power and soldiers 
sets a dreadful precedent for the region,”257 and commentary in Wales Online declared that 
“democracy in Egypt has been at best suspended or at worst abandoned.”258 By the 25th of July 
Kim Sengupta writing in The Independent, one of the most hopeful observers of the Egyptian 
situation, described the scene in Cairo as one of “broken windows, damaged cars, lumps of 
                                                          
256 05-07-2013: The Daily Mail 
257 07-07-2013: The Economist 
258 07-07-2013: Wales Online 
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rocks, abandoned banners: a sign of just how much the vision of a democratic, pluralist post-
Mubarak society had faded away.”259 Optimism for the Arab Spring’s future in Egypt became 
increasingly rare as the summer progressed.  
This commentary on the future of the Arab Spring and democracy in the Middle East 
was mirrored when the focus was applied to other Middle Eastern nations. Although focus on 
Tunisia, Libya, Iraq, and Afghanistan (I discuss Syria below) was far more sporadic and drew 
less newspapers than the focus on Egypt, when discussion did turn to these nations’ ability to 
move towards a democracy (and the international community’s ability to help them on this 
path) the commentary was a widely similar one of dismay and pessimism. The Economist 
featured analysis that “roughly two-and-a-half years after the revolutions in the Arab world, 
not a single country is yet plainly on course to become a stable, peaceful democracy,”260 while 
an editorial in The Guardian stated that “with Syria in flames, Egypt deadlocked, and Libya 
enfeebled, a Tunisian failure would complete the gloom casting a growing shadow over a 
revolution once so widely welcomed in the region and outside.”261 Reporting on Iraq was 
almost entirely limited to reports on setbacks to the country’s path to peace, such as bombings 
conducted by insurgent militias.262 It was not until very late in the 2013 case that coverage of 
Afghanistan started to cautiously highlight aspects of progress made there, with Thom Shanker 
reporting in The New York Times that “the enemy is now less capable, less popular and less of 
an existential threat to the Afghan government than in 2011. Even so, insurgents maintained 
influence in many rural areas that serve as platforms to attack.”263 
However, perhaps the most persistent and widespread undercurrent of the commentary 
on these issues was a resigned vision of international powerlessness in the face of a complex 
situation. Across the board, commenters produced an image of a crisis in which there were no 
good guys and bad guys. The Muslim Brotherhood received almost no positive coverage and 
no strong recommendations for their reinstatement, despite being repeatedly described as 
undemocratically deposed by a dangerous military.264 Christopher Booker writing in The 
Telegraph described how “the Western world gazes baffled and powerless at the ever more 
tragic mess unfolding across the Middle East”265 while reporting in The Independent stated that 
“Egypt is experiencing a crisis that is beyond the reach of any British counsel.”266 Some 
commenters went further and took the events as evidence that the West can never get involved 
in the Middle East’s road to democracy. This argument featured in particular in The Daily Mail, 
where it was stated that “this is a lesson to Western leaders who continue with breathtaking 
                                                          
259 25-07-2013: The Independent 
260 15-07-2013: The Economist 
261 27-07-2013: The Guardian 
262 For examples see 09-07-2013: The Washington Post; 02-08-2013: The New York Times; and 12-08-2013: The 
Guardian 
263 31-07-2013: The New York Times 
264 For examples, see 05-07-2013: The Daily Mail; 16-08-2013: The New York Times; 18-08-2013: The 
Economist 
265 18-08-2013: The Telegraph 
266 18-08-2013: The Independent 
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naivety to try to impose their version of democracy on the region…the broader message of this 
seismic event is that we in the West meddle at our peril in Middle Eastern regime change.”267 
As the question of international involvement faded, it was replaced by a growing focus 
on the most clear-cut aspect of the Egyptian crisis: the escalating violence. Tabloids in 
particular quickly adopted a singular focus, without broader commentary, on the deaths 
following the military coup. By the end of July, most major papers were following the same 
route. On the 9th and 17th of July in particular, mass killings of Muslim Brotherhood supporters 
by the Egyptian military were reported with decreasing calls for any international action in 
response. Instead, the reporting adopted a general tone of dismay and factual numbers, typified 
by reporting in The Sun on the 9th which stated that “at least 51 people were killed in Cairo 
yesterday after pro-Morsi demonstrators clashed with the Egyptian army. Armed forces said 
one officer was killed and 40 soldiers were injured. At a hospital nearby emergency services 
said more than 430 were hurt in the incident.”268 Similarly factual tones underlay reporting of 
the fatal military crackdown on the 17th, with Patrick Kingsley of The Guardian taking one of 
the more emotive tones in a report stating that “seven died and more than 260 were injured, 
dashing hopes that the city was returning to normal.”269 This type of coverage focusing on the 
violence playing out in Egypt and other Arab Spring countries rather than on the possibility of 
international action became more dominant as the summer progressed.270 
Overall then, this story – which was one of the most widely covered in the 2013 case – 
reflected a strong sense of pessimism for the future of Egyptian and Arab democracy more 
widely and an attitude towards the Middle East as morally complex, along with a British sense 
of powerlessness and ultimately resignation towards the region. 
 
NSA Spying Scandal 
 Coverage of the NSA spying scandal began on June 6th, 2013 with Edward Snowden’s 
leaking of NSA documents to The Guardian. Although this story received significant mileage, 
stretching over a month for most publications, by the outset of my case limits on the 27th of 
June coverage of this story was beginning to wind down in several media outlets. However, it 
was significantly renewed on the 1st of July with the release of documents specifically detailing 
how the NSA had been monitoring many of America’s European allies, in particular Germany. 
Understandably this received more coverage in European papers than American-based outlets, 
with broadsheets and specialist magazines covering it more extensively than tabloids. By mid-
July coverage was winding down across the board, with the only major outlet continuing to 
cover the story into August being Der Spiegel. Coverage of the story housed and revealed 
several arguments regarding the wider US-UK relationship, including British attitudes towards 
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the US as an ally and a moral leader worthy of trusting and following into international 
missions. 
 Media discourse on this issue was highly similar across the spectrum of news outlets. 
A major common theme in different papers’ coverage was the emphasis on scale, with most 
commentary describing the NSA as having an overwhelming ability to monitor the globe. It 
was reported in The Guardian that the leaked documents “detail an extraordinary range of 
spying methods, from bugs implanted in electronic communications gear to taps into cables to 
the collection of transmissions with specialised antennae… the extent of this surveillance has 
been staggering.”271 Meanwhile Jon Swaine wrote in The Telegraph that “the Americans were 
able to access discussions in EU rooms as well as emails and internal documents on 
computers,”272 and it was specified in The Daily Mail that “the NSA monitored 20million 
German phone connections and 10million internet data sets, rising to 60 million phone 
connections on busy days.”273 The NSA was repeatedly depicted as wielding terrifying power 
of a previously unknown level,274 perhaps most evocatively described by Jurgen Tritten in The 
Guardian who argued that “if even a few of these revelations are true, our worst Orwellian 
nightmares have become reality.”275 
 The most ubiquitous point of analysis surrounding the July 1st leaks was that they would 
(and, for some commenters, should) result in a deterioration of relations and trust between 
European nations and the US. Commentary in Der Spiegel emphatically stated that “revelations 
that America’s National Security Agency spied on top European officials sent shockwaves 
across the Continent this weekend…The news potentially endangers trans-Atlantic 
relations.”276 It was also noted by Nicholas Cecil in The Evening Standard that “French foreign 
minister Laurent Fabius has also said it would be "completely unacceptable" if it is proved 
America spied on EU,”277 while reporting in The Daily Mail simply recounted “German FURY 
at US snooping on half a billion calls and emails every month.”278 This analysis was often 
underlain with imagery of America as a bullish and aggressive nation unworthy of trust, even 
in papers with a normally more pro-US stance. Reporting in The Telegraph stated that “NSA 
officials were said to boast that US spies "attack the signals" of Germans as extensively as they 
monitor states such as China and Saudi Arabia,”279 while German commentary that US 
behaviour “was reminiscent of the actions of enemies during the cold war”280 was requoted in 
The Guardian. Meanwhile it was noted in Der Spiegel that “it apparently falls to the United 
States intelligence agencies, primarily the NSA, to confirm all the prejudices about Americans 
held by much of the world.”281 
                                                          
271 01-07-2013: The Guardian 
272 01-07-2013: The Telegraph 
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275 03-07-2013: The Guardian 
276 01-07-2013: Der Spiegel 
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 While the coverage of this story wound down more quickly than that of the Egyptian 
uprisings, as papers moved on to other news foci they often made the emphatic point that the 
NSA story was yet incomplete. It was underlined that American spying was probably set to 
continue and our knowledge of it was likely to barely grasp the true scale of what was going 
on. Marcel Rosenbach writing in Der Spiegel emphasised that “more than six weeks after the 
scandal began, the German government is still waiting for answers on what exactly the NSA is 
doing in – and against – Germany,”282 while analysis in The Guardian stressed that “we can 
only speculate about the real motivation. What type of information is being extracted, and what 
is being done with it? Should our delegations choose to meet at secret locations in future and 
prepare meetings using encrypted code, because otherwise the US National Security 
Agency will know their every move in advance?”283 As the summer progressed, positive 
commentary on the US as an international partner was uncommon. Overall then, coverage of 
the NSA scandal reflected a strong sense of distrust, betrayal, and fear towards America, along 
with a decreased willingness to see America as a moral leader. 
 
Relationship with the EU 
 Although discourse around Britain’s relationship with the EU was even more extensive 
in 2015, the debate about leaving the EU was also underway in 2013. With this debate came 
extensive commentary on the positives and negatives of being in the EU, along with frequent 
analysis of the beneficial or harmful implications the EU’s activities had for Britain. Coverage 
of this relationship brought to the surface several arguments about the types of international 
leadership and independence Britain should strive for, ideas of national pride and greatness, 
and desires to be internationally assertive. Unlike coverage of the NSA scandal and the 
Egyptian uprisings, commentary on Britain’s relationship with the EU was sharply divided 
between papers, with certain major papers overwhelming covering the EU in positive or 
negative ways. Consistently pro-EU papers included The Guardian, The Independent, and The 
Huffington Post, while consistently anti-EU papers included The Daily Mail, The Sun, and The 
Daily Express, with most other papers regularly offering both positive and negative 
commentary about the UK-EU relationship.  
 Positive coverage of the EU focused heavily on the economic benefits membership 
brought, along with enhanced influence for Britain as a nation and mobility for Britons as EU 
citizens. Analysis in The Guardian that “integration has brought to the EU, and hence to the 
UK, in most if not all observers' opinions, appreciable economic benefits,”284 was 
commonplace in pro-EU papers throughout the case.285 More mixed papers would tend to 
feature this type of analysis in specific instances, such as upon the release of a CBI report on 
the EU’s economic impact on Britain. After the release of this report Christopher Hope reported 
in The Telegraph that “despite some concerns in the reports, officials…found that the economic 
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benefits of being inside the EU were "appreciably greater than they otherwise would be".”286 
More individual-level benefits of EU membership tended to be highlighted in The Huffington 
Post, where the EU’s reduction of roaming charges was described as “one piece of news from 
the EU that is positive and benefits the consumer…as a result it is now cheaper to text, call and 
use data between EU countries.”287 
 Pro-EU commentary tended to place more emphasis, however, on how disastrous 
leaving the EU would be, with The Independent and The Daily Mirror emphasising warnings 
that “leaving the EU is neither a good nor a realistic economic option for this country”.288 
Meanwhile statements from Japan that Britain “must stay in the union and single market, 
suggesting tens of thousands of jobs would be lost if [Brexit occurred],” were stressed by 
Harriet Alexander in The Telegraph,289 and warnings that “the risk to the UK of leaving 
the European Union is of a rapid drift into international irrelevance” were highlighted by 
Nicholas Watt in The Guardian.290 This type of coverage was often accompanied by a 
discrediting of Euroskeptics’ arguments for ditching the EU in favour of alternative 
relationships with English-speaking countries, with Euroskeptics being referred to as 
“desperate,” “scaremongering,” and “unrealistic.”291  
 Negative coverage of the EU partly consisted of concerns regarding mass immigration 
and its effects on Britain’s economy and social cohesion, although this type of discourse came 
primarily from The Daily Mail and The Daily Express. As Croatia joined the EU, it was 
reported in The Daily Mail that “tens of thousands of southern European workers have been 
coming [to Britain] since the start of the eurozone crisis. Croatia has a population of 4.2million 
and overall joblessness rate of more than 20 per cent…its citizens can travel freely to Britain 
from today.”292 In The Daily Express this focus on mass immigration was often coupled with 
imagery of immigrant freeloaders and criminals, with Anil Dawar reporting that “crime, 
particularly prostitution, has rocketed in immigrant-hit areas. Waves of job and benefit seekers 
will be free to pour into the UK when visa restrictions on the two new EU member states end 
on January 1.”293 
 However, negative coverage of the EU tended to focus more on EU “bloatedness” than 
mass immigration in 2013. The Spectator published commentary on the EU’s European 
External Action Service as being unnecessarily grandiose, stating that “it does not need 140 
embassies and 500 limousines. They exist for the same reason that the EU has an anthem, a 
currency and a flag, and wants an army. It is a self-aggrandising EU vanity project which should 
be dismantled.”294 Meanwhile Macer Hall stated in The Daily Express that the EEAS figures 
“revealed the EU’s bloated ambitions. They showed unelected Labour peer Baroness Ashton 
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now employs more than 3,000 European pen-pushers in over 120 countries – all paid for by 
taxpayers.”295  
EU overreach was also a persistent concern of Euroskeptic commentary, which 
frequently stated that the EU was involving itself in British affairs and harmfully expanding 
bureaucracy in the process. Analysis in The Evening Standard of proposals for new EU capital 
regulations described the “new capital rules from Brussels as one of the biggest threats to UK 
jobs and growth. Chief executive Tidjane Thiam warned that the Solvency II guidelines could 
prevent companies such as Prudential investing in infrastructure and property if they are too 
onerous”.296 Meanwhile, in terms that were commonplace within negative tabloid coverage of 
the EU, an EU proposal for automatic brakes to be applied to cars travelling over the speed 
limit was described by Glen Owen in The Daily Mail as “draconian new road safety measures 
being drawn up by officials in Brussels…[meaning] vehicles already on the road could even 
be sent back to garages to be fitted with the 'Big Brother' technology.”297  
Overall then, this imagery of bloatedness and overreach conjured an image of the EU – 
on the Euroskeptic side of things –  as an overlarge meddler undermining Britain’s international 
prowess, which ultimately reflected British senses of decreasing influence along with desires 
to regain relevance and independence. Meanwhile, Europhile reporting displayed ideas that the 
EU was beneficial for Britain and that leaving it would be a disaster, reflecting British senses 
of being strong and relevant only through activity in conjunction with – rather than outside of 
– the biggest players in the international sphere. 
 
Relationship with Russia 
 Britain’s relationship with Russia was initially described as being one of tension and 
wariness but eventually moved to descriptions of outright hostility. This UK-Russia 
relationship was frequently subsumed under the grander “Western” relationship with Russia, 
with “Russia” often implicitly synonymised with Putin. At the start of the 2013 case discussions 
of this relationship were restricted to broadsheet newspapers and gained disproportionate 
coverage in American papers, and it never received as extensive coverage as the specific US-
Russia relationship. However, the British/Western relationship with Russia gained increasing 
attention in late August before eventually becoming noted in most tabloids and local British 
papers in early September. Coverage of the story brought to the surface several attitudes 
regarding Britain’s image of its own influence and normative place on the international stage. 
 Although rarely described as anything more positive than “productive” or 
“cooperative”, the first major downturn in reporting of Western relationships with Russia came 
in late July with the trial of Alexei Navalny, a Russian opposition leader sentenced to prison in 
what was widely described as an attempt to smother democratic opposition to Putin.298 
Reporting on the trial became a platform on which to highlight Russia’s normative distance 
from “Western models of the rule of law”, with reporting in The Herald Scotland stating that 
“the European Union expressed concern over the conviction, saying it raised questions about 
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the rule of law in Russia and Putin’s treatment of opponents.”299 Meanwhile analysis in Der 
Spiegel argued that “the West should not turn away from this tragic development. This is 
deliberate abuse of democratic institutions with a goal that differs little from the Soviet leaders 
of the Communist Party – to stay in power for life,”300 while Shaun Walker commented in The 
Independent that the jailing “raised serious questions about Russian law.”301 
 A further downturn in reported relations, more to do with interactional rather than 
normative tensions, came in early August when Edward Snowden was granted temporary 
asylum in Russia. In what was typical of wider analysis that Russia was set to be an increasingly 
antagonistic nation, Alec Luhn reported in The Guardian that “with Russian relations now at a 
cold war-style low, Snowden slipped out of Sheremetyevo airport yesterday afternoon… 
Obama's already floundering attempts to "reset", or improve, relations with Moscow are in 
effect over”302. The incident brought to the surface significantly harsher implicit and explicit 
characterisations of Russia even from papers sympathetic to Snowden. Rupert Cornwell’s 
analysis in The Independent stated that “Mr Snowden's moral standing would be greater had 
he stayed to face the consequences, instead of taking refuge in a country noted for corruption, 
autocracy and a disdain for human rights and the rule of law.”303 Reporting in The Daily Mail 
outlined that “Edward Snowden was granted refugee status in Russia yesterday amid Western 
concerns he is now in the embrace of Moscow's secret services.”304 
 The more overtly hostile characterisations of the relationship with Russia did not fully 
emerge, however, until the reports of chemical weapons usage in Syria in late August (detailed 
in the section below). As Western nations considered taking action in Syria, Russia was 
frequently characterised as an obstructive force that would back Assad at the expense of 
international cooperation and Syrian peace. Philip Rucker reported in The Washington Post 
that the West faced “fresh resistance from Russia, Syria's stalwart patron,”305 and commentary 
in specialist publications frequently decried Putin’s actions in even stronger terms, with The 
Economist noting Russia’s “threats to deliver an advanced air-defence system to Syria that 
would gravely complicate future Western or Israeli air strikes or no-fly zones over the 
country.”306 The discussion of Russian relations only continued to deteriorate in tone, with the 
comment “Britain is a small island who nobody listens to except the Russian oligarchs who 
bought up Chelsea” being attributed to a Putin spokesperson on the 7th of September right at 
the end of my case limits. The comment was reported in almost every British paper, including 
locals and tabloids. The Sun, The Times, and The Daily Mirror went on to report Tory MP 
Henry Smith’s response to the comment on Twitter, in which the MP declared that “Putin really 
is a tosser.”307 
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 Overall then, the Russia Relationship story reflected an increasing hostility between 
Britain and Russia as the 2013 case developed, along with a sense of British normative 
superiority. This sense of normative superiority was not accompanied by a sense of material 
superiority, and indeed the opposition of Russia to British and Western activities and hopes in 
the Middle East was reported with an unease that reflected an underlying British sense that its 
international opponents were not trivial or easily dealt with.  
 
Syrian Civil War and Chemical Weapons Usage 
 Reports of a chemical weapons attack in Ghouta, Syria on the 21st of August brought 
the prospect of British participation in a US-led strike against the Assad regime. Although the 
entirety of the British media turned its attention to the situation in Syria after the Ghouta attack, 
Syria was also persistently the focus of a broad spectrum of publications in July. Most tabloids 
and local papers tended to focus on the deteriorating state of the country and the plight of Syrian 
civilians, while broadsheets and specialist publications additionally covered the broader 
regional and international implications of the civil war and discussed its place within the Arab 
Spring. As with Egypt, before the chemical weapons attack in Ghouta there was little 
discussion of Britain getting involved in the conflict beyond humanitarian measures (and a 
short debate about arming Syrian rebels), and the West’s influence in Syria was generally 
depicted as very low. Coverage of this story highlighted several arguments and attitudes 
regarding Britain’s influence internationally and British citizens’ desires to assert themselves 
more directly on the international stage, along with Britain’s sense of commitment to different 
international problems and its relationship with different international actors including Russia, 
the US, and groups in Syria. 
 Before the chemical weapons attack the overarching focus of coverage of the civil war 
concentrated on the plight of Syrian civilians, the deterioration of the overall situation, and the 
seeming collapse of the Arab Spring. Several papers regularly summarised (and emphasised 
the tragedy within) UN reports on the conditions inside Syria. The imagery in this reporting 
was usually quite provocative and the language around it emotive, with a report in The Belfast 
Telegraph outlining that a “UN envoy has warned that Syria’s devastating civil war, now in its 
third year, will force a generation of children to grow up illiterate and filled with hate,”308 and 
the i reporting UN comments that “both sides in the Syrian conflict…continue to commit grave 
violations against children.”309 The UN’s analysis of the Syrian situation “as the worst 
humanitarian crisis since Rwanda” was reported across the spectrum of media outlets. 
Emphasis was always on deterioration and the seeming impossibility of improvement. As late 
into the case as September the statement from the UN High Commissioner for Refugees that 
“we are witnessing a conflict in constant escalation. We have to be prepared for things to get 
much worse before, eventually, they start to get better”310 was reported in The New York Times. 
Meanwhile, a report in the i in mid-July stating that “confrontations between Western-backed 
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groups and Islamic fundamentalist fighters threaten to spiral out of control”311 was mirrored in 
several broadsheet and specialist publications.312 
The Syrian situation was also frequently mentioned in the same breath as Egypt, with 
the two countries being compared in terms of a tragic and deteriorating loss of the promise of 
the Arab Spring.313 This focus was often accompanied by bloody imagery in both broadsheets 
and tabloids, with analysis in The Daily Express stating that “those who reacted with optimism 
and even joy to the onset of the so-called "Arab Spring" more than two years ago have plenty 
of cause to reconsider. Not only is Egypt turning into a bloodbath but there has been an even 
greater death toll in Syria”314 and Christopher Booker noting in The Telegraph that “the 
wishful-thinking euphoria that greeted the "Arab Spring" two years ago seems a million miles 
away as Egypt plunges into bloody chaos and an even greater catastrophe continues to engulf 
Syria.”315 Additionally, in line with the coverage of Egyptian events was the widely adopted 
focus on Britain and the West as powerless to improve the Syrian situation. Syria was regularly 
described as not just an overcomplex quagmire but also an increasingly complicating scenario 
in which Britain could not afford to get stuck. This stemmed primarily from two main lines of 
analysis, firstly that Assad was too secure to be removed from office through anything other 
than full Western military involvement, and secondly that the groups opposing Assad were not 
clear-cut reliable allies.  
Publications broadly at odds on other issues were notably in agreement on the ability 
of Assad to maintain his power for a considerable period, with Tim Shipman reporting in The 
Daily Mail that “defence chiefs told the Prime Minister that sending small arms or ground to 
air missiles is 'hardly worth it' since it would make little difference to the outcome of the 
conflict. Even options like a no-fly zone would require air attacks on Syrian defences lasting 
weeks or even months.”316 It was also stated in The Huffington Post that “introducing a no-fly 
zone over Syria, could mire Britain in a conflict for months because of the strength of the 
regime’s air defences.”317 The role of Russia in bolstering Assad’s position was a frequent 
theme, with Patrick Wintour in The Guardian emphasising that “Cameron has come to realise 
that Russia is simply not going to abandon Assad.”318 British and Western diplomatic efforts 
to improve the Syrian situation were described in similarly pessimistic terms or at most a very 
cautious acknowledgement of small pieces of diplomatic progress. As Assad’s military position 
strengthened, reports such as Nicholas Cecil’s in The Evening Standard, which noted that 
“Britain and America have sought to put pressure on Assad and the rebels to join peace talks 
in Geneva. But diplomatic sources said the likelihood of this happening next month was now 
ebbing away,” became increasingly typical.319   
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 The character and loyalties of the Syrian rebels were persistently questioned by the 
international media, with few publications (the main exception being The Huffington Post) 
featuring arguments that they were trustworthy or reliable allies. Far more frequently they were 
depicted as an increasingly fractious group that contained significant jihadi elements 
perpetrating acts as unsupportable as those of the Assad regime. By mid-July reports such as 
Ruth Sherlock’s in The Telegraph noting that “Syria’s rebel movement descended into its own 
conflict yesterday after a faction linked to al-Qaeda was accused of assassinating a senior 
commander in the Free Syrian Army”320 became increasingly common. On the 15th of July 
analysis in The Economist stated that “the fighting opposition inside Syria is growing ever more 
fractious. Two rebels were reported to have been beheaded recently…after they clashed with 
fighters from a rival group calling itself the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (“Greater Syria” 
in Arabic), which is tied to al-Qaeda.”321 In light of the unclear nature of the rebels’ unity and 
ideological aims, questions of whether or not Western involvement should even seek to topple 
Assad became more frequent, rendering any moral certainty on the situation increasingly rare. 
By mid-August analysis such as Loveday Morris’ assessment in The Washington Post that 
“with al-Qaeda-linked foreign fighters playing an increasingly prominent role in challenging 
government forces...if the regime falls today, it is likely to bring only more chaos and 
bloodshed,”322 became commonplace. Even The Huffington Post (long the most stalwart 
proponent for aiding the rebels) featured commentary stating that “if the regime were to fall, 
chemical weapons could get into the hands of Al Qaeda.”323 None of this coverage was ever 
complimented by positive commentary of Assad, who was at best described as better than 
jihadists. 
 Once reports emerged that chemical weapons had been used in Ghouta on the 21st of 
August the media became dominated by coverage of the situation in Syria and Britain’s 
possible response. A strong proportion of the coverage emphasised the clearest aspect of the 
incident, namely the deaths of innocent civilians, with almost every paper highlighting the high 
number of fatalities (estimates ranged from 200 to over 1000 initially) and some describing in 
rather gruesome detail the condition in which bodies of entire families were found. However, 
in contrast to universal reporting on the horrific nature of the attack, commentary on how to 
respond to this attack was significantly divided.  
Arguments in favour of Britain acting against Assad through an aerial strike focused on 
Britain’s moral duty to stand by Syrian civilians and to deter the dangerous proliferation of 
chemical weapons usage. While descriptions of the chemical weapons attack as “a crime 
against humanity” appeared in publications as diverse as The New Statesman, The Daily 
Record, and The Daily Mirror,324 and analysis in The Economist argued that “air strikes might 
slow or halt Syrian massacres,”325 the moral argument was typified in The Scotsman, where it 
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was asked “can the UK, still a major global power, stand by while innocent civilians die? Can 
we pass by on the other side of the international street, turning our head away and pretending 
not to see? The honest answer is that we cannot, and if that means the UK and her allies moving 
towards intervention short of "boots on the ground" in order to save lives, then this is an option 
we should contemplate.”326  
Alongside the moral argument was analysis arguing that allowing the use of chemical 
weapons to go unpunished would set a dangerous international precedent. Rachel Sylvester 
writing in The Times argued that “if red lines are set up and then crossed by a dictator, with no 
consequences, then despots all over the world will take that as encouragement to tweak the tail 
of the West,”327 while commentary in The Wall Street Journal argued that “the use of these 
weapons was a threat to international peace and security.”328 The danger of allowing flagrant 
breaches of international law go unpunished was also frequently invoked, with arguments in 
The Telegraph stating that “as use of chemical weapons violates international law, thereby 
undermining the authority of the UN…the strategic risks of doing nothing are horribly 
clear,”329 and commentary in The New Statesman describing aerial strikes as a means of 
sending the message to Assad “that the use of chemical weapons to kill hundreds of people was 
not consequence-free.”330 
Commentary opposing participation in the US-led action followed the same focus as 
before the Ghouta attacks, emphasising the complicated nature of the Syrian problem and the 
difficulty of the UK getting out if it got involved. Commentary in The Financial Times 
described “unease over the prospect of Britain getting dragged into an open-ended conflict,”331 
while it was emphasised by Oliver Wright in The Independent that “any strike will inevitably 
drag the West further into the Syrian conflict,”332 and The Guardian published opinion that 
Cameron needed to give far stronger assurances that involvement in Syria would be 
“foreseeably finite.”333  Almost every anti-intervention argument conjured the shadow of Iraq, 
with analysis in The Huffington Post stating “now, before the inspectors have had time to 
complete their work and report, we are told it is to be a cruise missile attack by the end of the 
week. This is horribly reminiscent of the rush to war in Iraq before Hans Blix could complete 
his work”334 being echoed in several other publications.335 Fears that Britain would suffer a 
terrorist backlash if it got involved were also voiced, with The Daily Mirror featuring a warning 
that “we will need to guard against terror attacks in retaliation for a strike on Syria”336 and 
analysis in The Independent voicing “fears that [a strike]…could lead to retaliation or terrorist 
attacks.”337 There was even some debate about whether or not it was Assad, a rogue 
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commander, or the rebels themselves who unleashed the chemical weapons, although even 
skeptics about Assad’s culpability generally stated that Assad was the most likely, although 
not the proven, author of the attacks.338 
As a whole, however, coverage focusing on Syria generally lacked or intentionally 
avoided clear analysis of the situation and what to do about it, with doubt and complexity 
underlying far more of the coverage than clarity and purpose. This was perhaps best typified 
by Daniel Finkelstein’s analysis, published in The Times, which stated “while the outcome of 
intervention in Syria is impossible to predict, so is the outcome of not acting. [In Syria] we did 
nothing and the situation got worse. And the worse the situation got, the more we used it as an 
excuse to do nothing. All this if we do nothing. But what reason is there to believe that acting 
might be any better? Is there anything we can do that has any point to it at all? Or are we being 
urged to act just for show?”339 Such back and forth questioning focusing on the unknown and 
unpredictable implications of intervention became increasingly commonplace in the aftermath 
of the Ghouta attacks.340  
Overall then, the Syria story reflected a British sense of pessimism for the future of 
Syria as a democracy or even as a fundamentally stable country, in line with reporting on Egypt. 
Reporting reflected a British sense of powerlessness in the face of Assad and Russia’s strength 
and the moral complexity of the Syrian landscape (including the blurring lines between 
legitimate rebels and jihadists). The divided calls for and against international action in 
response to chemical weapons usage largely reflected an overarching sense of British hesitancy 
and uncertainty, torn between desires to defend international peace and civilians abroad and a 
fear of getting caught in a prolonged and difficult conflict. 
 
Overall then, the most persistent media stories of the 2013 case centred around the 
Middle East, Russia, the EU, and the US. Coverage of these events brought to the surface a 
several arguments and attitudes regarding Britain’s place on the international stage, including 
its normative goals, its perceived level of influence, its desire/hesitation to be internationally 
assertive, and its imagery of its international relationships. A sense of powerlessness in the face 
of complexity underlay much of the coverage of Middle Eastern developments, along with a 
dismay at the seeming collapse of the Arab Spring and the inability to form morally certain 
arguments regarding who was at fault and what to do about it. Coverage of the NSA spying 
scandal was more straightforward and outraged, although similarly lacking in any clear sense 
of countermeasure. While focus on Russia was uniformly and increasingly negative (reflecting 
a British sense of moral though not material superiority), commentary on the EU was far more 
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During the 2015 case, which stretched from the 1st of October to the 18th of December 
2015, three major stories received persistent media coverage. These were the refugee crisis, the 
EU membership negotiations and impending EU referendum, and the Syrian civil war.  
 
Coverage Data 
The following data outlines which stories were covered to what extents in 2015, hence 
revealing which broad news foci the British public was most exposed to in this period. In Table 
4.4 below I succinctly lay out and rank the number of days and documents in which these 
stories were covered, while in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 I provide more detailed coverage data. The 
tables are organised in the same manner as the previous coverage tables for 2013. As the Syrian 
Civil War story at times largely focused on ISIS and Russia’s actions in Syria I have separately 
highlighted the coverage of these facets of the Syria story. The below tables also include 
coverage data for every other story that received more than three days of coverage during the 
2015 case, but which were still too infrequent to be detailed in this chapter. These more minor 
stories include coverage of Britain’s relationship with Germany, Turkey’s evolving status as a 
tense ally, Britain’s relationship with Iran, the future of the Trident weapon system, and China’s 
status as an international partner.  
 
Table 4.4     Summary of Coverage 2015 
Story Number of Documents 
Covered In    (On Front Page) 
Number of Days  
Covered On    (On Front Page) 
Syrian Civil War 284 103 40 24 
Syrian Civil War and Russia 184 15 40 4 
Syrian Civil War and ISIS 163 92 36 22 
Syrian Civil War Otherwise 97 5 36 4 
Refugee Crisis 239 27 40 18 
EU Relationship 236 46 39 26 
Germany Relationship  39 6 14 3 
Turkey As An Ally 24 0 18 0 
Future of Trident 21 11 6 5 
China Relationship 20 11 12 4 

















Table 4.5  Coverage of Major Stories Each Day 2015 
 Number of Documents Story Was Covered In On This Date (On Front Page) 





Date Syrian Civil  
War 










01-10-2015 13 6 13 6 4 2 3 1 11 1 6 1 
03-10-2015 10 9 1 4 7 4 2 
05-10-2015 9 1 9 3 1 3 1 9 10 1 
07-10-2015 8 7 6 3 12 4 4 
09-10-2015 12 12 0 2 10 9 3 
11-10-2015 11 1 9 2 8 1 7 6 2 
13-10-2015 3 1 3 1 0 2 4 7 1 
15-10-2015 8 1 6 1 1 4 6 6 2 
17-10-2015 2 2 1 1 7 2 10 2 
19-10-2015 5 5 0 3 9 2 7 1 
21-10-2015 6 5 1 4 5 6 
23-10-2015 3 2 3 1 2 1 5 1 7 
25-10-2015 4 4 1 1 4 4 
27-10-2015 6 6 1 0 8 9 1 
29-10-2015 4 1 3 0 2 8 8 
31-10-2015 7 2 7 2 1 6 2 7 1 4 
02-11-2015 5 2 4 1 2 3 5 5 2 
04-11-2015 5 3 5 1 3 2 8 9 1 
06-11-2015 5 2 5 2 2 0 9 6 
08-11-2015 5 4 3 1 2 1 3 1 
10-11-2015 2 1 1 1 9 9 4 
12-11-2015 3 2 4 1 6 2 7 2 
14-11-2015 8 9 4 11 9 1 7 1 5 1 
16-11-2015 13 12 8 12 12 1 8 3 2 1 
18-11-2015 14 9 10 4 9 9 4 3 3 5 
20-11-2015 13 11 2 13 11 2 8 1 5 1 
22-11-2015 7 4 4 7 4 0 7 1 5 
24-11-2015 9 4 5 8 4 0 4 1 2 2 
26-11-2015 9 4 4 4 8 1 5 2 4 
28-11-2015 6 4 3 4 4 2 3 0 
30-11-2015 9 6 1 7 6 4 4 5 
02-12-2015 11 8 3 12 8 8 1 1 2 
04-12-2015 8 7 3 11 7 4 2 1 2 2 
06-12-2015 4 1 4 1 5 1 6 
08-12-2015 3 2 2 3 2 1 2 6 
10-12-2015 4 3 3 2 3 2 4 2 
12-12-2015 7 4 5 2 5 4 1 
14-12-2015 6 1 5 1 4 7 1 
16-12-2015 4 1 1 4 1 2 5 7 1 
18-12-2015 3 1 1 2 8 2 9 4 









Table 4.6  Coverage of Minor Stories Each Day 2015 
 Number of Documents Story Was Covered In On This Date (On Front Page) 
 Germany 
Relationship  






01-10-2015 0 0 4 4 0 0 
03-10-2015 0 0 1 0 0 
05-10-2015 0 1 0 0 0 
07-10-2015 0 1 2 0 0 
09-10-2015 1 0 0 0 0 
11-10-2015 1 0 0 0 0 
13-10-2015 1 0 0 0 0 
15-10-2015 2 0 0 2 2 2 
17-10-2015 6 5 0 2 1 
19-10-2015 3 3 0 3 3 1 
21-10-2015 1 0 0 6 3 0 
23-10-2015 1 0 0 5 3 1 
25-10-2015 0 0 0 1 0 
27-10-2015 2 0 0 0 1 
29-10-2015 2 1 0 0 1 
31-10-2015 0 1 1 1 0 2 
02-11-2015 0 1 3 3 0 0 
04-11-2015 3 0 2 2 0 1 
06-11-2015 1 0 2 1 1 
08-11-2015 1 0 0 0 1 
10-11-2015 0 0 1 0 0 
12-11-2015 1 1 1 1 0 0 
14-11-2015 2 1 0 0 0 
16-11-2015 0 1 0 0 0 
18-11-2015 0 0 0 0 2 
20-11-2015 0 2 1 0 0 
22-11-2015 0 0 0 0 0 
24-11-2015 0 0 2 0 0 
26-11-2015 1 0 0 0 0 
28-11-2015 0 0 1 0 0 
30-11-2015 2 3 0 0 0 
02-12-2015 0 0 0 0 0 
04-12-2015 2 4 0 0 0 0 
06-12-2015 2 0 0 0 0 
08-12-2015 1 0 0 0 0 
10-12-2015 1 1 1 0 0 0 
12-12-2015 1 0 0 0 1 
14-12-2015 0 0 0 0 0 
16-12-2015 0 2 0 0 0 
18-12-2015 1 1 0 0 0 0 
SUM 39 6 24 0 21 11 20 11 15 0 
 
 One thing that immediately stands out is how much more coverage of issues reflecting 
Britain’s place on the international stage there was in 2015 compared to 2013. The top three 
stories of 2015 were covered every single day (with the exception of 28-11-2015) and each of 
them was covered in over 200 issues, while in 2013 only one story gained such coverage. Front 
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pages were also dedicated to such issues significantly more than in 2013, with a total of 204 
front page features in 2015 compared to 136 in 2013.  
The most covered story of 2015 was the Syrian Civil War, being covered in 274 issues 
and appearing on the front page 103 times. The story received coverage at almost every stage 
of the case before garnering immense attention in the wake of the Bataclan attacks in Paris on 
the night of the 13th of November, after which point it was covered in the majority of newspaper 
issues every day for almost three weeks. The story was broad enough to include both coverage 
of ISIS and Russia’s actions in Syria, with Russia initially gaining more coverage than ISIS as 
a result of Russia’s unexpected bombing campaign in Syria in early October. The next most 
covered stories were the Refugee Crisis and Britain’s relationship with the EU. Both stories 
were covered to a similar extent, appearing in 239 and 226 issues respectively, although the 
EU Relationship story was front page news almost twice as often as the refugee crisis. Unlike 
the Syrian Civil War story, which fluctuated in coverage intensity, both these stories were 
covered steadily and persistently, appearing in 4-8 issues almost every day (although the 
Refugee Crisis story was covered slightly more than this in early October).  
The more minor stories managed to make front page news more often than in 2013 but 
were still covered rather sporadically. The exception to this was coverage of Britain’s 
relationship with Germany, which received steadier if still low coverage. However, although 
technically different than coverage of Britain’s relationship with the EU, the Germany 
Relationship story was almost always a subset of the EU Relationship story, with Germany 
being described almost always as an inhibitor or a facilitator of Britain’s ongoing negotiations 
with the EU. Papers’ coverage of the Britain-Germany relationship consistently mirrored their 
coverage of the Britain-EU relationship (which is described below), and the former was never 
discussed separately to the latter. 
 
The Refugee Crisis 
 Coverage of the refugee crisis consistently drew attention from across the spectrum of 
news media from the first to the last day of the 2015 case. The story brought to the surface 
several arguments about Britain’s international duties and historic debts to the Middle East, 
along with British attitudes towards international institutions and the ongoing Syrian crisis. It 
was a particularly divisive news story, with different publications treating the issue with 
notable fervour. Papers diverged sharply on how the refugees should be received, with The 
Guardian, The Independent, The Metro, and The Huffington Post being among the more major 
papers routinely advocating for a more welcoming response to the refugees while The Daily 
Mail, The Daily Express, and The Sun consistently took the opposite stance (with most other 
large papers publishing mixed commentary). Indeed, although I title it here as the “refugee” 
crisis, several publications even disagreed on whether the individuals arriving in Europe were 
refugees in need of asylum or simply “economic migrants.” 
Despite the broad divisions in how this story was covered, all papers were uniformly 
united on, and persistently emphasised, one core aspect of the crisis: the scale of human 
movement towards and through Europe. In October several publications published figures 
released by the UN on the crisis, which were summarised in The Metro as stating that “some 
648,195 migrants have sought refuge in the EU, with 110,000 doing so in August alone. The 
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record influx…is 20,000 greater than last year and almost treble that of 2008.”341 Across the 
case, seemingly staggering numbers were frequently reported in publications from The Daily 
Express to The Guardian (the two papers which published the least/most welcoming attitudes 
towards refugees respectively). It was noted in the former paper that “refugees are arriving at 
a rate of more than 3,500 a day. The number of claims was double those recorded in August 
last year”342 while reporting in the latter stated that “more than 400,000 people have poured 
into [Europe] this year.”343 Though the implications of these numbers were debated throughout 
the case, at every point the broad spectrum of papers depicted the scale of the crisis as 
monumental.344 
 For the camp arguing that Britain and Europe should accommodate these refugees, this 
scale was usually described alongside a sense of sympathy for the individuals making a long, 
arduous, and often fatal journey to Europe from various parts of the world (usually Syria, but 
also Afghanistan and the horn of Africa). This sense of sympathy also often materialised in 
newspapers that regularly published anti-accommodation arguments, with Louisa Loveluck 
describing in The Telegraph how “the approach of winter brings further misery and danger to 
thousands trudging through the western Balkans”345 and reports in The Sun stating that “a 
wrecked pleasure boat lies on rocks after capsizing in high seas yesterday, killing 11 migrants 
including six kids. Lifeguards found ten bodies in the cabin and a young girl was washed up 
on a beach.”346  
More often, this imagery accompanied commentary extolling a moral argument that 
Britain had a duty to welcome and shelter these refugees, with a common refrain in The 
Guardian arguing that “we owe them much more than what has been petitioned for. There is a 
lot more the UK could and should be doing.”347 Arguments regarding “liberal values” also 
frequently underpinned broader pro-accommodation reporting, such as analysis in The 
Economist stating that “the use of a strong external border to shut out refugees would gravely 
undermine liberal values without making Europeans any safer.”348 This type of commentary 
was also regularly though not consistently complimented by an emphasis that Britain had a 
particular duty to welcome these refugees as the catastrophes forcing them from their homes 
were partly the result of British actions, with analysis in The Huffington Post asserting that “if 
refugees continue to come to Europe because of our actions abroad, then we have a moral 
obligation to support them as best we can, including an increase in the number we take into the 
UK.”349 
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 Although less frequent than the focus on a moral duty to accommodate refugees, pro-
accommodation arguments regularly stressed that Britain and Europe were capable of handling 
the influx. It was emphasised by Zoe Williams in The Guardian that “there is no shortage of 
space on this island,”350 while it was noted in The New York Times that “the total [influx of 
refugees] would increase the European Union's population by 0.4 percent at most.”351 Aside 
from simply being manageable, the refugee influx was sometimes described as economically 
beneficial for Britain, with it being stressed in The Huffington Post that “those coming from 
Syria are potential professional workers desperately needed to sustain Europe and its aging 
population”352 and The Daily Star publishing analysis that “while the refugee crisis has caused 
chaos for European governments…the new arrivals could benefit economies within a few 
years.”353  
 For those on the other side of the debate, the scale of the refugee crisis was usually 
depicted as a core reason for why refugees needed to be turned away. One of the most common 
themes amongst such commentary was that Britain simply could not cope with the amount of 
people that wanted entry to the country. While this argument was usually made within papers 
that were outright hostile to refugees, it also frequently appeared in papers offering more mixed 
commentary. A typical refrain from mixed papers, taken here from The Telegraph, was “that 
such a large number of incomers will have a massive impact on social cohesion and economic 
infrastructure.”354 Much focus was placed on the experience of Germany, the main EU receiver 
of refugees, with Jeevan Vasagar describing in The Financial Times “chaotic scenes outside 
Berlin's State Office for Health and Social Affairs [which] have proved humiliating…after 
months in which its staff have struggled to cope.”355 On the more hostile side of things, it was 
more directly argued in The Daily Express that other countries should “shoulder the burden of 
feeding, housing and educating these individuals and families many of whom are either too old 
or too young to work and will simply be a drain on public services.”356 The Daily Mail, The 
Daily Express, and The Sun frequently included analysis arguing many of these individuals 
were not refugees but rather economic migrants.357 This was often accompanied by an explicit 
rejection of any British duty to help these individuals, with opinion in The Sun stating that 
“when someone comes to this country, what should matter is what is good for US and not 
simply what is good for THEM…our country does not simply exist to give the rest of the world 
a better life.”358 
 Aside from the focus on the difficulty of coping with refugees on this scale, one of the 
most common themes on this side of the debate was an association of the refugee influx with 
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anti-social behaviour, crime, and, in the aftermath of the Bataclan attacks in Paris (detailed 
below), terrorism. Early in the 2015 case The Telegraph, The Sun, and The Metro featured 
reports that “three Libyan soldiers convicted of sexual assaults in the UK are seeking asylum 
in this country,”359 while The Times ran extended coverage on “several crime bosses from 
immigrant communities who have turned to people smuggling.”360 Scenes of chaos at the 
refugee camp Calais were regularly invoked, with it being reported in The Daily Express that 
“the people of Calais must long to see the back of these antisocial neighbours…They roam the 
streets in gangs, brazenly breaking the law and making life a misery.”361 Across the board, even 
amongst papers sympathetic to refugees, there was frequent coverage of refugees attacking 
lorries in Calais to try to gain entry to the UK. Peter Allen reporting in The Daily Record 
detailed that “hundreds of migrants living in illegal camps around the port town could be seen 
throwing stones at lorries, and then trying to clamber aboard them when they stopped”362 and 
even The Guardian published reports from Kevin Rawlinson of “people trying to break locks 
and slash open roofs of lorries, while diversionary tactics were apparently also used to draw 
police away.”363 This focus on refugees as dangerous reached its peak directly after the 
Bataclan attacks in Paris, when it was it was regularly emphasised in almost all but the most 
pro-accommodation of papers that the perpetrators may have entered Europe disguised as 
refugees.364 This was countered by statements in the pro-accommodation camp emphasising 
that this was not enough of a reason to turn away refugees, as typified in the argument published 
in The Guardian that “the moral case for Europe to remain a place of refuge is unaltered by 
what happened [in Paris].”365  
 Overall then, the Refugee Crisis story brought to the fore very different British attitudes 
regarding how committed Britain should be to international problems and how much of a moral 
duty Britain owed the wider world, along with differing ideas of Britain’s material and 
logistical capability to make good on any such moral duty. The divisive but charged coverage 
of the story ultimately reflected a polarised but morally certain British public in 2015 when it 
came to international duties. 
 
Relationship with the EU 
 As Prime Minister Cameron and Chancellor Osborne made regular trips to Brussels 
from late October onwards to renegotiate the terms of Britain’s EU membership ahead of a 
promised referendum on this membership, the subject of Britain’s relationship with the EU 
remained under the spotlight. In the aftermath of the Bataclan attacks the EU relationship also 
received attention, as the anti-EU camp attributed some blame for the attacks on EU freedom 
of movement laws. Coverage of this relationship again brought to the surface several arguments 
about the types of international leadership and independence Britain should strive for, ideas of 
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national pride and greatness, and desires to be internationally assertive. Many of the themes 
from the 2013 commentary on the EU carried over into 2015. The same papers continued to 
divide along the same lines of describing positive and negative relationships between the EU 
and Britain, with the only major focus from 2013 dropping in prevalence being the vision of 
the EU as a bloated institution.  
 However, in 2015 some themes gained considerably more attention than in 2013, while 
some entirely new themes emerged as well. These were mostly on the anti-EU side of things. 
One major and persistent new focus was on Cameron as having no ability to effectively 
negotiate meaningful new terms of membership with the EU. Although new, this theme 
complimented the pre-existing focus on the EU as an overlarge and overreaching institution 
against which Britain had no power. While the pro-EU commenters also described Cameron as 
unable to deliver on his election promise of a renegotiation, their focus was usually on the 
negotiations as being unnecessary in the first place and consequently not something the EU 
should indulge. This was typified with numerous reports in The Metro, The Guardian, and The 
Independent supporting John McDonnell’s November statement that the negotiations were “a 
meaningless publicity stunt demanding powers of veto we already have.”366 On the anti-EU 
side, commentary instead fixated on the seemingly bullish intransigence of EU negotiators, 
depicting them as unfair and unconcerned with reasonable British demands. John Stevens 
writing for The Daily Mail reported that Cameron was “ordered to compromise on his demands 
for welfare reform [by] European Council president Donald Tusk,”367 and analysis in The Daily 
Express stressed that “it is the EU, not Cameron, that has proved stubborn”,368 while more 
mixed papers such as The Times featured reports that “European allies hardened their resolve 
to reject [Cameron’s] plan last week.”369 This focus was regularly complimented by a 
disappointment with seeming weakness on Cameron’s side and a desire to make bigger bolder 
demands and actions, with opinion in The Daily Mail noting the “limpness”370 of Cameron’s 
agenda and Charles Moore expressing in The Telegraph “frustration that Cameron is not 
making stronger demands.”371 
 A major difference in focus between the two cases was that in 2015 even usually pro-
EU papers began highlighting the EU as an incohesive and indeed an incompetent institution. 
Across the spectrum of papers, attention frequently turned to the EU’s inability to find common 
and timely solutions to problems, a commentary uniting papers as ideologically opposed as The 
New Statesman and The Telegraph. The latter featured descriptions of “the EU’s collective 
leadership [as] arrogant and divided,”372 while the former published analysis that “EU decision-
making has become a two-stage process. At first, there is paralysis because the institutions 
cannot find a solution with which everyone can agree. Then, when crisis turns to emergency, 
power politics takes over.”373 This type of analysis was consistently applied to the EU’s 
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handling of the refugee crisis. Commentary from The Independent stated that “the EU’s main 
problem is that we don't have a common approach,”374 while Gideon Rachman writing in The 
Daily Mail argued that “the EU is creaking under the strain. Its 28 members are arguing bitterly, 
and seem incapable of framing effective responses to their common problems.”375 Reports even 
appeared in The Guardian lamenting the EU’s “deepening divisions and failure to follow 
through on past promises.”376 As the refugee crisis wore on, the EU was painted in an 
increasingly poor light across the board, with its overall competence being frequently 
questioned even by usually pro-EU publications.377  
 Perhaps the most intense deterioration in commentary on the EU relationship between 
the cases was that in 2015 there was an increasing focus on the EU as an unintentional aid to 
terrorists, a focus that was very rare in 2013. This focus emerged in the aftermath of the 
Bataclan attacks in Paris, when it was widely reported that at least one of the terrorists had 
posed as a refugee to gain entry to Europe, with headlines repeatedly appearing in anti-EU 
papers such as The Daily Express stating that “KILLER WAS RESCUED FROM SINKING 
BOATFUL OF MIGRANTS”.378 The EU’s freedom of movement and refugee policies were 
thereafter increasingly referred to as not just unwise but dangerous, with John Gray arguing in 
The New Statesman that “uncontrolled immigration on the scale that has been reached in the 
past year cannot avoid posing security risks in conditions that approximate those of war,”379 
while Janet Daley writing in The Telegraph questioned “how can you track suspected terrorists 
across a continent which has not only dismantled boundaries but deconstructed the apparatus 
which allows nation states to monitor transit across their territory?”380 While several pro-EU 
and mixed papers regularly acknowledged this commentary, most counter-commentary was 
found in The Guardian, The Independent, and The Huffington Post, with analysis such as that 
in The Guardian stating “it’s not clear that even a miniscule proportion of these refugees has 
any terrorist connection of any kind,”381 being regularly repeated in these papers. 
 Overall then, as in 2013, reporting on Britain’s relationship with the EU reflected the 
same Euroskeptic desires to regain relevance and independence and the same Europhile senses 
that Britain was strong and relevant only through activity in conjunction with the biggest 
players in the international sphere. In addition, there was an added Euroskeptic sense that the 
EU was an aid to terrorists, and a feeling across the board that this large international player 
was devolving into something incoherent, internally divided, and incompetent, along with a 
common sense that Cameron was powerless against the EU. This ultimately reflects a British 
sense that the EU was incapable of using its own power to good effect, which was bolstered on 
the Euroskeptic side by a sense that the EU was simultaneously prohibitive of British power. 
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Syrian Civil War (including the actions of ISIS and Russia) 
 Despite having been waged for almost four years at this point, the Syrian Civil War was 
still covered extensively across the spectrum of newspapers throughout the 2015 case. 
Coverage of this story highlighted several arguments and attitudes regarding Britain’s influence 
internationally and British citizens’ desires to assert themselves more directly on the 
international stage, along with Britain’s sense of commitment to different international 
problems and its relationship with different international actors.  
Commentary surrounding the situation in Syria in 2015 had both notable similarities 
and distinctions to commentary on Syria in 2013. Perhaps the most major theme common to 
both 2013 and 2015 was a depiction of Russia’s obstructive and untrustworthy involvement in 
the conflict, although this theme received significantly more attention in 2015. When Russia 
began bombing Syria in early October its actions were immediately regarded with distrust and 
even hostility. Commentary in The Daily Mirror indicated that “Britain has said that Russia's 
bombing raids in Syria were striking pro-democracy rebels. But Mr Putin insisted air strikes 
were hitting Islamic State,”382 while it was reported in The Guardian that “experts have offered 
a plethora of theories for Russia’s action in Syria, from a bargaining chip to get the Americans 
around the table, to the beginning of a sustained drive to save Bashar al-Assad, to more 
implausible suggestions such as a nefarious plot to further burden Europe with millions more 
refugees.”383 More sensationalistic papers described the situation in even more alarmist terms 
of international tension, with The Daily Mail running the headline “RUSSIA DEFIES THE 
WEST TO DROP BOMBS ON SYRIA.”384 Across the board, Russia’s actions were seen as 
obstructive, avoiding rather than contributing to the fight against ISIS, and even a prelude to a 
Western-Russian conflict, with Bel Trew describing Russia in The Times as “undermining a 
political process, aggravating the humanitarian situation and increasing radicalisation,”385 
while commentary in The New York Times stated that “the Syrian conflict is edging closer to 
an all-out proxy war.”386  
This commentary was regularly punctuated with a dismay that the West was not being 
as assertive as Russia, with commenters from every category of newspaper arguing that by 
stepping back the West was allowing this to happen. Commentary in The Guardian stated that 
“when you call something a quagmire, you have told the world that you’re out and staying out. 
Russia and Iran will have their way,”387 while Simon Heffer writing in The Telegraph argued 
that Russia’s assertiveness “is why rogues such as Putin can command such respect 
internationally, and can exert themselves as they do.”388 This was often accompanied by calls 
for Britain and the West to step up and take more timely and forthright action in Syria, with 
commentary in The Daily Star asking “When is someone going to take action over Syria? And 
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what’s happening with President Assad? It’s a crisis and it wants tackling now,”389 and Frederic 
Hof writing in The Washington Post stating that “in Syria-time, months mean deaths: thousands 
of them. Months mean people slaughtered, maimed, stampeded, starved, tortured and raped by 
Assad's people.”390 
 A major difference between the commentary on Syria in 2015 and 2013 was a much 
reduced focus on the paralysing complexity of the war. This focus was certainly still visible in 
2015, with analysis in The Independent stating that “a map of the ground war would show a 
jigsaw puzzle of different parties in control of different bits of territory…there is an increasing 
risk of aircraft hitting the wrong target,”391 and a common refrain in several papers being “Syria 
is complex.”392 However, this type of commentary was significantly less ubiquitous than in 
2013. Additionally, it was increasingly countered with analysis that elements of Syria could 
and must be managed. This move from complexity to clarity arose as focus shifted from Assad 
to ISIS.  
The question of Assad’s removal disappeared completely in the wake of Russia and 
Iran’s staunch defence of him, with Bill Powell’s analysis in Newsweek that “Assad can stay 
in power for as long as his two patrons desire”393 echoing most wider commentary. Focus 
instead moved to ISIS. Unlike commentary on Assad in 2013, there was no moral ambiguity 
about the possible negative consequences of defeating ISIS, with the group regularly being 
described as “evil” or in similar terms,394 and with no mentions of a worse alternative ready to 
replace them if they were eliminated. Furthermore, focus on the feasibility of defeating ISIS 
was mixed, with frequent analysis across the spectrum of papers noting the difficulty but 
possibility of eliminating the group. The New York Times regularly published analysis on “the 
potential for using a combined air and ground operation to defeat the Islamic State,”395 and 
reporting in The Telegraph stated that “the bombing campaign against Isil has cut its oil 
revenues and squeezed its finances to a point where it is cutting fighters' pay.”396 Additionally, 
in the aftermath of prolonged Russian bombing reporting in tabloids took up a theme of 
highlighting fleeing ISIS fighters, such as Jerry Lawton’s report in The Daily Star of “panic 
and desertion spreading through the bloodthirsty Islamic warriors.”397  
Even before the Bataclan attacks, this kind of reporting on how ISIS could and should 
be defeated was often (like reporting on Russian assertiveness) accompanied by a denigration 
of perceived Western sluggishness and a call to join the fight against ISIS more directly. Niall 
Ferguson writing in The Evening Standard argued that “Syria has been ‘meetinged’ to death, 
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along with up to 330,000 of its citizens,”398 and the question “when the heck is Britain going 
to show it has the backbone to send in its bombers too?”399 being asked in The Daily Express. 
Even The Huffington Post (usually the most averse to publishing pro-military intervention 
opinions) published analysis that “there is absolutely a basis for intervention.”400  
Although ISIS had been described as a threat to British and international security before 
the Bataclan attacks in Paris on the 13th of November, in the aftermath of these attacks this type 
of commentary became extensive. Jason Burke writing in The Guardian stated that “events in 
Paris confirm that Isis has gone global,”401 while commentary in The Huffington Post argued 
that “the attacks in France this year have now brought this war to Europe”,402 and Catherine 
Philp writing in The Times described the attacks as “a major and dangerous evolution in the 
threat [ISIS] poses to the West.”403 In comparison to 2013 the seeming approach of British 
military action in Syria in the aftermath of the Bataclan attacks was met with far fewer mentions 
of the shadow of Iraq. Additionally, descriptions of Syria as a complex quagmire were met 
with the above-outlined arguments of the possibility of defeating ISIS and the urgency of the 
security objectives at hand.  
One of the most ubiquitous themes uniting the broad spectrum of newspapers in the 
aftermath of the Bataclan attacks was a solidarity with France, which appeared not only in the 
major national papers and specialist publications but also in almost every local newspaper 
(which usually covered international events more sporadically). It was reported in The 
Newcastle Chronicle that “united in grief, the people of the North East showed their defiant 
solidarity with the French after the Paris terror outrage,”404 while The Bristol Post published 
that “from football fans to students, Bristol stood in solidarity with the French after Friday’s 
deadly terrorist attacks in Paris,”405 while statements in The Scotsman declared that “we stand 
with the people of France”406 and Sam Leith writing in The Evening Standard described 
“London and Paris [as] kindred cities united in grief.”407  
Overall, reporting on Syria in 2015 reflected considerably stronger British senses of 
moral clarity and purpose than in 2013. This emerged through the sense of solidarity with 
France, the more clear-cut vision of ISIS as a morally unambiguous and possibly defeatable 
target, and the overarching frustration with the hesitancy and trepidation Britain (unlike Russia) 
had displayed in regard to Syria over the past years. 
 
Overall then, the most persistent media stories of the 2015 case centred around Syria, 
Russia, the EU, and refugees. Several themes from 2013 carried over into 2015, including a 
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sense of hostility between Russia and the West along with most commentary surrounding the 
EU. Nonetheless, the sense of powerlessness in the face of complexity regarding Syria was 
much less ubiquitous. It was also frequently countered with a focus on clearer moral goals and 
paths to defeating enemies. There was also a common sense of frustration at seeming 
sluggishness and inability to directly confront international issues, with these themes 
underlying much of the coverage of both Syria and the EU.  
Combining this with the commentary from 2013, we see the broad discursive 
landscapes that the British public were immersed in during my cases. As was outlined in 
Chapter Two, these landscapes formed a major discursive context that influenced the 
securitizations I am looking at by upholding, containing, and reflecting important visions and 
senses of the international world for the British public. Consequently, it was from these lines 
of discourse that I extracted precise articulations and identifications regarding Britain’s place 
on the international stage, documented their character and frequency over time via the research 
exercises outlined in the Methodology Chapter, and analysed their precise effects on 
securitizations (and securitizations’ effects on them). In the next chapters I will present this 




































Research Data and Hypothesis Tested 
 
 Chapter Abstract 
The aim of this chapter is to present the data that emerged from my research phases 
and to show how this data provides strong evidence supporting my hypothesis. The structure 
of the chapter is as follows. First, I overview my data on securitizing and anti-securitizing 
rhetoric from the 2013 case. I then overview my data on identifications from the same period, 
highlighting their strength, density, and alignment to the (anti-)securitizing rhetoric. In doing 
so, I reveal the audience receptivity which securitizing and anti-securitizing arguments would 
have enjoyed under the dynamics laid out within my hypothesis. I do this textually with the 
support of some highlighted graphs from my dataset, while remaining graphs can be found in 
the Appendix. I then do the same for the 2015 data, before detailing how combining my two 
cases of data provides strong empirical support for my hypothesis regarding how 
identifications affect securitizations. Aside from directly supporting my hypothesis, in this 
chapter I also highlight noteworthy data from within my dataset which sheds light on 
identification strength outside of and during securitizations, and which also provides 




This chapter aims to validate my hypothesis regarding how identifications affect 
securitization success by testing if this hypothesis can be empirically verified. 
To make this chapter as clear as possible, I will now summarise the data and what it 
reveals. I will then carefully elucidate the details of this data (and how it reveals what it does) 
over the course of the chapter. This summary is as follows.  
My hypothesis argued that the receptivity of the audience to the (anti-)securitizing 
argument will be determined by the co-locations between the argument and the audience’s 
identifications. As is re-summarised in the table below this paragraph, the audience will be 
most receptive to arguments that co-locate with identifications that are strong, thick, and 







Strong, Thick, Aligned +2 
Strong, Usually Thin, Aligned         +1.5 
Weak/Thin/Not Present                    +1 
Strong, Usually Thin, Misaligned    0 
Strong, Thick, Misaligned -1 
 
Recall that in 2013 the securitization failed and in 2015 the securitization succeeded. 
My data (which I detail in this chapter) revealed that in 2013 the anti-securitizing argument co-
located with identifications that were strong, thick, and aligned to the argument to a much 
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greater extent than did the securitizing argument. The anti-securitizing argument co-located 
mostly with identifications that were strong, thick and aligned, while the securitizing argument 
co-located mostly with identifications that were weak, thin, or usually thin. My hypothesis 
would therefore predict that in 2013 the audience would have been much less receptive to the 
securitizing argument than to the anti-securitizing argument, and consequently the 
identifications at play would have been conducive to a securitization failure. Additionally, my 
data revealed that in 2015 the securitizing argument co-located with identifications that were 
strong, thick, and aligned to the argument to a much greater extent than did the anti-securitizing 
argument. In this case, the securitizing argument co-located almost entirely with identifications 
that were strong, thick, and aligned, while the anti-securitizing argument co-located almost 
entirely with identifications that were weak or thin. My hypothesis would therefore predict that 
in 2015 the audience would have been much less receptive to the anti-securitizing argument 
than to the securitizing argument, and consequently the identifications at play would have been 
conducive to a securitization success. As such, my research into the two most similar 
securitizations in the 21st century – securitizations which were similar and in some ways 
identical across a range of important conditions, including securitizing move, securitizing 
actors, and surrounding political and cultural contexts – shows that the different outcomes of 
these highly similar securitizations can be explained by my hypothesis regarding the influence 
of identifications on securitizations.  
 I will now detail my data and show how it reveals the above. I will do so with the 
following structure. First, I overview my data on securitizing and anti-securitizing rhetoric 
from my 2013 case. I then overview my data on identifications from the same period, while at 
the same time highlighting how the identification data and securitization data relate to each 
other by showing the co-locations between 2013 (anti-)securitizing rhetoric and 2013 
identifications. I then do the same for my 2015 case. At this point, I combine the two cases of 
data to make clear how the data supports my hypothesis. Throughout this chapter, I present my 
data textually with the support of some important graphs from my dataset, while remaining 
graphs can be found in the Appendix (as indicated at relevant points in this chapter).  
 
2013 Securitizing and Anti-Securitizing Rhetoric 
 I begin this section by outlining the securitizing argument of 2013. The aim here is to 
extract and highlight the key rhetorical assertions that built this argument and their relative 
ubiquity. By doing so, I can then show how these assertions related to contemporary 
identifications, which will allow me to test my hypothesis. 
 
Securitizing Rhetoric 
Securitizing rhetoric was tracked via an analysis of all parliamentary and governmental 
statements made to the public during my case studies which developed the arguments that there 
were certain objects of worth under certain threats which could be resolved via actions which 
were appropriate and feasible. As public statements from parliamentary or governmental 
sources, these were very well documented in records that were easily accessible through 
government and public watchdog archives. These statements included official statements, 
document releases, speeches, public debates, and press conferences from Downing Street, the 
House of Commons, the House of Lords, the Prime Minister, the Foreign and Commonwealth 
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Office, the British UN Ambassador, and the Department for International Development, among 
others. Each of the original public documents I analysed including links to their sources can be 
found via Sheet Five in the Appendix. 
 In line with the breakdown of securitizing arguments which I outlined in Chapter Two, 
I analysed this securitizing rhetoric under key categories: arguments regarding the proposed 
object(s) of worth; arguments regarding the proposed threat(s) to this object; arguments 
regarding the feasibility of the proposed military air strikes to resolve this threat (in that, the 
air strikes can achieve what they set out to do); and arguments regarding the appropriateness 
of this proposed action. “Appropriateness” arguments were further sub-divided into two sets 
of arguments, one regarding the justness of the action (in that the action is appropriate because 
it is morally justified) and the other regarding the necessity of the action (in that the action is 
appropriate because there is no other course of action available for resolving the threat). This 
gives us five key categories of securitizing rhetoric, each of which are fundamental to the 
overall securitizing argument.  
It should be noted the rawest possible rhetorical assertion data can be found via Sheet 
Six in the Appendix. This Sheet contains links to opensource documents online in which I have 
included every rhetorical assertion I extracted from every public document which I analysed in 
both of my cases. Through Sheet Six you can see the original segments I coded for rhetorical 
assertions (both securitizing and anti-securitizing) and how I coded those segments. These 
segments are too numerous to attach directly to this thesis, which is why I have placed them in 
the opensource documents which are accessible via Sheet Six of the Appendix.  
I will begin by detailing the 2013 securitizing rhetoric which built the argument that the 
proposed military air strikes were “just”. It is important to view each sub-section (“just action” 
rhetorical assertions, “objects of worth” rhetorical assertions, etc.) separately like this because 
each sub-section forms a critical part of the overall argument, without which the argument as 
a whole is fundamentally lacking as a securitizing proposition. Note that a key Master Graph 
numerically backing up statements here such as “x assertion was made to a great extent” or “a 
large proportion of the argument consisted of y assertion” is included at the end of this section. 
More detailed graphs numerically presenting the data that underlies the textual descriptions 
here can be found in Sheet Seven of the Appendix. 
In 2013 the “just action” element of the securitizing argument was built from six 
rhetorical assertions, but the most commonly utilised assertion by far was that Assad had used 
chemical weapons against civilians. This assertion formed the core of the argument that the 
proposed policy of bombing Assad was justified, and indeed made up a large proportion of the 
overall securitizing argument. To a slightly lesser extent, but still quite persistently, the 
justification for the policy was backed up with the assertion that the policy was legal and 
proportionate, and that UN processes for authorising such military action would be respected. 
Some securitizing actors also tried to justify the military policy by making the point that UN 
processes did not necessarily have to be respected in order for this policy to be justified, and 
as such any doubts that UN processes were not being respected were irrelevant anyway. This 
indicated an uncertainty – or at least debatable quality – about the assertion that UN processes 
were being respected. Surprisingly, given the political and media climate of the time which so 
heavily and negatively referenced the securitization in relation to Iraq (as was outlined in 
Chapter Four), securitizing actors largely declined to point out differences between Syria 2013 
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and Iraq 2003 as a means of justifying the mission. A final assertion that was made to justify 
the proposed mission was that Assad was simply an illegitimate ruler who deserved removing, 
but by the end of the case this assertion was made only rarely and even sometimes refuted by 
other securitizing actors.  
It is noteworthy that this assertion that Assad was illegitimate and deserved removing 
formed the majority of the just action securitizing rhetoric for most of the case, with Assad’s 
illegitimacy forming 100% of the justifications at one point. Only in the last few days of the 
case did the assertion about the legality of the action form a significant proportion of the “just 
action” rhetoric, while the other assertions formed negligible proportions of this rhetoric until 
the final day of the case. This indicates a very rapid and indeed hasty reorientation of 
justifications at the last minute, an indication reinforced by the observation that the “Assad 
illegitimacy” point all but disappears on the final day of the case. The final “just action” 
argument as a whole sought to present the military policy as falling under a clear legal 
framework and as a response to a heinous act. In doing so it aimed to reduce the complexity of 
the situation and make it morally clear.  
 Then there is the element of the securitizing argument claiming that the action was 
necessary. Securitizing actors built this “necessity” argument on five core rhetorical assertions. 
By far the most ubiquitous of these was the assertion that international responsibilities had to 
be met, an assertion which made up over 42% of the argument that the policy was necessary. 
The vast majority of the remainder of the necessity argument was built from the vague assertion 
that inaction in this situation was simply impossible (this idea that we cannot do nothing), and 
the similar but more specific assertion that the use of chemical weapons could not go unreacted 
to. The necessity of doing something about the worsening humanitarian situation in Syria was 
also a major concern, though less ubiquitous than the above mentioned assertions. Overall, the 
necessity argument was rather unspecific, focusing mostly on the idea that “something” had to 
be done, or that doing nothing was not an option, revealing a lack of a clear rationale for the 
hastily put together security measure. This is reinforced by the fact that in the last ten days of 
the securitization these assertions underwent an almost total reorientation in terms of priority 
and emphasis, indicating again the unformed and unsure nature of the securitizing argument. 
By the end of the case just two assertions formed the majority of the “necessity” argument.  
 Next, there was the argument that the action was feasible. When building this argument, 
securitizing actors oscillated between several different and often unclear assertions. It is 
particularly telling that the most ubiquitous assertion made to defend the feasibility of the 
action was that risks and difficulties are always present in foreign and military policy, so the 
UK should not let the risks and difficulties associated with this mission deter the mission 
entirely. This is less a robust defence of the feasibility of the mission than it is a dismissal of 
arguments against its feasibility, a sort of “ignore how infeasible this seems” argument. A 
further common assertion defending the feasibility of the proposed mission was that there was 
no slippery slope in Syria (Britain would simply get in and get out). This assertion was more 
than a little out of place in a political and media environment dominated by the idea of the 
slippery slope (as was outlined in Chapter Four). More direct assertions regarding how the 
mission would be feasibly supported included claims that the mission would be backed up with 
both diplomatic efforts towards a political transition in Syria, that humanitarian relief would 
form a large backdrop to the military element of the mission, and that Britain had the support 
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of the international community. Surprisingly again, securitizing actors largely avoided pointing 
out that Syria 2013 was different to Iraq 2003 and hence more feasible, with this assertion 
forming less than 6% of the overall feasibility argument.  
 Next, there was the securitizing argument regarding what the object of worth under 
threat was. This argument was much more straightforward. It consisted of five rhetorical 
assertions, but two of these dominated the argument. Securitizing actors almost always asserted 
that the objects of worth under threat were Syrian civilians and/or the international norm of 
non-use of chemical weapons. The latter assertion was often backed up with the claim that 
international law and order in general was also under threat. Sometimes, but relatively rarely, 
securitizing actors asserted that Middle Eastern regional stability and Britain’s international 
reputation were also under threat, but these assertions were not nearly as ubiquitous as the 
others. The object of worth argument was one of the steadiest made in 2013, with Syrian 
civilians being either the most emphasised object of worth or a close second for the entirety of 
the case. Towards the end of the case, the norm of non-use of chemical weapons and the 
upholding of international law and order gained significantly in prominence, while Middle 
Eastern regional stability and Britain’s credibility also made slight gains. Securitizing actors 
were therefore far steadier regarding what they proposed they were defending than they were 
regarding how/why they could defend these things through military air strikes.  
 Finally, there was the argument regarding what was threatening these objects of worth. 
Very interestingly, securitizing actors rarely described external actors as the threat to the 
delineated objects of worth, with the assertion that Assad was a threat to Syrian civilians 
making up just over 10% of the argument about threats. Instead, rather than assigning threat 
status to a clear “other”, securitizing actors asserted that it was actually British inaction that 
was threatening the objects of worth. The most ubiquitous assertion here was that British 
inaction threatened the international norm of non-use of chemical weapons. This was closely 
followed by the assertion that British inaction would threaten the livelihood of Syrian civilians. 
The final assertion in this argument was that British inaction would threaten international law 
and order itself. While the argument that Assad was a threat to Syrian civilians maintained a 
prominence for the entirety of the case, it dropped significantly in the final stretch to make way 
for the three other proposed threats. This threat ascription is intriguing, as it focuses on Britain 
itself as generating a threat through inaction, rather than foreign actors as generating a threat 
through their actions. While the two are implicitly connected, the explicit emphasis here is very 
much on British action as the necessary ingredient for the deterrence of threats.  
In the below graph, we can now separate and highlight the main assertions forming the 
core of the full securitizing rhetoric. This graph shows us that by the end of the case the core 
of the securitizing rhetoric oriented largely around chemical weapons, Syrian civilians, and 






 The above outlining of the 2013 securitizing argument and the assertions that built it is 
fully displayed numerically on the Master Graph on the next page. More detailed graphs 
showing the precise proportions of assertions in the individual argument elements (the just 
action element, necessity of action element, etc.) both statically and longitudinally can be found 
in Sheet Seven in the Appendix. 
 
Anti-Securitizing Rhetoric 
Having outlined the 2013 securitizing rhetoric, I will now outline the 2013 anti-
securitizing rhetoric, before then presenting the 2013 identifications and showing how these 
identifications co-located with this securitizing and anti-securitizing rhetoric. During my case 
periods, anti-securitizing rhetoric was not publicly documented as efficiently as securitizing 
rhetoric. Securitizing actors came mostly from the governing political party of the time, along 
with the governing Cabinet and senior political figures such as the UN Ambassador. When 
such figures released statements, they were quickly and systematically made part of the public 
record of governance documents. This facilitates analysing and consistently comparing them 
over time in an analytically sound manner. Meanwhile, most (though not all) anti-securitizing 
rhetoric came from opposition parties and peripheral political figures. These figures’ public 
statements, press briefings, and office releases – beyond those which were given in the Houses 
of Commons and Lords or at party conferences – were not as systematically documented, being 
mostly summarised and cut down in various media outlets and online political tracking blogs. 
They were therefore not conducive to a data set that could lay claim to analytical consistency, 
a holistic representation of anti-securitizing rhetoric, or a longitudinal comparability to the 
securitizing rhetoric dataset. Nonetheless, the anti-securitizing argument laid out in the final 
Commons debate on the motion to authorise military action in Syria was fully documented and 
is suitably comparable to the securitizing argument data documented in the same debate. As 







2013 Securitizing Rhetoric 
Main Concerns 
Action Will Be Legal And Proportionate
Assad Has (Very Likely) Used Chemical Weapons Against
Civilians
International Responsibilities Must Be Met
Upholding International Law and Order






that debate and will be compared only to the securitizing rhetoric from that final debate. The 
transcript of the anti-securitizing side of this debate can be found via Sheet Five in the 
Appendix, while every segment of anti-securitizing rhetoric that I coded for rhetorical 
assertions can be viewed via Sheet Six in the Appendix. 
I will now outline the data on the proportional deployment of rhetoric building the 
argument that the proposed air strikes were not just, not necessary, and not feasible, along with 
rhetoric asserting what the anti-securitizing actors believed the objects of worth to be. The 
proportion of the anti-securitizing argument that concerned misidentified threats was too small 
(only 1.6% of the anti-securitizing rhetoric as a whole) to extract meaningful data from. 
Anti-securitizing rhetoric arguing that the proposed mission was unjust relied most 
heavily on the assertion that UN resolutions and processes were necessary for the action to be 
just but were being ignored. This was backed up with the commonly made assertion that the 
action would not be legal if it went ahead, with these two assertions combined making up 43% 
of the unjust mission argument. It is interesting to note that the second most common assertion 
in this argument was the idea that Assad may not have used chemical weapons. This was an 
assertion that went against almost all available evidence at the time, but which reflected an 
overarching lack of British confidence in their understanding of the Middle East, which they 
saw as complex, difficult to make sense of, and uncontrollable, as was laid out in Chapter Four. 
Other less common assertions forwarded the ideas that the action was unjust because the British 
public were against it, because it would contribute to Syrians’ suffering, and because the use 
of chemical weapons does not necessarily justify war. Overall, this “unjust action” argument 
appeals to the British concern with complexity by passing responsibility for a situation that is 
hard to grasp on to higher authorities, and additionally by applying clear-cut legal frameworks 
and jurisdictions to the problem at hand.  
Next, there was the argument that the action was unnecessary. This was a highly 
monolithic argument. Over half of the overall argument was built from the single assertion that 
the mission had been put together too quickly and that not enough facts were yet known. The 
only other assertion that built a significant chunk of the “unnecessary action” argument was 
that diplomacy and the UN should be utilised more before opting to take a military route. The 
rest of the argument was built from assertions that other nations should take responsibility, that 
humanitarian and legal tools should be pursued first instead, and that Britain did not simply 
have to follow America’s lead, along with often vague invocations of Iraq 2003 and how that 
mission had not been necessary either. The “unnecessary action” argument complements the 
“unjust action” argument above, as it plays off an underlying discomfort with taking action 
when a situation still is not fully understood, along with a continuing affinity for doubt rather 
than leaps of faith in the face of missing information. Combined, these arguments appeal to a 
desire to pass the buck onto other nations or at least into the future. 
Then there was the argument that the proposed mission was not feasible. As the below 
graph shows, this argument was built from a large number of different assertions. The majority 
of these assertions are oriented around the core ideas that Syria is set to worsen, that British 
action will only add to this degeneration, and that the situation is not clear-cut enough to be 
confident in positive results. This fits very well with the above arguments that Britain simply 
does not have the understanding or the influence to make a positive difference in such a volatile 





Finally, there was the anti-securitizing argument regarding what the object of worth 
was. Anti-securitizing actors most commonly asserted that a stable Syria for Syrians was what 
was most in need of defending, and that the proposed action would not deliver on this need. 
Indeed, this assertion took up almost half of the overall “objects of worth” argument. The next 
most common assertion in this regard was that Middle Eastern regional stability itself was at 
stake, and that this stability would be undermined by the proposed action. These two assertions 
complemented each other and painted a picture of a Syria that would only get worse if meddled 
with. The remaining two objects of worth assertions partly agreed with the securitizing 
argument, claiming that the norm of non-use of chemical weapons and the upholding of 
international law were both in need of defending. 















Consequences Are Worryingly Unknown
Region Could Destabilise
Syrian Civil War Could Escalate/Worsen
Slippery Slope/Expanding Mission Possible
Objectives/Strategies Are Unclear/Confused
Remember Iraq
War Will Cost Too Much (Lives/Resources)
Action May Not Be Enough To Deter Chemical
Weapons Use
Action Will Not Improve Things (Vague)





The above graph shows that the core anti-securitizing concerns oriented themselves 
around the ideas that Britain did not fully understand the situation in Syria and needed more 
evidence and clearer objectives, that action may well make the situation worsen, that there was 
a slippery slope, that UN resolutions were necessary but being ignored, that the object of worth 
was a stable Syria for Syrians, and that British action may not be enough to stop chemical 
weapons being used. 
The above outlining of the 2013 anti-securitizing argument and the assertions that built 
it is fully displayed numerically on the Master Graph on the next page. More detailed graphs 
showing the precise proportions of assertions in the individual argument elements (the unjust 
action element, the unnecessary action element, etc.) both statically and longitudinally can be 
found in Sheet Seven in the Appendix. 
 
Having outlined the 2013 securitizing and anti-securitizing rhetoric, I will now present 
the 2013 identifications and show how these identifications co-located with this securitizing 
and anti-securitizing rhetoric. In and of itself, the identification data I have uncovered and will 
present here also reveals much about core British attitudes towards Britain as an international 
actor, what Britain should stand for, what ability it has to pursue these goals, who its friends 
are, and where British international anxieties lie. These shifting identifications have significant 
implications for Britain’s future direction as an international actor, which I will highlight 
towards the end of this chapter. The presentation of this identification data will therefore be 
geared both towards presenting information necessary for answering my core research question 
and towards illuminating major and shifting elements of modern British identifications. 
 
2013 Identifications and Co-Locations 
Before going through this data, I will outline a few important points on its presentation. 
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Remember Iraq
British People Are Not in Favour of Action
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Action Could Escalate/Worsen Syrian Civil War
Slippery Slope/Expanding Mission Possible
Objectives/Strategies Are Unclear/Confused
Action May Not Be Enough To Deter Chemical Weapons
Use





place on the international stage” as the British public’s “international identifications”. As I laid 
out previously, I am focusing on international identifications because the securitizations I am 
looking at regarded international issues, international actors, and purported international 
threats, with the primary proposed remedy to these international threats in both cases being the 
military of the British nation-state. Consequently, British identifications that were more 
domestically focused, such as Britain as the country of the NHS or the royal family, were not 
relevant for this study.  
 
Identifications and Identification Points 
As I detailed in the Methodology Chapter, my analysis of discourse was aimed at 
extracting articulations regarding Britain’s place on the international stage. Once these raw 
articulations were gathered, however, they were too numerous and individually specific to 
serve as usable data points with which to examine identifications. Consequently, they were 
grouped under higher categories which illustrated the underlying identification point that these 
articulations oriented themselves around and expressed.  
For instance, an identification point might be “Britain’s Deference to International 
Institutions,” which encompasses normative articulations of Britain’s position relative to 
international institutions (should these international institutions supersede British 
autonomy/sovereignty or not?). All articulations regarding Britain’s deference to international 
institutions (for instance the articulations “Britain must respect UN decisions” and “Britain 
should disregard international treaties”) were grouped under this identification point.408 These 
identification points were not pre-conceived but rather emerged from the data based on 
entities/concepts (such as deference to international institutions) that numerous articulations 
commonly regarded.  
While an identification point only refers to the entity/concept that articulations regard, 
identifications refer to both the entity/concept and how this entity/concept is regarded. For 
instance, under the identification point “Britain’s Deference to International Institutions,” we 
have the associated identifications “Britain should defer to international institutions” (under 
which all articulations expressing that Britain should defer were grouped) and “Britain should 
not defer to international institutions” (under which all articulations expressing that Britain 
should not defer were grouped). This is re-illustrated in the below table. 
 
Identification Point  
“Deference to International Institutions” 
Identification  
“Britain should defer 
to international institutions” 
Identification  
“Britain should not defer 
































                                                          
408 Note that one articulation can be grouped under several different identification points simultaneously. 
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Condensed Data Presentation 
As I laid out in Chapter Two, identifications have three major characteristics, strength, 
density, and alignment of their content to the (anti-)securitizing argument. Here, I will 
simultaneously present my data on these three characteristics with the aid of the following type 
of diagram: Condensed Segments. Here is an example Condensed Segment. 
 
 
Here is the legend for Condensed Segments. 
 
As the legend here outlines, at the point of the Condensed Segment we see the 
identification point. On the green and red spaces, we see the two competing identifications 
concerning this identification point, one of which holds that Britain should be active/forthright 
on the international stage, and the other of which holds that Britain should be internationally 
restrained. Outside them, we see yellow bars indicating the content and frequency of the five 
most common articulations underlying each of these identifications. In the centre we see black 
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dashes, which quickly indicate the density of the identification point and underlying 
identifications (which in the example Segment is persistently thick). 
Then there is the blue bars pointing to the green and red spaces. These simultaneously 
illustrate the “content balance” of this identification point and the strength of the underlying 
identifications. These terms require clarification. As I detailed in the Methodology Chapter, a 
dominant identification and its content are defined by the balance of articulations grouped 
under an identification point at a given moment. If, at a certain moment, articulations 
expressing that Britain should be internationally active far outweigh those that express that it 
should not, then this reflects that the dominant identification for this identification point in this 
moment is that Britain should be internationally active. 
An identification’s strength is defined by whether or not this content balance changes 
over time. If the content balance never changes (i.e. if the “be active” articulations always 
outweigh the “be restrained” articulations), then we have only one dominant identification and 
it is strong. On the other hand, if this content balance changes sides over time (i.e. if at one 
point the “be active” side outweighs the “be restrained” side, but at another point this is not the 
case) then this would indicate that at different times we have dominant “be active” and “be 
restrained” identifications, but they are both weak identifications 
As is explained in this legend, the position of the blue bars in these Segments indicates 
the range of content balances over time, and consequently the strength of the dominant 
identifications. 
 
Position of Blue Bars Strength of  
Identification 
Bars are all on one side  
(just green side or just red side) 
Strong 
Bars are on both sides  
(both green and red sides) 
Weak 
 
Looking at the example Condensed Segment, re-illustrated on the next page, we see 
that the content balance for the “Mode of International Activity” identification point swung 
from between a +100% balance on the side of the “Britain should be active” identification to a 
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+40% balance on the side of the “Britain should be active” identification. As indicating a swing 
from 100% on the “Active side” to 40% on the “Active” side requires blue bars all of which 
are on the “Active” side, the example segment quickly indicates the presence of one strong, 
persistently thick identification holding that Britain should be an internationally active nation.  
 
Note that detailed graphs breaking down all the information contained within 
Condensed Segments are located in Sheet Eight of the Appendix. 
 
Content Categories 
As a final point, I laid out in Chapter Two that identification content was broken down 
into content regarding national norms, influence, affiliations/estrangements, perceptions in the 
eyes of others, and history. Identifications under each category filter in/out specific types of 
securitizing rhetoric that they co-locate with, as I laid out in Fig. 2 from Chapter Two 
(reproduced below). 
 
          
However, looking at this graphic we can see that “perceptions in the eyes of others” 
content has the same co-locations as “affiliations/estrangements” content, in that they both co-




with threatening intentions. Additionally, over the course of my research it became clear that 
almost all “perceptions in the eyes of others” articulations acted simultaneously as articulations 
regarding “affiliations/estrangements” (for instance the articulation “Russia views Britain as a 
pushover”). Essentially then, “perceptions in the eyes of others” articulations mapped onto and 
did the same work as “affiliations/estrangements” articulations. As such, to simplify the 
extensive data here, articulations on “perceptions in the eyes of others” have been treated as a 
sub-set of “affiliations/estrangements” data rather than being displayed separately. 
Additionally, as I laid out in Chapter Two and as I indicated in Fig. 2 above, history 
content serves to back up the filtering processes performed by the other content categories. As 
such, to make the data I gathered more efficient I sorted articulations on British history under 
the identification content category these articulations were backing up. For instance, the 
statement “Russia has always been working against Britain in some way” would have been 
sorted under the affiliation/estrangement identification “Russia has an antagonistic relationship 
with Britain.” As such, as I present my data on identifications below I will divide these 
identifications into three main categories, namely British international identifications regarding 
norms, relative influence, and affiliations/estrangements. 
 
I will now present and unpack my identification data from 2013. In 2013 there were 24 
identification points. The Master Graphs on the next two pages provide us with a snapshot of 























I will now break these identification points down and unpack the data within each set 
of identifications, so as to extract the core data necessary to empirically evidence my 
hypothesis. I will start with the normative identification points. 
 
Normative Identifications 
As the extracted Condensed Segment below shows, a large number of articulations in 
2013 oriented themselves around the question of whether it was normatively desirable for 
Britain to have an active international military role. These articulations fell under two distinct 
identifications. The first identification held that Britain should be militarily active, and was 
supported mainly by articulations stating that military operations are effective tools, back up 
diplomacy, show a willingness to use force, and engender an acceptable level of risk. A second 
identification held that Britain should not be militarily active, and was supported by 
articulations stating that military operations worsen conflicts, are ineffective, worsen civilian 
conditions, and are hard to get out of. However, the content balance was always in favour of 
the identification holding that Britain should not be militarily active. Additionally, these 
articulations were mostly primed towards the end of the case, going through long periods of 
infrequent and even entirely absent priming, hence making the identification here usually thin. 
This means that we have one strong, usually thin identification holding that Britain should not 
be militarily active. 
 
 
 How did this identification co-locate with securitizing and anti-securitizing arguments? 
Starting with the securitizing argument, we can see that this identification co-locates with two 
of the previously outlined securitizing rhetorical assertions. The first is the assertion that risks 
and difficulties are ever present with military operations and that their presence should not 
deter military activity. This assertion is misaligned with this strong, usually thin identification, 
as the identification is built from articulations precisely stating that risks and difficulties of 
military activity make military activity unacceptable. Next, there is the securitizing assertion 
that the proposed mission was designed to protect Syrian civilians as an object of worth. This 
assertion is misaligned with this strong, usually thin identification, as the identification is built 
from articulations explicitly stating that military operations worsen civilian conditions and 
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conflicts in general. This identification also co-locates with five rhetorical assertions in the 
anti-securitizing argument. These are the assertions that the military action will contribute to 
Syrians’ suffering, that humanitarianism would be more effective, that international legal 
routes would be more effective, that war is too costly, and that it would not achieve any 
deterrence of chemical weapons. The identification aligns with all of these anti-securitizing 
assertions, as it is built on articulations regarding the ineffectiveness of military operations and 
the idea that military operations worsen civilian conditions. 
 What do these (mis)alignments mean for audience receptivity? Recall the receptivity 






Strong, Thick, Aligned +2 
Strong, Usually Thin, Aligned         +1.5 
Weak/Thin/Not Present                    +1 
Strong, Usually Thin, Misaligned    0 
Strong, Thick, Misaligned -1 
 
By applying these scores to above securitizing assertions based on their identification 
co-locations, we see that both of the securitizing assertions would get a receptivity score of 0 
(because they co-locate with a strong, usually thin, and misaligned identification). Next, by 
looking at the previously presented Master Graph which showed the entirety of the 2013 
securitizing argument (on page 123), we can see that these two securitizing assertions 
combined made up 16.4% of the securitizing argument. As such, 16.4% of the securitizing 
argument gets a receptivity score of 0.  
Meanwhile, each of the anti-securitizing assertions would have received a score of +1.5 
(because they co-locate with a strong, usually thin, and aligned identification). These assertions 
combined made up 13.1% of the anti-securitizing argument, as we can see in the previously 
presented Master Graph showing the entirety of the 2013 anti-securitizing argument (on page 
127). As such, the anti-securitizing argument so far has a receptivity score of 19.65 (13.1×1.5). 
Consequently, at this point the securitizing argument has a receptivity score of 0 and the anti-
securitizing argument has a score of 19.65.  
 
2013 Securitizing Argument  
Receptivity Score So Far 
2013 Anti-Securitizing Argument 
Receptivity Score So Far 
0 19.65 
 
As I go through the identifications and their alignments to (anti-)securitizing rhetoric I 
will keep track of these receptivity scores, so we can see the relative receptivity that the two 
arguments would have received. This will steadily reveal how my data supports the hypothesis 
that higher/lower audience receptivity generated by certain identification-assertion co-




 Next, there are the normative identifications regarding Britain’s mode of international 
activity. Several articulations in 2013 oriented themselves around the question of whether it 
was normatively desirable for Britain to be an active player on the international stage. In fact, 
as the below Condensed Segment shows, this was a persistently thick identification point, being 
regularly primed throughout the 2013 case. The first identification here held that Britain should 
be internationally active, and was built from articulations stating that Britain cannot remain 
inactive or removed from the international stage, that standing back allows for problems to 
emerge, that the UK should step up international problems, and that the UK should demonstrate 
forthright leadership internationally. The competing identification held that Britain should be 
internationally restrained, and was built from articulations stating that restraint was pragmatic, 
meddling abroad makes things worse, that Britain should avoid hubristic actions, and that 
international activity was always risky. Over the course of the 2013 case, the balance of 
articulations for this identification point was always on the side of the Britain should be 
internationally active identification, making this a strong, persistently thick identification.
 
 
 This identification co-located with two assertions from the 2013 securitizing argument 
and none from the 2013 anti-securitizing argument. In the securitizing argument, the 
identification co-located with the assertion that the use of banned chemical weapons simply 
could not go unreacted to, and the assertion that inaction was simply impossible (that something 
had to be done). It aligned with both of these assertions, as it was built from articulations stating 
that the UK cannot stand back from problems and that it simply cannot be internationally 
inactive. As such, both of these assertions co-located with strong, thick, and aligned 
identifications, and therefore receive a receptivity score of +2. These assertions combined made 
up 4.8% of the securitizing argument, therefore adding 9.6 (4.8×2) to the securitizing 
argument’s receptivity score. 
 
2013 Securitizing Argument  
Receptivity Score So Far 
2013 Anti-Securitizing Argument 





 Then there is the identification point regarding Britain’s commitment to international 
duties and bonds. The first identification here held that Britain should be committed to 
international duties, and was built from articulations stating that Britain must defend human 
rights abroad, had humanitarian duties generally, had duties to migrants, had duties to civilians 
in other countries, and should take part in international coalitions. The other identification 
rejected the idea that Britain was internationally duty-bound, and was built from the 
articulations that the UK had no duties to migrants, that Britain needed to be more sovereign 
and less internationally tied, and that international aid was a waste of resources. Over the course 
of 2013, the balance between these articulations expressing that Britain was or was not 
internationally duty-bound changed from one identification to the other, meaning that these 
were two weak identifications. 
 
 
 These weak identifications co-located with four assertions in the 2013 securitizing 
argument and one in the anti-securitizing argument. In this case, the question of whether or not 
the identifications aligned or misaligned with the assertions is irrelevant, as weak 
identifications give the assertions they co-locate with a receptivity score of +1, regardless of 
alignment.409 In the securitizing argument, the identifications co-located with the assertions 
that international responsibilities must be met, that the international community was calling for 
something to be done, and that international law and order and human rights were being 
threatened and had to be protected. Each of these assertions therefore receive a receptivity score 
of +1. These assertions combined made up 15.3% of the securitizing argument, hence adding 
15.3 to the securitizing argument’s receptivity score. In the anti-securitizing argument, the 
identifications co-located with the assertion that UN processes needed to be respected and 
abided by. This assertion therefore receives a receptivity score of +1. The assertion made up 
5% of the anti-securitizing argument, hence adding 5 to the anti-securitizing argument’s 
receptivity score. 
                                                          
409 Recall from my hypothesis in Figure 1 that alignment only matters if an identification is strong, as only 
strong identifications will reject arguments they misalign with, while weak identifications may well bend to 




2013 Securitizing Argument  
Receptivity Score So Far 
2013 Anti-Securitizing Argument 
Receptivity Score So Far 
24.9 24.65 
 
 A further normative identification point that emerged from the data came from 
articulations stating that Britain should or should not defer to international institutions. As the 
below Condensed Segment shows, this identification point was built from only a small number 
of articulations. These were primed infrequently, making these identifications usually thin, but 
they did go through periods of very strong priming, being expressed in great volume towards 
the end of the case. The first identification here held that Britain must defer to the rule of 
international institutions, and was built from the articulations that international law must be 
respected and that only the UN could provide justifications and permissions for a country to go 
to war. The second identification held that Britain did not have to defer to international 
institutions, and was built from the articulations that UN approval was not necessary to go to 
war, and that international law did not have to be respected. Throughout the case, the balance 
of articulations here was firmly on the side of the identification holding that Britain had to defer 
to international institutions, making this a strong, usually thin identification.   
 
 
 This identification co-located with five assertions from the 2013 securitizing argument 
and three from the anti-securitizing argument. In the securitizing argument, this strong, usually 
thin identification aligned with the assertions that the proposed mission would be just because 
it was legal and because it respected UN processes, and with the assertion that the international 
norm of non-use of chemical weapons was an object of worth that Britain had to protect. These 
assertions therefore receive a receptivity score of +1.5. Combined, they made up 18% of the 
securitizing argument, thus adding 27 to the securitizing argument’s receptivity score. The 
identification misaligned with the securitizing assertion that UN processes did not necessarily 
have to be respected in order for the action to justified, and therefore that assertion receives a 
receptivity score of 0. On the anti-securitizing side, the identification aligns with the assertions 
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that the mission needed to be legal, needed to respect UN processes, and that the international 
norm of non-use of chemical weapons was something Britain had to protect. These assertions 
therefore also receive a receptivity score of +1.5. Combined, they made up 10.3% of the anti-
securitizing argument, therefore adding 15.45 to the anti-securitizing argument’s receptivity 
score. 
 
2013 Securitizing Argument  
Receptivity Score So Far 
2013 Anti-Securitizing Argument 
Receptivity Score So Far 
51.9 40.1 
 
 The final normative identification point concerned Britain’s normative duty to respond 
to chemical weapons usage. The articulations building this identification point supported an 
identification holding that Britain could not ignore the use of chemical weapons. Nonetheless, 




 This identification co-located with one assertion in the securitizing argument and none 
in the anti-securitizing argument. In the securitizing argument, this strong, usually thin 
identification aligned with the assertion that the Assad’s likely use of chemical weapons 
justified a response, giving this assertion a receptivity score of +1.5. This assertion made up 
10.5% of the securitizing argument, therefore adding 15.8 to the securitizing argument’s 
receptivity score. 
 
2013 Securitizing Argument  
Receptivity Score So Far 
2013 Anti-Securitizing Argument 




 I will now turn to British identifications regarding British influence over Syria and the 
Middle East. In 2013 seven British identification points concerned Britain’s influence in the 
Middle East, in particular Syria. These seven identification points broadly refer to different 
aspects of Britain’s self-image as an (un)influential supporter and guardian of democracy and 
stability in the Middle East. These points concentrated on Britain’s ability to support 
democracy in Egypt, Britain’s ability to spread democracy/stability to the Middle East, 
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Britain’s diplomatic influence over Syria, clarity of Britain’s role in Syria, the Syria Crisis’ 
trajectory, Britain’s ability to see moderate rebels prevail, and Syria-Iraq parallels.  
While the first three of these points are relatively straightforward, the latter four can be 
unpacked quickly. The clarity of Britain’s role in Syria point refers to the British public’s sense 
of purpose and coherence in their role in Syria. It encompasses identifications holding that 
Britain has a clear/manageable role in Syria or that this role is complex/hard to understand. 
This point is comprised of articulations referring to the worthiness of Britain’s goals in Syria, 
the reliability of its relationships in Syria, and its ability to foresee its future path in Syria. The 
Syria Crisis’ trajectory point refers to how Britain identifies Syria with unstoppable 
deterioration (and consequently how it identifies Britain with powerlessness in Syria), while 
the Britain’s ability to see moderate rebels prevail point refers to identifications holding that 
Britain has/does not have the influence to aid the moderate rebels in Syria to victory. Finally, 
the Syria-Iraq parallel point is comprised of articulations that co-locate the 2003 Iraq 
experience with the 2013 Syrian situation, or which state that the two are distinct. 
The majority of these identification points were persistently thick throughout the 2013 
case. The only two that were usually thin are the Syria-Iraq parallel and diplomatic influence 
over Syria points. Indeed, these were some of the thickest identifications in the 2013 case. This 
shows that the identification of Britain as an (un)influential supporter and guardian of 
democracy and stability in the Middle East formed a fundamental part of Britain’s international 
identifications in this period, constantly being primed and invoked to very high levels. These 
identifications directly impacted Britain’s sense of what it could achieve and what kind of 
international missions were feasible. Additionally, these identifications related to a specific 
aspect of Britain’s influence (Britain’s influence in a specific region), an aspect which directly 
impacted visions of the feasibility of the mission the securitization proposed. These 
identifications’ combined thickness and specific relevance to the securitization makes them 
particularly important identifications for this case study. 
Moreover, the finding that such a substantial portion of the articulations in 2013 
concern Britain’s ability to influence the exact part of the world that the securitization (which 
took place at the end of the case) later proposed influencing is quite significant. It shows that  
for months before the securitization took place the discursive bedrock not only of general 
international identifications relevant to a securitization (such as basic British norms and the 
influence of other nation-states generally) but indeed the discursive bedrock of very specific 
identifications relevant to exactly this securitization (Britain’s influence in Syria precisely) was 
being laid. This evidences the idea that by observing national identifications over time one can 
uncover the information relevant to upcoming securitizations that are not yet in motion or 
indeed predicted. This is a particularly useful insight, as it lends weight to the idea that the 
content of an upcoming securitization (which usually cannot be known) does not need to be 
known in order to apply this method and use it to gauge receptivity to securitizations that later 
emerge. 
 Not only were these some of the thickest identifications of the 2013 case, but they were 
also some of the strongest. Five identifications here were very strong, and there were only two 
weak identifications holding that Britain has and does not have diplomatic influence in Syria. 
These five very strong and persistently thick identifications identify Britain with an inability to 
support democracy in Egypt, Britain with an inability to spread democracy/stability to the 
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Middle East, Britain’s role in Syria with unclarity and complexity, Britain with a weak ability 
to support moderate rebels in Syria, and Syria with unstoppable deterioration. 
With the exception of the weak and usually thin identification of Britain with diplomatic 
influence in the Middle East, every one of these identifications identifies Britain with low 
influence in Syria and the Middle East, painting an unmistakable vision of powerlessness in 
the region the British focused on the most. Coupling this information on British senses of 
powerlessness with the above data on British desires to be internationally active and to not 
ignore the use of chemical weapons in Syria, we see a nation notably torn between what it 
desires to be and what it feels it can do; a potent recipe for the kind of hesitation and proposals 
lacking follow-through that we see in the 2013 securitization process. 
I will now go through these identifications individually and show how they co-located 
with the (anti-)securitizing arguments of 2013. First there is the identification regarding the 
clarity of Britain’s role in Syria. This was a very strong and persistently thick identification 
holding that Britain’s role in Syria was complex and difficult to understand. It was built from 
articulations that stated that the rebels in Syria (which Britain was claiming to back and defend) 
were fractious and contained jihadists, that Syria was a slippery slope, that the Syrian crisis 
was not abating, and that the West had no vision for Syria. 
 
This strong, thick, identification mis-aligned with one assertion from the securitizing 
argument. This was the assertion that there was no slippery slope in Syria, which went directly 
against a core articulation building this identification, and consequently received a receptivity 
score of -1. This assertion made up 3.2% of the securitizing argument, therefore reducing the 
securitizing argument’s receptivity score by 3.2. The identification aligned with four assertions 
from the anti-securitizing argument. These were the assertions that the mission’s justifications 
were unclear and lacked evidence, that the consequences of the mission were worryingly 
unknown, that a slippery slope was on the horizon, and that the mission’s objectives were 
unclear and confused. Each of these assertions aligned with the strong and thick identification 
of Syria with complexity and unclarity, and consequently receive a score of +2. Combined, 
these assertions made up 24.5% of the anti-securitizing argument, therefore adding 49 to the 
anti-securitizing argument’s receptivity score. 
 
2013 Securitizing Argument  
Receptivity Score So Far 
2013 Anti-Securitizing Argument 





Next there is the identification regarding the trajectory of the Syrian crisis. This was a 
very strong and persistently thick identification which identified the Syrian crisis with 
unstoppable deterioration, and was built from articulations stating that the humanitarian crisis 
was dire and deteriorating, that the situation as a whole was worsening, that the wider region 




This strong, thick identification aligned with one assertion from the securitizing 
argument, the assertion that the action was necessary because the Syrian crisis was worsening 
fast, hence giving this assertion a receptivity score of +2. This assertion made up 1.6% of the 
securitizing argument, hence adding 3.2 to the securitizing argument’s receptivity score. The 
identification misaligned with one assertion from the securitizing argument, the assertion that 
it was possible to bring about a political solution to the crisis in Syria, hence giving this 
assertion a score of -1. This assertion made up 2.7% of the securitizing argument, hence 
reducing the receptivity score by 2.7. The identification aligned with three assertions from the 
anti-securitizing argument. These were the assertions claiming that the region was likely to 
destabilise, that Syria was likely to deteriorate, and that the action had little hope of improving 
things. These assertions therefore receive a score of +2. These assertions made up 12.5% of the 
anti-securitizing argument, hence adding 25 to the anti-securitizing argument’s receptivity 
score. 
 
2013 Securitizing Argument  
Receptivity Score So Far 
2013 Anti-Securitizing Argument 
Receptivity Score So Far 
65 114.1 
 
Next, there are the identifications regarding Britain’s diplomatic influence over Syria. 
There were two identifications for this point, one holding that Britain had a high diplomatic 
influence and the other holding that it had a low diplomatic influence, with both identifications 






These weak identifications co-located with only one assertion, which was from the anti-
securitizing argument. This was the assertion that more diplomacy could be tried first before 
the proposed mission, hence giving this assertion a receptivity score of +1. This assertion made 
up 4% of the anti-securitizing argument, hence adding 4 to the anti-securitizing argument’s 
receptivity score. 
 
2013 Securitizing Argument  
Receptivity Score So Far 
2013 Anti-Securitizing Argument 
Receptivity Score So Far 
65 118.1 
 
 Then there was the identification of Syria 2013 with Iraq 2003. This identification was 
usually thin but quite strong, built from the articulation made to a great extent towards the end 




This identification aligned with two assertions from the anti-securitizing argument, 
which were the identifications holding that the mission was unjustified and unnecessary as it 
too closely resembled the rush to war in Iraq in 2003. These assertions therefore receive a 
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receptivity score of +1.5. Combined, they made up 3.4% of the anti-securitizing argument, 
hence adding 5.1 to the anti-securitizing argument’s receptivity score. 
 
2013 Securitizing Argument  
Receptivity Score So Far 
2013 Anti-Securitizing Argument 
Receptivity Score So Far 
65 123.2 
 
Finally, there were three identifications regarding Britain’s influence in the Middle East 
that did not co-locate with any assertion from either argument. These were the strong, and 
persistently thick identifications holding that Britain did not have the influence necessary to 
bring the Syrian rebels to victory and that Britain did not have the ability to spread democracy 
to Egypt or the Middle East. These identifications and the articulations that built them are 







Influence of International Actors Identifications 
I will now turn to British identifications regarding the influence of international actors, 
specifically the US, the EU, Assad, Russia, the West, and of course Britain itself. Note that 
these six actors appear here simply as a result of the articulations expressed by the British in 
2013. These are the actors that the British focused on and to which they attributed high/low 
influence. Whether or not other actors who “actually” have more influence should be listed 
here and whether or not these six really are “actors” with influence (it is particularly debateable 
whether or not “the West” is an actor) is beside the point that the British attributed actor status 
and some level of influence to these entities.  
Only two of the six identification points regarding international actors’ influence were 
persistently thick during the 2013 case. These are the points concerning Britain and America’s 
international influence, which were frequently articulated whether or not specific momentary 
events were invoking senses of these countries’ influence. Other actors’ influence, in particular 
that of the EU and Russia, invoked identifications only in specific moments related to 
immediate events. The EU Influence point was only thick at the beginning of the case when 
questions of the EU’s potential to impact the Egyptian crisis were raised, while the Russian 
Influence point was thick only towards the end of the case when the debate over how to respond 
to chemical weapons usage in Syria brought Putin’s role into the spotlight. It would seem then 
that in 2013 only Britain and America’s international influence formed a fundamental part of 
British visions of the international matrix of influences, and consequently of British visions of 
opportunities and feasible missions overseas. 
As for these identifications’ strength, they were generally weaker than the normative 
identifications above. There were four strong identifications; one which identified Assad with 
high international influence; one identifying the West with a lack of international influence; 
one identifying the US with a lack of international influence; and one identifying Russia with 
international influence. There were four weak identifications: one holding that the EU is 
internationally influential and one holding that it is not, and one holding the Britain is 
internationally influential and one holding that it is not. 
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It is important to note here that the British consistently attribute low influence to each 
of Britain’s allies (America and the West) and high influence to each of Britain’s perceived 
opponents (Assad, Russia, and the EU410). This contributes to a sense that international 
coalitions of Britain’s allies and against its opponents are unlikely to have the influence to 
achieve their goals, which indicates a vision of international isolation and incapability amongst 
the British public. This is particularly so towards the end of the case when the attribution of 
international influence to Russia increased sharply while the attribution of influence to Britain 
disappeared.411 As such, while the British do identify Britain with international influence for 
much of the case, they tend to identify the international stage as a whole with an overwhelming 
imbalance of influence on the side of their opponents, especially at the late end of the case. 
Below we see the Condensed Segments for these identifications, which summarise their 
individual content, strength, and articulations. None of these identifications co-located with 
any (anti-)securitizing rhetoric assertions412, but presenting them helps us form a fuller picture 
of British identifications in this period. First, we see two weak, persistently thick identifications 




Then, for the Russian Influence point, we see one strong, usually thin but sometimes 
thick identification that Russia has high international influence. 
 
                                                          
410 I will show in the 2013 Affiliations/Estrangements Identifications section below that British identifications 
held the EU relationship to be a conflictual one in this period, with the EU seen as restricting Britain and 
undermining British democracy. 
411 See Sheet Eight in the Appendix for detailed graphs regarding this. 
412 Technically the British Influence identifications did co-locate with assertions, but the assertions they co-
located with also co-located with other identifications. As the British Influence identifications were weak 
identifications, their influence is superseded by the influence of the other strong identifications that those 





The next segment for the Assad Influence point shows one very strong, usually thin but 




 This next segment for the EU Influence point shows two weak, usually thin but 






The US Influence point shows one strong though almost weak, usually thin but 




The final segment here for the Western Influence point shows one strong, usually thin 






The final set of identifications from 2013 is the set of identifications regarding Britain’s 
international relationships (affiliations and estrangements). In 2013 six identification points 
emerged regarding Britain’s international affiliations and estrangements. These concerned 
Britain’s relationships with the US, the EU, Russia, Assad, the Syrian Rebels, and Syrian 
Civilians. These relationships are defined not in terms of relative influence but rather in terms 
of the mutual trust and intent that was perceived as existing between different international 
entities and Britain. They were built by articulations stating that these actors were intentionally 
working against/with Britain or could present confrontations/alliances. The various types of 
relationships envisioned ranged from positive and cooperative to negative and outright 
antagonistic. These relationships reveal much about Britain’s sense of international 
isolation/integration and its comfort with this environment. This directly impacted British 
visions of who was going to present obstacles and assistance regarding international problems, 
and consequently British visions of how feasible international missions would be.  
Almost all of these identification points were persistently thick, which reveals that the 
British public’s ideas of Britain’s international relationships formed a particularly important 
part of their sense of place on the international stage. Additionally, the concentration on Syrian 
actors (who made up half of these identifications) long before the securitization itself further 
reinforces the previous indication that the discursive bedrock relevant not only to a 
securitization but to the upcoming securitization specifically was laid down in the months 
before the securitization itself. This again indicates that this research method can be used to 
uncover data relevant to specific upcoming securitizations even if the researcher does not know 
the content of these future securitizations.  
Note that in this section “Antagonistic” refers to a relationship where the entity 
concerned is perceived as actively working against Britain or its interests (including normative 
affronts such as human rights abuses). “Negative” refers to a relationship where the entity 
concerned is not perceived in a positive light but is described as someone who must be 
cooperated with despite unpleasantness (rather than as a direct or prioritised enemy/opponent). 
For instance, the Assad relationship was sometimes seen as “Negative” due to Assad being 
described as the lesser of two evils.  
Every identification in this set was strong. Three were particularly strong, these being 
an identification identifying Britain’s relationship with Assad as antagonistic; another 
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identifying Britain’s relationship with Syrian civilians as sympathetic; and another identifying 
Britain’s relationship with Syrian rebels as unsupportive. There was also a strong identification 
of Euroskepticism, and two further strong identifications identifying Britain’s relationship with 
Russia as antagonistic and Britain’s relationship with the US as negative. 
These identifications present a clear-cut picture that reinforces previous identification 
data. Overwhelmingly, the relationships envisioned here are not positive. The US was never 
described in positive terms during this case, being at most a necessary if unpleasant ally. Russia 
hovered between being seen as a necessary ally and an outright antagonist, being perceived 
more and more as the latter as the case progressed. Assad was usually considered an antagonist, 
though as reports of jihadists infiltrating the Syrian rebels proliferated at the latter end of the 
case there was increasing talk of Assad as the lesser of two evils. The rebels themselves were 
rarely unreservedly seen as supportable allies. Overall then, the previous indication that Britain 
held a sense of international isolation in the absence of influential allies is reinforced here by a 
vision of consistently counterproductive international relationships and an absence of truly 
positive international friendships. 
I will now go through these identifications individually to draw out their co-locations 
with assertions building the 2013 securitizing and anti-securitizing arguments. First, there is 
the identification of Britain’s relationship with Assad as antagonistic. This identification was 
persistently thick and quite strong. It was built from articulations stating that Assad had targeted 
civilians both with and without chemical weapons, was actively working against the UK and 




 This strong, thick identification aligned with two assertions from the securitizing 
argument. These were the assertions that Assad was a threat to Syrian civilians and that the 
action was justified because Assad was harming Syrian civilians. These assertions therefore 
receive a receptivity score of +2. Combined, they made up 3.4% of the securitizing argument, 
thus adding 6.8 to the securitizing argument’s overall receptivity score. The identification 
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misaligned with one assertion in the anti-securitizing argument, the assertion that Assad may 
not have used chemical weapons. This assertion therefore gets a score of -1. This assertion 
made up 4.2% of the anti-securitizing argument, therefore reducing the anti-securitizing 
argument’s overall receptivity score by 4.2. 
 
2013 Securitizing Argument  
Receptivity Score So Far 
2013 Anti-Securitizing Argument 
Receptivity Score So Far 
71.9 119 
 
Next, there is the identification of Britain’s relationship with America as negative. This 
was a strong but usually thin identification, built by articulations stating that the US relationship 
had been damaged by the NSA scandal, that Obama was not an admirable leader, and the US 




 This identification aligned with one assertion in the anti-securitizing argument, the 
assertion that Britain should not be following America’s lead. This assertion therefore receives 
a score of +1.5. The assertion made up 1.7% of the anti-securitizing argument, therefore adding 
2.5 to the anti-securitizing argument’s overall receptivity score.  
  
2013 Securitizing Argument  
Receptivity Score So Far 
2013 Anti-Securitizing Argument 
Receptivity Score So Far 
71.9 122.4 
 
Next there is the identification of Britain’s relationship with Syrian rebels as 
unsupportive. This identification was strong and persistently thick. It was built from 
articulations stating that the rebels contained jihadists, that they were acting in very concerning 





 This identification aligned with one assertion from the anti-securitizing argument. This 
was the assertion that the Syrian rebels were not clear-cut allies. As such, this assertion, which 
made up 4.7% of the anti-securitizing argument, receives a receptivity score of +2, and the 
consequently adds 9.4 to the anti-securitizing argument’s overall receptivity score.  
 
2013 Securitizing Argument  
Receptivity Score So Far 
2013 Anti-Securitizing Argument 
Receptivity Score So Far 
71.9 131.8 
 
  Next there is the identification of Britain’s relationship with Syrian civilians as 
sympathetic. This was a strong and persistently thick identification built from a highly frequent 




 This identification aligned with two assertions from the securitizing argument. These 
were the assertion that the mission should contain humanitarian relief to aid Syrian civilians, 
and the assertion that inaction would leave Syrian civilians in a threatening situation. These 
assertions therefore receive a score of +2. As combined these assertions made up 4.6% of the 
securitizing argument, they add 9.2 to the securitizing argument’s overall receptivity score. The 
assertion aligned with one assertion from the anti-securitizing argument, the assertion that any 
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mission should be focused on securing a stable Syria for Syrians. This assertion therefore 
receives a receptivity score of +2. This assertion made up 8.7% of the anti-securitizing 
argument, therefore adding 17.4 to the anti-securitizing argument’s overall receptivity score. 
 
2013 Securitizing Argument  
Receptivity Score So Far 
2013 Anti-Securitizing Argument 
Receptivity Score So Far 
81.1 149.2 
 
 There were two more identifications in this set that did not co-locate with any assertions 
in either the securitizing argument. These identifications are displayed here in order to give us 
a complete picture of the identifications present in 2013. The first was a strong, persistently 











Finally, a small proportion of the assertions in the securitizing and anti-securitizing 
arguments did not co-locate with any contemporary identifications, and therefore received a 
receptivity score of +1. In the securitizing argument, these were the assertions that Assad would 
only respond to military force, that Britain’s credibility and Middle Eastern regional stability 
were objects of worth being threatened. Combined, these assertions made up 6.3% of the anti-
securitizing argument, therefore adding 6.3 to the securitizing argument’s overall receptivity 
score. In the anti-securitizing argument, these were the assertions that chemical weapons usage 
did not justify war, that the British people were not in favour of the action, that responsibility 
to act lied with other nations, and that Middle Eastern regional stability was an object of worth. 
Combined, these assertions made up 9.6% of the anti-securitizing argument, therefore adding 
9.6 to the securitizing argument’s overall receptivity score. 
 
2013 Securitizing Argument  
Receptivity Score So Far 
2013 Anti-Securitizing Argument 
Receptivity Score So Far 
87.4 158.8 
 
2013 Summarised   
Looking at this data, we see a British public aspiring to be active and decisive while at 
the same time not knowing how to do so and lacking confidence in Britain’s capabilities as an 
international actor. The British public in 2013 were concerned with Britain’s status as an 
internationally active nation as a fundamentally important question of character, yet 
concentrated only intermittently on what forms of international activity were actually desirable. 
When they did focus on specific elements of their normative character they were unsure of 
what exactly to stand for and how, identifying negatively with military force, identifying 
positively with deference, switching between conflicting identifications regarding international 
duties, and ultimately not holding any specific positive normative goals regarding what types 
of activity Britain should be involved in. This desire to be forthright and decisive while lacking 
a clear sense of what to do and how to do it facilitates the hesitancy and proposals lacking 
follow-through which we see with the failed securitization at the end of the 2013 case. 
The British identified far more consistently with characteristics of international 
influence, which they attributed strongly to their opponents, waveringly to themselves, and 
never to their allies. Emphasis on holding clear visions and executing them decisively formed 
a significant part of identifications regarding international influences, rather than more 
material-based forms of power. This clarity of vision and decisiveness is precisely what the 
British aspired to gain yet saw themselves as lacking, particularly when Russia was seen as 
exhibiting this trait (implying a form of Russian envy). Ultimately this contributes to a British 
sense of international powerlessness and a vision that the international stage was filled with 
overwhelming oppositional forces, which is not likely to have aided a securitization effort 
calling for international action. 
Identifications regarding Middle Eastern actors and issues made up a significant 
proportion of the identifications in 2013, which highlights the usefulness of this method for 
researching receptivities to various upcoming securitizations whose content is as of yet 
unknown. When it came to the Middle East, the British held a debilitating sense of uncertainty 
and lacked confidence regarding Britain’s capabilities. They leaned much more on the side of 
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doubt than clarity, altogether lacking a clear sense of purpose and not knowing who exactly 
Britain should be supporting. The Middle East as a whole was identified with fractiousness, 
volatility and uncontrollable elements, while Syria was identified with unstoppable 
deterioration and regularly equated with the 2003 situation in Iraq. These general and specific 
senses of powerlessness were reinforced by a sense of international friendlessness, with no 
wholly positive international relationships coming to the fore at any point during the case study.  
In this section I have outlined the securitizing and anti-securitizing arguments from 
2013 and broken them down into their core assertions. I then presented the British 
identifications of the same period while highlighting their (mis)alignments to these (anti-
)securitizing assertions. Based on the resulting co-locations between identifications and 
argument assertions, I applied the receptivity scores from my hypothesis to each argument 
assertion. By doing so, we can see that in 2013 the successful anti-securitizing argument would 
have enjoyed a much higher audience receptivity than the failed securitizing argument it 
contended with. This data is quickly summarised visually on the Master Graphs on the next 
two pages, which show that the anti-securitizing argument received a far greater proportion of 
co-locations with strong, thick and aligned identifications (the best kind of co-location for 
receptivity) than the securitizing argument. It is also numerically displayed in the table here. 
 
2013 Securitizing Argument  
Receptivity Score Overall 
2013 Anti-Securitizing Argument 
Receptivity Score Overall 
87.4 158.8 
 
 This data lends backing to my hypothesis regarding the influence of identifications on 
securitizations. I hypothesised that audience receptivity to (anti-)securitizing arguments is 
generated by identification-assertion co-locations (strong, thick, aligned co-locations giving 
high receptivity; strong, usually thin, and aligned less receptivity; and so on). I then 
hypothesised that audience receptivity to securitizing arguments provides the conditions for 
securitizing success in conjunction with other factors such as securitizing move and 
securitizing actor based factors, and all things being equal audience receptivity can make the 
difference between a successful and a failed securitization. The 2013 data demonstrates that if 
we treat audience receptivity as being generated in the manner I hypothesised, we can see that 
the failed securitizing argument was indeed suffering from lower audience receptivity than its 
counter-argument. However, I must now present my data for the 2015 case before I can truly 
say that my hypothesis has been strongly evidenced. This is because in 2013 the securitization 
failed while in 2015 it succeeded, despite the fact that these securitizations were highly similar 
and indeed almost identical in several respects of securitizing move and securitizing actors. If 
I can show that in 2013 the failed securitizing argument suffered from lower audience 
receptivity than its counter-argument according to my hypothesis, and in 2015 the successful 
securitizing argument enjoyed higher audience receptivity than its counter-argument according 
to my hypothesis, then I will have shown that relative differences in audience receptivities 
(generated by identification-assertion co-locations) create conditions for securitization success 
with a significant and meaningful impact, and all things being equal audience receptivity can 








2015 Securitizing and Anti-Securitizing Rhetoric 
The 2015 securitizing and anti-securitizing rhetoric data was uncovered via the same 
research methods, sources, and processes as the 2013 data. The original public documents (both 
securitizing and anti-securitizing) which I analysed for the 2015 case can be found via Sheet 
Five in the Appendix, and the raw segments I coded (along with how I coded them) can be 
found via Sheet Six in the Appendix.  
 
Securitizing Rhetoric 
I will start with the “just action” element of the securitizing argument. The “just action” 
argument in 2015 went through considerable flux the week before the securitization gathered 
pace, before then steadying out. This indicates that the week preceding the full-paced 
securitization acted as a tentative period of formation for the securitizing argument. In its final 
form, the securitizing argument placed most of the emphasis in its just action argument on the 
claims that military air strikes were just because they were backed by the international 
community, and would avoid civilian casualties. This shows clear emphasis on both the moral 
and legal justifications of the military action. The next most commonly made assertions here 
were that the action was justified because it was sanctioned by international law, and because 
there was no need to respect the Syria-Iraq border as a conflict demarcation. The remaining 
assertion was that Britain should not let the memory of Iraq deter future international actions. 
Overall, the just action securitizing argument balanced moral and legal justifications while 
making a call to shake off the memory of Iraq and move forward with moral certainty. 
Next there was the securitizing argument that the action was necessary. This aspect of 
the securitizing argument also fluctuated in the week before the securitization gathered pace 
but took slightly longer to steady off, finding a consistent form about eight days before the end 
of the case. The main rhetorical assertions forming this aspect of the securitizing argument 
were that the situation in Syria demanded resolve, persistence, and action, that Britain had to 
honour its commitment to allies, and that defeating ISIS required attacking them in Syria. These 
were much clearer and specific reasons for action than those within the 2013 securitizing 
argument, and hinged much more on an underlying theme of international obligations. Less 
common assertions in this argument also hinged on this theme, including assertions that Britain 
had to stand united with other nations and could not outsource its international responsibilities. 
A final assertion appealed directly to a British sense of strength, holding that the UK’s 
capabilities could provide necessary input in Syria. Overall, the argument appealed to a need 
for action over complacency, and a need to stand with – rather than apart from – the 
international community. 
Next there was the securitizing argument that the action was feasible. This argument 
fluctuated much more than the above arguments but again found a stable form in the last eight 
days of the case. The largest rhetorical assertions here claimed that the action was feasible 
because it would combine several different tools beyond the military, including humanitarian 
and diplomatic tools, while the second most common assertion emphasised that Britain was 
committed to a long term political solution in Syria. While both these claims seek to divert 
attention away from the military, the third major assertion claimed that the action was feasible 
because ISIS was militarily defeatable. Other lesser assertions included the assertion that 
Britain would be supported by moderate Syrian rebels, and that Britain had a comprehensive 
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strategy ready for the mission. There is a clear wariness here about putting all the eggs of the 
feasibility argument in the military basket, which suggests a sense of caution following the 
failed securitization of 2013. 
Finally, there were the arguments about objects of worth and threats to these objects. 
These arguments were both relatively monolithic. The most emphasised objects of worth were 
the safety of the British people and the protection of civilians internationally, followed by 
assertions that Western liberal/democratic values were in need of protection. Threats to these 
objects were consistently described as being ISIS and British inaction, with the greater 
emphasis being placed on ISIS. At this point we can look at main concerns of the securitizing 
argument as a whole, which are displayed on the below graph. This graph shows that strong 
appeals to the safety of British and international civilians, assertions that the action would 
utilise non-military methods, and invocations of the need to be resolved, persistent, active and 




The entirety of the 2015 securitizing argument is displayed on the Master Graph on the 
following page.  
 
Anti-Securitizing Rhetoric 
I will now overview the 2015 anti-securitizing argument that contested this securitizing 
argument, starting with the anti-securitizing argument that the proposed mission was unjust. 
The largest part of this “unjust action” argument centred on the possibility of harm to civilians 






2015 Securitizing Rhetoric 
Main Concerns 
Final Debate
The Situation Requires Resolve,
Persistence, and Action
Must Honour Committment to Allies
Will Combine Humanitarian, Military, and
Diplomatic Tools
Committed to a Feasible Long Term
Political Solution
British Safety





a more humanitarian route first. There were also smaller emphases on the lack of clear legal 
authorisation from the UN and the Foreign Affairs Committee, along with an assertion that 
Britain did not have to support its allies with the proposed action. The unjust action rhetoric 
nonetheless placed potential harm to Syrian civilians at the centre of its argument, very much 
banking on this assertion to portray the proposed mission as unjustifiable.  
Next there was the anti-securitizing argument that the proposed mission was not 
necessary. This argument was very straightforward. The two most common assertions (which 
were made in almost equal measure) were that Britain should attempt to defeat ISIS using non-
military tools, and that Britain had little ability to actually make a difference in Syria anyway. 
A third assertion claimed that the responsibility for the Syrian situation lay with other nations, 
so Britain did not need to act. It is worth noting that the first of these assertions did not truly 
counter the securitizing argument, which also emphasised the use of non-military measures. 
Next there was the anti-securitizing argument that the proposed action was not feasible. 
This aspect of the anti-securitizing argument was far more mixed, consisting of several smaller  
assertions that are fully laid out in the below graph. As this graph shows, the largest part of the 
argument focused on the assertion that there were not 70,000 moderate reliable local partners 
on the ground in Syria that would assist with the operation. This is a direct refutation of the 
assertion within the “feasible action” aspect of the securitizing argument that such a force did 
exist. However, the securitizing argument did not place much emphasis on the assertion about 
the local partners (it formed only 1.5% of the overall securitizing argument), so the emphasis 
on refuting this assertion seems an inefficient use of the argumentative space available to the 
anti-securitizing side. There is also an assertion here stating that Syria was complex, an 
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Only Diplomacy/Political Settlement Will
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Finally, there were the anti-securitizing arguments regarding objects of worth and 
threats to these objects. The anti-securitizing argument made the same assertions about objects 
of worth as the securitizing argument, focusing on British safety and Syrian civilians. However, 
it stressed that the threats to these objects had been misjudged by the securitizing actors. Anti-
securitizing rhetoric instead asserted that Assad, not ISIS, was the real threat to Syrians. It also 
asserted that taking military action was playing into ISIS’ hands and would incite a terrorist 
backlash, hence creating its own threat. This anti-securitizing argument centres the threat on 
British action rather than inaction.  
We can now take a look at the main concerns of the anti-securitizing argument overall, 




 This graph shows that the core anti-securitizing assertions oriented themselves around 
the lack of moderate reliable local partners, the incoherence of Britain’s strategy, British 
irrelevance, the inefficacy of airstrikes, and Syria’s complexity. The large emphasis here on 
refuting the securitizing claim about moderate reliable local partners highlights the inefficient 
dedication of time the anti-securitizing argument spent countering this relatively minor part of 
the securitizing argument. Finally, we can look at the anti-securitizing argument as a whole, 
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2015 Identifications and Co-Locations 
Having outlined the 2015 securitizing and anti-securitizing arguments and the 
proportional composition of assertions building them, I will now detail the 2015 identifications 
and highlight their (mis)alignments with these assertions. This will be done via the same system 
as with the 2013 identifications. Note that the detailed graphs breaking down the data behind 
each of the Condensed Segments in this section can be found in Sheet Eight in the Appendix. 
Two Master Graphs providing a snapshot of the full identification data from 2015 are laid out 




The normative identification points that arose in 2015 were very similar to those in 
2013. Points regarding Britain’s Mode of International Activity, Commitment to International 
Duties/Bonds, and Military Role all appear again in 2015, indicating their long-term 
importance for the British public’s international sense of self. There are some differences 
between the normative identifications appearing in the two cases, with neither the Response to 
Chemical Weapons nor the Deference to International Institutions points (the two thinnest 
normative identification points of 2013) appearing in 2015. Additionally, a new point regarding 
Britain’s Willingness to Assist Migrants arises in 2015. This point encompasses identifications 
holding that Britain should or should not assist/welcome migrants entering the country. It is 
considered a separate identification point from the Commitment to International Duties/Bonds 
point due to the sheer number of articulations specific to duties to migrants that arose in 2015 
separately from articulations regarding Britain’s international duties in general or regarding 
other international duties. 
 Normative identifications in 2015 were significantly thicker than in 2013. Every 
normative identification point was persistently thick, with articulation levels for each 
substantially higher than in 2013. Normative identifications are therefore far more concentrated 
on in 2015 than 2013, forming a much more fundamental part of the British people’s sense of 
place on the international stage in this period. Although International Duties and Migrants 
points became thinner towards the end of the case as questions of international military activity 
gained salience, they remained thick almost for the entire duration of the case.  
 There were six normative identifications in 2015: a strong identification holding that 
Britain should be an active/forthright nation; a strong identification hold that Britain should be 
committed to international duties/bonds; two weak identifications holding that Britain should 
and should not welcome migrants; and two weak identifications holding that Britain should 
and should not be a militarily active nation. This reveals significant differences and continuities 
between normative identifications in 2013 and 2015. While on the one hand the number of 
weak identifications in 2015 still indicates considerable uncertainty about what Britain should 
stand for and what norms it should uphold, there is a consistent shift between the two cases 
towards the side of using all tools necessary to contribute to the solving of international 
problems. While in 2013 the British held a strong negative identification with the use of 
military force abroad, in 2015 they are completely unsure about this. Additionally, while in 







duties/bonds, holding weak identifications regarding this norm, in 2015 they have gained a 
strong identification that they should be internationally committed. The absence of the 
Deference to International Institutions point further backs this up, removing a normative 
conflict between the desire to be internationally forthright and deferent. Indeed, the only 
identification that has not changed is the one holding that Britain should be an internationally 
active nation, which remains strong in both cases. Overall, in 2015 we see a British public with 
identifications much more open and even committed to internationally forthright activity 
utilising a broader range of tools in the service of a wider array of peoples. 
 I will now break these points down and highlight their co-locations with contemporary 
(anti-)securitizing arguments. First we see one strong, persistently thick identification holding 
that Britain should be an internationally active nation, built from articulations that Britain 
should take on a pro-active, confident international leadership, that Britain should step up to 
confrontations, that Britain should be internationally relevant, that Britain should not do 
nothing on the international stage, and that Britain should deliver through action rather than 
make purely rhetorical international commitments.  
 
 
 This strong and thick identification aligned with five assertions in the 2015 securitizing 
argument. These were the assertions that Britain should not be inactive now due to past 
international failings, that Britain must actively defend its security rather than outsource this 
role, that Britain must show resolve, persistence, and action, that Britain should step up rather 
than delay, and that inaction was a threat to British objects of worth. These assertions therefore 
receive a receptivity score of +2. Combined, they made up 20.8% of the 2015 securitizing 
argument, therefore adding 41.6 to the securitizing argument’s overall receptivity score. The 
identification aligned with one assertion from the anti-securitizing argument, the assertion that 
Britain should be taking more action to resolve the Syrian humanitarian crisis. This assertion 
therefore receives a receptivity score of +2. The assertion made up 2.5% of the anti-securitizing 
argument, therefore adding 5 to the anti-securitizing argument’s overall receptivity score.  
 
2015 Securitizing Argument  
Receptivity Score So Far 
2015 Anti-Securitizing Argument 





 Next, there is the strong, persistently thick identification holding that Britain should be 
committed to international duties/bonds. This identification was built by articulations that 
Britain had to fulfil its international humanitarian commitments, that it should be involved in 
international collective actions, that it should commit itself to international causes, and that it 
must stand by its international allies.  
 
 This strong, thick identification aligned with five assertions from the 2015 securitizing 
argument. These were the assertions that the action was justified by the international 
community’s assent to it, that the mission was justified because it was sanctioned by 
international law, that the mission was necessary because Britain had to stand united with the 
international community, that the mission was necessary because Britain must honour its 
commitments to its allies, and that the mission was feasible because Britain would remain 
committed to it in the long term. These assertions therefore receive a receptivity score of +2. 
Combined, these assertions made up 16.1% of the securitizing argument, therefore adding 32.2 
to the securitizing argument’s overall receptivity score. The identification misaligned with one 
assertion from the anti-securitizing argument- the assertion that the mission was not necessary 
because Britain could pass the responsibility for the Syria crisis on to other nations. This 
assertion therefore receives a score of -1. This assertion made up 3.7% of the anti-securitizing 
argument, therefore reducing the anti-securitizing argument’s overall receptivity score by 3.7. 
 
2015 Securitizing Argument  
Receptivity Score So Far 
2015 Anti-Securitizing Argument 
Receptivity Score So Far 
73.8 1.3 
 
 Next, there are the two weak identifications holding that Britain should and should not 
have an active military role on the international stage. These identifications were built from 
articulations stating, on the one hand, that the British military was a force for good, the military 
force is needed for defence, that civilian casualties in war can be avoided, and that Trident is a 
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worthwhile military tool. On the other hand, there were several and frequent articulations that 
the British military was of limited use, that military activity simply fuelled backlashes, that 
military activity worsened conflict, and that ideological, legal, and diplomatic tools were more 




 These weak identifications co-located with three assertions from the securitizing 
argument. These were the assertions that the mission would avoid civilian casualties, that 
military force was necessary to ensure peace, and that the mission would protect civilians 
internationally. These assertions therefore receive a receptivity score of +1. Combined, these 
assertions made up 10.3% of the securitizing argument, therefore adding 10.3 to the 
securitizing argument’s overall receptivity score. The identification co-located with five 
assertions from the anti-securitizing argument. These were the assertions that the mission was 
unjust because civilians may suffer, that the mission was unnecessary because only diplomacy 
will solve the situation, that the mission was unnecessary because military action would not 
defeat ISIS, that war breeds terrorists, and that war would incite a backlash. These assertions 
therefore receive a receptivity score of +1. Combined, these assertions made up 22.7% of the 
anti-securitizing argument, therefore adding 22.7 to the anti-securitizing argument’s overall 
receptivity score. 
 
2015 Securitizing Argument  
Receptivity Score So Far 
2015 Anti-Securitizing Argument 
Receptivity Score So Far 
84.1 24 
 
 There were two normative identifications in 2015 that did not co-locate with any 
assertions in either argument. These were weak identifications that Britain should and should 






Influence of International Actors Identifications 
Next, there was the set of identifications regarding the influence of international actors. 
This set of identifications once again formed a significant part of Britain’s international 
identifications in 2015. There is a strong degree of continuity in this aspect of Britain’s 
identifications, in that four of the six actors whose influence the British regularly focused on 
in 2013 reappear in 2015, these being the EU, the US, Russia, and Britain itself (however, 
Britain’s international influence was a much thicker identification in 2015, thick enough that I 
am presenting it and its sub-identifications in a separate section later). This indicates the long-
term significance these actors’ influence has for British ideas of Britain’s place on the 
international stage. Meanwhile, identifications regarding the international influence of the 
West and Assad have altogether disappeared in 2015. Like the normative identifications that 
failed to reappear in 2015, these were two of the thinnest identifications in their set in 2013, 
reinforcing the idea that particularly thin identifications are more likely to lack longevity. In 
their place we see new identifications focusing on the international influence of Germany and 
France.  
 Only two of these identifications were persistently thick, those concerning the influence 
of Russia and the EU. All others were usually thin, with the US Influence point significantly 
thinner than in 2013 and the France and Germany points thinner than the 2013 West and Assad 
points which they replaced. Additionally, the overall trend here was decreasing thickness as 
the case progressed, whereas in 2013 influence identifications became thicker as the case 
progressed and specific missions became more salient. All in all, this indicates that the 
international influence of non-British actors was much less important to the British sense of 
international place in 2015 than in 2013. Within this set there were three strong identifications: 
one identifying France with influence, one identifying Germany with a lack of influence, and 
one identifying the EU with a lack of influence. There were four weak identifications: two 
identifying Russia as influential and as lacking influence, and two identifying the US as 
influential and as lacking influence. 
This shows significant differences between the influence identifications active in the 
two cases. Whereas in 2013 international opponents were consistently attributed with influence 
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while allies were seen as uninfluential, here we see two key allies (the US and France) being 
identified with influence. This is particularly so in the second half of the case when a specific 
international mission was being proposed. Meanwhile, of Britain’s perceived opponents – 
Russia and the EU413 – the EU is this time strongly identified with a lack of influence, and the 
identification of Russia with influence disappears when the securitization begins. The vision 
of the international stage as a place where opponents are strong and allies weak is therefore 
much less prevalent in 2015. This likely enhanced a British sense of international capability 
and reinforces the indication from the normative identification set that the international stage 
was now seen more as a place for productive action rather than filled with overwhelming 
oppositional forces.  
None of these identifications co-located with any assertions from the 2015 securitizing 
or anti-securitizing arguments. This is interesting in itself, as it shows that the arguments made 
in 2015 were much more centred on Britain than on international actors. This further reinforces 
a shift away from the 2013 mode of thinking about the international stage as a stage filled with 
overwhelming forces. In 2015, British security rationales were much more focused on Britain 
itself and its capabilities. For completeness, I will display here the identifications regarding 
other nations’ influence. The first Segment shows two weak, persistently thick identifications 




The next segment shows one strong but almost weak, persistently thick identification 
identifying the EU as lacking influence. 
 
                                                          
413 In 2015 the EU was once again seen as having a conflictual relationship with Britain, as I will outline in the 





The next shows two weak, usually thin but sometimes thick identifications identifying 
the US as influential and as lacking influence. 
 
 
The next shows one strong, usually thin but sometimes thick identification identifying 





The final segment shows one very strong, usually thin but sometimes thick 




British Influence Identifications 
In 2015 British identifications regarding international influence focused heavily on 
Britain’s influence specifically, far more so than in 2013. This shows that, while the British 
were becoming less concerned with the influence of others in 2015, their own international 
influence was forming a much more fundamental part of their international identifications. The 
sheer amount of articulations regarding British influence made it possible to divide them under 
the three distinct sub-identification points of Britain’s Military Strength, Economic Power, and 
International Effectiveness. Given the individual thickness of these sub-points and their 
significance for understanding important British self-images, I present them here separately 
along with the overall British Influence point. Doing so highlights the more precise ways in 
which the British identified with Britain’s international influence. This was not possible in the 
2013 case given the much lower density of these sub-identification points during that period, 
which made extracting meaningful information from any of them much less feasible.  
While the Britain’s Military Strength and Economic Power sub-points were only 
sometimes thick, their presence and intermittent thickness (particularly the Military Strength 
sub-point) indicate a substantive shift from the 2013 case in which they barely featured. This 
backs up the indication from the previous section that in 2015 material forms of international 
influence were much more important to British visions of the international matrix of influences. 
Every identification regarding British influence was weak, and particularly weaker than their 
2013 counterparts. This indicates that when it comes to Britain’s own influence in 2015 the 
British had entirely changeable identifications. 
Additionally, it should be noted that in the second half of the case each of the 
identifications moved notably towards the side of confidence in British international influence, 
and the “Britain is militarily strong” identification actually remained strong for almost the 
entire case. This reinforces previous indications that as the 2015 case progressed the British 
held an increasing openness to the feasibility of international missions and saw the international 
stage as less composed of overwhelming oppositional forces.  
I can now break these identifications down and highlight their co-locations with 
contemporary (anti-)securitizing assertions. First we see two weak identifications identifying 
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Britain with high and low international effectiveness. These were built from articulations, on 
the one hand, stating that Britain was decisive and impactful, while on the other hand we see 




These weak identifications co-located with one assertion from the anti-securitizing 
argument- the assertion that British action would have little impact in Syria. This assertion 
therefore receives a receptivity score of +1. This assertion made up 7.1% of the securitizing 
argument, therefore adding 7.1 to the anti-securitizing argument’s overall receptivity score. 
 
2015 Securitizing Argument  
Receptivity Score So Far 
2015 Anti-Securitizing Argument 
Receptivity Score So Far 
84.1 31.1 
 
Next there are two weak identifications identifying Britain with high and low military 
strength, built from articulations directly stating that Britain was military weak and that Trident 
was ineffective, and competing articulations stating that Britain was militarily strong and that 





These weak identifications co-located with one assertion from the securitizing 
argument- the assertion that British capabilities could provide the necessary input against ISIS. 
This assertion therefore receives a receptivity score of +1. This assertion made up 3.6% of the 
securitizing argument, therefore adding 3.6 to the securitizing argument’s overall receptivity 
score. 
 
2015 Securitizing Argument  
Receptivity Score So Far 
2015 Anti-Securitizing Argument 
Receptivity Score So Far 
87.7 31.1 
 
The final segment shows two weak, usually thin but sometimes thick identifications 
identifying Britain with high and low international economic power. This identification did not 




British Influence in Syria Identifications 
Next, there is the set of identifications which emerged in 2015 regarding Britain’s 
international influence vis-à-vis Syria specifically. Like their counterparts in 2013, these 
identifications were again highly relevant to the specific upcoming securitization, reinforcing 
the indication that this research method can be used to gauge receptivities to various 
securitizations before these securitizations take place and without knowing the content of these 
upcoming securitizations. The influence identifications regarding Syria in 2015 focused on 
Britain’s Ability to Remove Assad, Britain’s Ability to Manage Syria, Britain’s Ability to 
Defeat ISIS, and Britain’s Diplomatic Influence Over Syria. These are quite different 
identification points to the ones regarding Syria in 2013, with the only point appearing in both 
cases being the Diplomatic Influence point. Although the 2013 influence over Syria 
identifications were some of the thickest of the 2013 case, they were also some of the most 
heavily related to current events of 2013. This indicates that identifications specifically relevant 
to current issues rather than more general aspects of national character can have particularly 
low longevity while also temporarily being highly important for how a nation sees itself.  
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It is interesting to note the total absence in 2015 of identifications orienting themselves 
around an image of Britain as a guardian of democracy/stability in the Middle East, which was 
the underlying guiding image of the 2013 influence over Syria/the Middle East identifications. 
The 2015 identification points are much more streamlined. The Middle East in a broad sense 
is no longer in focus, with Syria alone coming into focus. Regarding Syria, the British public 
appears not to be concerned with Britain’s ability to improve Syria in terms of democracy, 
stability, or humanitarian conditions, but instead is concerned with removing regimes and 
defeating terrorists. Britain’s image of its potential role and influence in Syria is therefore less 
grandiose and more efficient in 2015, oriented less around the introduction of governance 
systems and more around specific and tangible aspirations.  
 Unlike in 2013, the majority of these identification points were usually thin, indicating 
that Britain’s level of influence in Syria mattered much less to the British in 2015 than in 2013. 
In 2015, abilities to manage Syria in general, to remove Assad, or to assert diplomatic influence 
are only contingently important to Britain’s sense of place on the international stage. This 
reinforces the previous indication that in 2015 Britain was much more focused on its own 
inherent influence than its relative international influence. Meanwhile the Ability to Defeat 
ISIS point is the only one that was persistently thick, which once again indicates an increasing 
focus on military influence and objectives.  
 There were four identifications in this set: one strong identification of ISIS as 
defeatable, one strong identification of Assad as unremovable, one strong identification of 
Britain with high diplomatic influence in Syria, and one strong identification of Syria as 
unmanageable. This shows that, as in 2013, the identifications specifically relevant to the 
upcoming securitization are amongst the strongest of the case. This further reinforces the 
significance of these identifications for the overall success of the securitization, as well as the 
ability of this research method to identify important discursive bedrocks in the run-up to a 
securitization.  
These identifications are much more favourable to the proposition of an international 
mission in Syria than those of 2013. The entirety of the 2013 identifications indicated a very 
low British sense of influence in Syria and the Middle East, whereas two of the four 
identifications here (the identification of Britain with high diplomatic influence and of ISIS as 
defeatable) indicate a British sense of influence. Although the overall situation in Syria is still 
seen as unmanageable and Britain is not seen as having the ability to remove Assad, as a whole 
the British public’s sense of influence in Syria in 2015 is more mixed and positive than the 
overwhelming sense of powerlessness that emerged in 2013. 
I will now break these identifications down and highlight their co-locations with 
contemporary (anti-)securitizing arguments. First we see one strong, persistently thick 






 This strong, thick identification aligned with two assertions from the securitizing 
argument. These were the assertions that the action was feasible because Britain could defeat 
ISIS, and that the action was necessary because Britain could only defeat ISIS by attacking 
them in Syria. These assertions therefore receive a receptivity score of +2. Combined, these 
assertions made up 6.4% of the securitizing argument, therefore adding 12.8 to the securitizing 
argument’s overall receptivity score. 
 
2015 Securitizing Argument  
Receptivity Score So Far 
2015 Anti-Securitizing Argument 
Receptivity Score So Far 
100.5 31.1 
 
Next there is the strong, usually thin but sometimes thick identification holding that 




 This identification aligned with one assertion in the securitizing argument- the assertion 
that the mission was feasible because it would utilise diplomatic tools. This assertion therefore 
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receives a receptivity score of +1.5. This assertion made up 5.2% of the securitizing argument, 
therefore adding 7.8 to the securitizing argument’s overall receptivity score. 
 
2015 Securitizing Argument  
Receptivity Score So Far 
2015 Anti-Securitizing Argument 
Receptivity Score So Far 
108.3 31.1 
  
Next there is the strong, usually thin but sometimes thick identification holding that 
Syria cannot be managed, built by articulations that Syria was a complex quagmire and that 




 This identification misaligned with one assertion in the securitizing argument, the 
assertion that Britain would be assisted by moderate, local ground troops. This assertion 
therefore receives a receptivity score of 0. The identification aligned with three assertions in 
the anti-securitizing argument. These were the assertions that Syria was complex, that the 
mission could lead to Britain becoming stuck in Syria, and that there were not 70,000 moderate, 
reliable ground troops in Syria. These assertions therefore receive a receptivity score of +1.5. 
Combined, these assertions made up 26.7% of the anti-securitizing argument, therefore adding 
40.1 to the anti-securitizing argument’s overall receptivity score. 
 
2015 Securitizing Argument  
Receptivity Score So Far 
2015 Anti-Securitizing Argument 
Receptivity Score So Far 
108.3 71.2 
 
Lastly, there was one strong, usually thin but sometimes thick identification holding 
that Britain does not have the ability to remove Assad. This identification did not co-locate 








In 2015 two identification points emerged encompassing identifications of certain 
entities on the international stage as being/not being threats. These points concerned terrorism 
and migrants. To be clear, I use the term “threat” here as a simple means of signifying “a danger 
to British lives,” referring specifically to the possibility of physical mortality rather than 
dangers to ways of life or quality of life. The articulations underlying these identifications 
specifically linked terrorism or migrants with intentions, activities, or processes that were 
described as (not) actively putting British lives at risk. Of course, the very theory of 
securitization underscores the meaning of the word “threat” as entirely subjective and socially-
contingent. Again, I am using “threat” here as a shorthand for “a mortal danger to life,” and am 
not implying on any level that this is the one true meaning of the word. It should be noted that, 
on the one hand, these threat identifications were low in number, frequency, and articulations 
in 2015 (which makes this section shorter than others). Nonetheless, their presence alone in 
2015 (compared to their absence in 2013) indicates that in 2015 a sense of international 
physical threat was fundamentally stronger than in 2013.414  
Breaking these two identification points down, first we see a strong, persistently thick 
identification identifying terrorism as an active danger to British lives. 
 
                                                          
414 We might consider this set of identifications to be a cross-section of the “Influence” and 
“Affiliations/Estrangements” sets, as they co-locate with (see Fig. 2 in Chapter Two) securitizing rhetoric 
regarding both actors with threatening abilities (as do “Influence” identifications) and regarding actors with 




This strong and persistently thick identification aligned with three assertions from the 
securitizing argument. These were the assertions that attacking ISIS was justified as it was self-
defence, and that the object of worth was British safety which was being threatened by ISIS. 
These assertions therefore receive a receptivity score of +2. Combined, these assertions made 
up 27.7% of the securitizing argument, therefore adding 55.4 to the securitizing argument’s 
overall receptivity score. The identification aligned with one assertion in the anti-securitizing 
argument- the assertion that the object of worth was British safety. This assertion therefore 
receives as receptivity score of +2. This assertion made up 0.6% of the anti-securitizing 
argument, therefore adding 1.2 to the anti-securitizing argument’s overall receptivity score. 
 
2015 Securitizing Argument  
Receptivity Score So Far 
2015 Anti-Securitizing Argument 
Receptivity Score So Far 
163.7 72.4 
 
Then there were weak, usually thin but sometimes thick identifications identifying 
migrants as being and not being active dangers to British lives. These identifications did not 






The final set of identifications in 2015 concerned Britain’s relationships with various 
other nations. Although affiliations and estrangements identifications once again formed a 
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significant part of British identifications in 2015, the international actors featured in these 
identifications (France, Russia, Turkey, the EU, and China) were very different to those in 
2013. Only the Russia and EU relationships feature in both cases, with the US, Assad, Syrian 
Rebels, and Syrian Civilians identification points of 2013 failing to reappear in 2015. As the 
US relationship point was quite thin for most of the 2013 case and the Assad, Syrian Rebels, 
and Syrian Civilians points were very much linked to important but temporary issues of 2013, 
this data reinforces the previous indication that identifications that are thin or heavily related 
to current events tend to lack longevity.  
In marked contrast to the 2013 relationship identifications, three of the five points in 
2015 are usually thin. Meanwhile, the only two persistently thick points became thinner as the 
case progresses. This indicates that in 2015 the British were much less concerned with their 
international relationships than in 2013, with these relationships forming only contingent 
elements of the British sense of international place in this period.  
There were six relationship identifications in 2015: one strong identification of an 
antagonistic relationship415 with China, one strong identification of solidarity with France, one 
strong identification of an antagonistic relationship with Turkey, one strong identification with 
Euroskepticism, and two weak identifications of a negative and antagonistic relationship with 
Russia. As with the 2013 case, we again see a significant lack of British visions of truly positive 
international relationships, although the solidarity with France identification bucks this trend 
somewhat. While this does present a continuing sense of international friendlessness, the 
general thinness of these identifications also indicates that this friendlessness is much less 
important to the British in 2015 than in 2013 (when these identifications were all persistently 
thick). Consequently, the vision of the international stage as full of oppositional forces still 
exists in 2015, though it is focused on much less and is marked by an exception. 
None of these identifications co-located with any assertions from the 2015 securitizing 
or anti-securitizing arguments. This reinforces the previous indications that the arguments 
made in 2015 were much more centred on Britain than on international actors, reflecting a shift 
away from the 2013 mode of thinking about the international stage as a stage filled with 
overwhelming forces. In 2015, British security rationales were much more focused on Britain 
and its capabilities. For completeness, I will display British identifications of international 
relationships here. First, we see two weak, persistently thick identifications identifying a 
negative and an antagonistic relationship with Russia. 
                                                          
415 As in 2013, here “Antagonistic” refers to a relationship where the entity concerned is perceived as actively 
working against Britain or its interests, while “Negative” refers to a relationship where the entity concerned is 
not perceived in a positive light but is described as someone who must be cooperated with despite 





The next segment shows one very strong, usually thin but sometimes thick 








 The next shows one very strong, usually thin but sometimes thick identification of 
solidarity with France. 
 
 
 The final segment shows one very strong, usually thin but sometimes thick 







Finally, a significant proportion of the assertions in the anti-securitizing argument did 
not co-locate with any contemporary identifications, and therefore received a receptivity score 
of +1. These were the assertions that supporting allies does not justify the mission, that the UN 
had not given clear authorisation, that the British public were against the action, that Britain 
should target ISIS finances instead, that Iraq 2003 evidenced that this mission was a bad idea, 
that Britain’s strategy was not comprehensive, that ISIS wanted the West involved in the 
Middle East, and that Assad was a bigger threat. Combined, these assertions made up 36.6% 
of the anti-securitizing argument, therefore adding 36.6 to the anti-securitizing argument’s 
overall receptivity score. The fact that such a large proportion of the anti-securitizing argument 
did not co-locate with any contemporary identifications is in itself very interesting, as it shows 
that the anti-securitizing argument was very detached from the tangible and active concerns of 
the contemporary British public. It also indicates that attempting to contest (anti-)securitizing 
arguments by banking on ideas that do not conflict with identifications is a much less effective 
strategy than utilising arguments which appeal to pre-existing strong and thick identifications. 
The securitizing argument contained a small proportion of assertions that did not co-locate with 
any contemporary identifications. These were the assertions that is not necessary to respect the 
Syria-Iraq border as a conflict demarcation, that Britain had a comprehensive strategy, that 
Britain’s credibility was at stake, and that liberal values were at stake. Combined, these 
assertions made up 8.3% of the securitizing argument, therefore adding 8.3 to the securitizing 
argument’s overall receptivity score. 
 
2015 Securitizing Argument  
Receptivity Score So Far 
2015 Anti-Securitizing Argument 




Looking at this data, we can see that in 2015 the British concentrated far more on 
Britain’s normative character and international influence than they did previously, with a much 
lower concentration on the influence of, or British relationships with, other international actors. 
This in itself signals a much lower preoccupation with the status of other nations and overall a 
greater sense of self-confidence. Normatively, the British are more open to using military force, 
which is now associated with both efficacy and a positive moral dimension. They are also more 
committed to assisting in international crises, placing an emphasis on international cooperation, 
collective action, and shared responsibilities, and are no longer conflicted between the desire 
to be internationally forthright and deferent. The only normative identification that does not 
shift between the cases is the desire to be internationally active, which maintains a very similar 
strength over a long period. Overall, this signals a fundamental desire to be active and a Britain 
much more open and even committed to internationally forthright activity utilising a broader 
range of tools in the service of a wider array of peoples. 
When it comes to Britain’s own influence, in 2015 the British had entirely changeable 
identifications, far too weak to act as schemata providing any significant filtering effects on 
securitizing arguments. Ideas of international influence are still largely formed from ideas of 
decisiveness and clarity of vision. However, there is also a greater emphasis on and belief in 
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Britain’s economic and military power than previously. The British become more confident in 
Britain’s influence as the case progresses. This also applies to British ideas of influence in 
Syria, which now present visions of both low and high influence in Syria as opposed to the 
overwhelming sense of powerlessness Britain held in 2013. This focus on Syria again shows 
the discursive bedrock specifically relevant to the upcoming securitization being laid in the 
period before this securitization. 
When the British did concentrate on the influence of others they concentrated on many 
of the same actors. However, they no longer saw all opponents as strong and all allies as weak, 
particularly during securitizations. This likely enhanced a British sense of international 
capability. It also reinforces the indication from the normative identifications that the 
international stage was now seen more as a place for productive action rather than as filled with 
overwhelming oppositional forces. Furthermore, identifications regarding the influence of 
others are weaker in 2015 overall, indicating that not only were the British less concerned with 
the international influence of others but they were also less certain about the status of these 
influences. Ideas of influence are still primarily made up of articulations of decisiveness and 
clarity of vision, although now (particularly with opponents) material military and economic 
bases of international influence are much more prominent. This backs up the British shift 
towards an openness to using military power (observed in the normative identifications) with 
a shift towards a greater vision of the importance of this form of influence. Additionally, when 
the British did concentrate on their international relationships they also moved towards more 
positive visions of these relationships as the case progressed. Finally, in 2015 the British had a 
more acute sense of international threat, which briefly but intensely formed a notable part of 
the British public’s overall sense of place on the international stage.  
Having outlined the securitizing and anti-securitizing arguments from 2013 and broken 
them down into their core assertions, and having then presented the British identifications of 
the same period while highlighting their (mis)alignments to these (anti-)securitizing assertions 
and applying the receptivity scores laid out in my hypothesis, we can see that applying my 
hypothesis to this case reveals that the 2015 securitizing argument would have enjoyed a much 
higher audience receptivity than the anti-securitizing argument it contended with. The Master 
Graphs on the next two pages show all of the identification-assertion co-locations of 2015 
which were detailed above, and quickly reveal that the securitizing argument received a far 










2015 Securitizing Argument  
Receptivity Score Overall 
2015 Anti-Securitizing Argument 
Receptivity Score Overall 
172 109 
 
The below table combines the 2013 and 2015 data. It shows that in both cases the 
historically successful argument was the one that co-located with identifications in such a way 
that (according to the dynamics I outlined in my hypothesis) would have allowed that argument 














Just/Unjust  +130.1 +87.5 +187.3 +119 
Necessary/Unnecessary +153.2 +166.5 +181.6 +59.6 
Feasible/Infeasible −9.7 +187.6 +148.1 +119.9 
Objects of Worth +48.5 +155 +161.5 +114.3 
(Misjudged) Threats +160 n/a +186.2 +100 
Full Argument  +87.4 +158.8 +172 +109 
 
As such, my data has revealed that in 2013 the anti-securitizing argument co-located 
with identifications that were strong, thick, and aligned to the argument to a much greater extent 
than did the securitizing argument. The 2013 anti-securitizing argument co-located mostly with 
identifications that were strong, thick and aligned, while the 2013 securitizing argument co-
located mostly with identifications that were weak, thin, or usually thin. My hypothesis would 
therefore predict that in 2013 the audience would have been much less receptive to the 
securitizing argument than to the anti-securitizing argument, and consequently the 
identifications at play would have been conducive to a securitization failure. Additionally, my 
data revealed that in 2015 the securitizing argument co-located with identifications that were 
strong, thick, and aligned to the argument to a much greater extent than did the anti-securitizing 
argument. In 2015, the securitizing argument co-located almost entirely with identifications 
that were strong, thick, and aligned, while the anti-securitizing argument co-located almost 
entirely with identifications that were weak or thin. My hypothesis would therefore predict that 
in 2015 the audience would have been much less receptive to the anti-securitizing argument 
than to the securitizing argument, and consequently the identifications at play would have been 
conducive to a securitization success. As such, my research into the two most similar 
securitizations in English-speaking countries in the 21st century – securitizations which were 
similar and in some ways identical in terms of securitizing move, securitizing actors, and 
surrounding political and cultural contexts – shows that the different outcomes of these highly 
similar securitizations can be predicted and explained by the dynamics regarding the influence 
of identifications on securitizations which I hypothesised in Chapter Two. 
To summarise, I have taken the two most similar securitizations in English-speaking 
countries in the 21st century. One of these resulted in securitization success and the other in 
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failure. I have shown that the differing results of these highly similar securitizations can be 
explained by looking at the audience receptivity the two contesting arguments enjoyed. By 
looking at this receptivity, which we derive from the dynamics regarding the influence of 
identifications on securitizations which I outlined in Chapter Two, we can see that relative 
differences in audience receptivities create conditions for securitization success that have a 
significant and meaningful impact, and all things being equal audience receptivity can make 
the difference between a successful and a failed securitization. As such, the audience 
receptivity dynamics which I hypothesised in Chapter Two can provide a meaningful 
contribution to explanations of how and why securitizations succeed and fail.  
 
 Secondary Identification Data 
In my Conclusions Chapter, I will clearly summarise this finding and argument, along 
with implications for important literatures. Before I move on to the Conclusions Chapter, 
however, I will present two secondary findings that emerged from the dataset on identifications 
that my research produced. The first of these two findings concerns the potential trajectory of 
modern British identifications, while the second concerns how these identifications’ strength 
fluctuated outside of and during securitizations. This data, while not a core finding of my 
research, is nonetheless of relevance for scholars concerned with identity fluctuation in general, 
with modern British identity trajectories in particular, and with the strength of identifications 
in the face of broader forces. 
 
Trajectory of Modern British Identifications 
By comparing the identification data from 2013 and 2015, we can uncover a possible 
trajectory for current British identifications. This will provide an idea of where modern British 
identifications may be heading, which will complement the above information on the state of 
these identifications in very recent periods.  
Firstly, however, I must emphasise that these ideas of trajectory are made cautiously, 
with complete deferment to the possibility that trajectories can be shifted suddenly by major 
events, and conscious of the fact that trajectories become less useful as time goes on without 
continual tracking of relevant data. These trajectories should therefore be taken as (i) forecasts, 
not predictions, (ii) revealing of the type of information a researcher at the end of 2015 would 
have been equipped with had they utilised this research method, (iii) an indication of the kind 
of information that could be improved upon if this method were taken up by other researchers 
who could apply it more continually and observe more trends in identification shifts over longer 
periods, hence keeping trajectory forecasts short-term and well-informed by cumulative data. 
 To help present the data informing these trajectories, below we have comparative 
Continuum Graphs. Each Continuum Graph positions identification points on a scale of 
strength. The higher up on the graph an identification point appears, the stronger the point. A 
point’s position on this graph is determined by how much its content balance swung over the 
course of my identification tracking study. Any point with a swing of more than 100% is a 
weak identification. The first Continuum Graph below displays the strengths of identifications 
that appeared in only one case, while the second graph shows the differences in the strengths 







 These graphs show that 13 of the 24 identification points in 2013 failed to reappear in 
2015. High strength in 2013 was no indicator of long term strength, with 12 of these 13 
disappeared points being strong and five of them being very strong. Additionally, the 
identification points that were new in 2015 were spread evenly along the strength continuum, 
and four of the six identifications that appeared in both cases were strong in 2013 but became 
weak in 2015. Identification strength over the course of weeks and months would therefore 
seem to be no indicator of strength over the course of years. More consistently, in fact very 
consistently, the above data shows that every identification lacking the strength to persist 
between the two cases were either the regularly very thin identifications of 2013 and/or those 
that were most closely related to important but temporary events of 2013. A much better 
indicator of a lack of long-term strength would therefore seem to be regularly very low density 
and/or close relation to current events. 
If we check to see which of the 2015 identification points fall under one or both of these 
categories we produce the following table. Light and dark green identification points fall under 
neither category, indicating that they are most likely to remain salient for the British sense of 
place on the international stage. However, light green points appeared in 2015 but not in 2013, 
which makes it difficult to develop an idea of their long-term trajectory. Light red points fall 
under one of these categories, while dark red ones fall under both, indicating low and very low 




British Identifications  
2015 
Heavily Related 
to Current Events 
 Mode of International Activity  
 Commitment to International Duties/Bonds  
 Military Role  
 Willingness to Assist Migrants  
 British Influence Overall  
 British International Effectiveness  
 British Military Strength  
 British Economic Power  
 Ability to Remove Assad  
 Ability to Defeat ISIS  
 Diplomatic Influence Over Syria  
 Ability to Manage Syria  
 Germany Influence  
 US Influence  
 EU Influence  
 Russia Influence  
 France Influence  
 Threat from Terrorism  
 Threat from Migrants  
 France Relationship  
 Russia Relationship  
 EU Relationship  
 Turkey Relationship  




At this point, if we compare the content of British international identifications in 2013 
and 2015 we can see certain clear trajectories regarding the content of above dark green 
identification points.  
Two of the dark green points steadily maintained one identification in both cases. The 
Mode of International Activity point remained very steady between to the two cases, 
consistently holding a “Britain should be active/forthright” identification with no signs at any 
point of this identification significantly wavering. Additionally, the EU Relationship point 
steadily held a “Euroskeptic” identification in both cases without any major signs of this 
changing. If these current trajectories continue we would expect to see these two identifications 
maintained.  
Three identification points make steady shifts between the cases which indicate clear 
trajectories. The EU Influence point moves from strongly holding an “EU is influential” 
identification to strongly holding an “EU lacks influence” identification, while the 
Commitment to International Duties/Bonds point shifts from holding two considerably weak 
“committed” and “uncommitted” identifications to holding one strong “committed” 
identification. Meanwhile, the Britain’s Military Role point goes from holding one strong 
negative identification with military force to holding two weak negative and positive 
identifications with military force. If these trajectories continue, we would expect to see the 
“EU lacks influence”, “Britain should be committed to international duties/bonds”, and 
“Britain should be militarily active” identifications become more prevalent over time.  
Finally, two identification points simply show weakness in both cases, making an idea 
of their trajectory over time very unclear. These are the British Influence and US Influence 
points, although the British Influence point does seem to have moved towards the “Britain is 
influential” identification as the 2015 case progressed. At this point we would forecast only 
ongoing changeability in these identification points, though their salience looks likely to 
continue. 
Overall then, based on a comparison of the identification data from both cases outlined 
in this chapter, we would cautiously forecast – with an emphasis on regular tracking of relevant 
data so as to develop more nuanced and informed ideas of identification shifts over time – that 
the British look set to maintain or further develop identifications holding that “Britain should 
be active/forthright”, that the “EU lacks influence”, that “Britain should be committed to 
international duties/bonds”, and that “Britain should be militarily active”, along with 
“Euroskeptic” identifications. Meanwhile, the British Influence and US Influence 
identifications are likely to remain changeable yet salient. Finally, the British International 
Effectiveness and British Military Strength identification points seem set to remain salient, 
although their direction is unclear given that they did not appear in 2013. 
 
Identifications’ Strength Outside of and During Securitizations 
 Tracking identifications across my two cases revealed these identifications’ general 
strength both outside of and during securitizations. This is because these cases’ limits were 
stretched to include time periods both before, during, and after the securitizations took place in 
earnest. By the “securitization taking place in earnest” I refer to the period in which a “full” 
securitizing argument was deployed almost on a daily basis. Before and after this period, 
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preliminary and partial securitizing arguments may still have been made irregularly. While the 
securitization in the 2015 case can be said to have happened in earnest between the 14th of 
November and the 2nd of December, I tracked the surrounding identifications and securitizing 
rhetoric from the 1st of October to the 18th of December. This makes the case 78 days long in 
total, and captures six weeks of identifications developing (and strengthening/weakening) 
without the influence of concerted securitizations. The 2013 case was also 78 days in length. 
The 2013 securitization took place in earnest between the 21st and 29th of August, and I tracked 
both the identifications and securitizing rhetoric surrounding this case from the 27th of June to 
the 13th of September. This produced sufficient “control” data on identification strength outside 
of securitizations to then gauge whether or not identifications fluctuated more during 
securitizations than they normally fluctuate outside of securitizations. 
The data that emerged regarding 2013 identifications’ strength both outside of and 
during securitizations is displayed on the below two graphs. The first graph is a Continuum 
Graph. Any point below the 100% mark on this graph is a weak identification. The second 
graph shows the precise time periods in which identification points weakened (indicated by the 
different lines’ position on the x-axis) and the extent to which their content balance shifted 








The above Continuum Graph highlights that the vast majority of the identification 
points in 2013 were strong and indeed a high proportion gravitated towards the very strong end 
of the continuum. Of the 24 points, only four are weak. Of the remaining 20, 10 are very strong, 
although three (the US Influence, Relationship With US, and Relationship With Russia points) 
are almost weak. Additionally, recalling that the securitization took place between the 21st and 
29th of August, we can see in the second graph that the securitization cannot be seen to weaken 
any identification. The second graph also shows that over the course of an 11-week 
identification tracking study involving 24 identification points (so 264 “identification weeks”) 
there were six instances of weakening, one of which occurred over the course of two weeks. 
This represents identifications weakening in only 2.6% of the time over which they were 
tracked. Moreover, of the four identification points that weakened only one did so after a 
prolonged period of strength (the Britain’s Influence point). As there were 18 points, including 
the Britain’s Influence point, that showed prolonged periods of strength, we see that only 1 of 
18 persistently strong identifications eventually weakened.  
 Next we can look at the same data for the 2015 identifications, which is displayed in 


















































2013 Moments When Identifications Weakened
Commitment to Int. Duties/Bonds EU Influence







 The above Continuum Graph highlights that out of the 24 identification points in 2015 
ten are weak, with five of these being very weak. Of the remaining 14, seven are very strong. 
As such, while the majority are still strong in 2015, altogether there is more weakness than in 
2013. Overall, the identifications are spread rather evenly across the continuum, although they 
still gravitate somewhat towards the strong end. The second graph shows that over the course 
of an 11-week identification tracking study involving 24 identification points (so 264 
“identification weeks”) there were 16 instances of weakening, six of which occurred over the 
course of two weeks. This represents identifications weakening in 8.3% of the time over which 
they were tracked. This is more frequent than in 2013, but still quite low overall. Moreover, 
only two identification points weakened after a prolonged period of strength (the US and Russia 
Influence points). As there were 14 points – including the US and Russia Influence points – 
that showed prolonged periods of strength, we see that only two of 14 persistently strong 
identifications eventually weakened in 2015. 
Recalling that the securitization took place between the 14th of November and the 2nd 
of December, we can see in the second graph that six identifications weakened during this 
period. However, two of these six (the Willingness to Assist Migrants and British Military Role 
identifications) were in a state of considerable flux both before and after the securitization, and 
as such their weakening does not seem to be connected to the securitization’s outset or closure. 
As such there are four instances in which the identifications can be seen to weaken during a 
securitization period.  
At this point, by combining the data on identification strength from both cases we can 
forward an empirical and context-conscious datapoint (and one that can be treated as a base 

















































2015 Moments When Identifications Weakened
Britain's Military Role US Influence Willingness to Assist Migrants
British Military Strength Russia Influence British Economic Power




identifications’ strength during and outside of securitizations. Looking at the two cases, we see 
that identifications only weaken 2.6% of the time in the 2013 case and 8.3% of the time in the 
2015 case, which averages out at 5.5% of the time over which identifications were observed. 
Additionally, out of the 32 identifications which showed periods of prolonged strength over 
the two cases – 18 from 2013 and 14 from 2015 – only three eventually weaken. Empirically 
speaking then, the observed identifications in modern Britain tend to be strong the vast majority 
of the time, and if they are strong for prolonged periods they seem particularly unlikely to 
weaken. As such, the datapoint I present here regarding identifications’ general strength is that 
they weaken very rarely. 
The datapoint I present regarding identifications’ strength during securitizations is that 
securitizations can weaken identifications, but rarely and usually in a specific circumstance. 
The fact that across both cases there are only four examples of identifications weakening during 
a securitization shows us the possibility but rarity of identifications weakening during 
securitization periods. Yet, why would we think that it is the securitization process that is 
weakening these identifications, and why would we think that this tends to happen in a specific 
circumstance? To explicate this answer, we can examine a common characteristic that three of 
these four weakenings share, which is that they are directly related to changes in British 
perceptions of the decisiveness of a certain nation, a change in perception that is consistently 
linked to that nation’s reaction to a securitization.  
Why does this seem to be the case? The four identification points that weaken during 
securitizations are the Russia Relationship, British Influence, US Influence, and Russia 
Influence points. Looking at these points, we can see that the latter three weaken in tandem 
with shifts in attributions of decisiveness to these three nations. How do we see this for each 
of these three identification points?  
For the British Influence point, the “Britain lacks influence” identification weakens 
during the securitization in parallel with the shift in its “Britain is internationally effective” 
sub-identification416. This sub-identification was primarily (over 50%) composed of a “Britain 
is decisive” articulation417, meaning that without a shift in this “Britain is decisive” articulation 
the weakening of the “Britain lacks influence” identification would not have been possible.  
For the US Influence point, when the “US lacks influence” identification weakens 
during the securitization it is replaced with a “US is influential” identification which is 
comprised solely of a “US is decisive” articulation418. This means it would have been 
impossible for the “US is influential” identification to arise without the “US is decisive” 
articulation suddenly outweighing all other articulations under this US Influence point.  
For the Russia Influence point, the “Russia is influential” identification weakens into a 
“Russia lacks influence” identification. This is despite the fact that the “Russia is decisive” 
articulation underlying the “Russia is influential” identification outweighs every articulation 
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Appendix. 
417 See the “2015 Articulations Regarding British High/Low Influence Overall” Graph in Sheet Eight in the 
Appendix. 




underlying the “Russia lacks influence” identification combined.419 This means it would have 
been impossible for the “Russia is influential” identification to weaken into a “Russia lacks 
influence” identification as it did without a major downturn in the frequency of this “Russia is 
decisive” articulation.  
It would seem then, that in three of the four instances we have of identifications 
weakening during securitization periods they do so as a direct result of shifts in the attributions 
of decisiveness afforded to specific nations. What is important to note is that these shifts in 
decisiveness articulations are consistently linked to the ways in which nations react to 
securitizations.  
British normative and influence identifications in both 2013 and 2015 show that the 
British strongly and persistently aspired towards being an internationally active nation, 
consistently valuing decisiveness and activity, while judging different nations by the extent to 
which they seem to hold these traits. In instances where nations react to securitization periods 
by stepping up to confrontations and getting involved in international missions to solve specific 
international problems, such as with Britain and America in 2015 and Russia in 2013, these 
nations are attributed with enhanced decisiveness and this consequently weakens 
identifications. Meanwhile, in instances where nations do not react to securitization periods 
with increased international activity against specific international problems, such as with 
Britain, and the US in 2013 and Russia in 2015,420 they are attributed with less decisiveness 
and again identifications weaken. This presents us with the possibility that securitizations can 
weaken British identifications by acting as a test of a nation’s decisiveness, which can 
consequently weaken certain influence identifications. As such, securitizations would seem to 
be able to weaken British identifications that are closely tied to ideas of national decisiveness. 
As such, the empirical and context-conscious datapoint (which can be treated as a base 
that can be built on through continued and regularly refined research on this topic) regarding 
identifications’ strength in general and during securitizations which I present here is as follows: 
For the British public in very recent periods identifications weaken very rarely, particularly if 
these identifications show prolonged strength. Securitizations seem only able to weaken 
specific influence identifications that are tied to ideas of national decisiveness, which they do 
by presenting a test of the extent to which various nations hold this trait. 
 
 Having presented my data, I will now move on to my Conclusions Chapter where I will 
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Conclusions, Contributions, and Recommendations 
 
At the outset of this thesis I laid out the core research question “How do the public 
audience’s identifications influence the success and failure of securitizations?” To answer this 
question, I built on previous critiques of securitization theory and synthesised research from 
fields of identity and cognitive studies. This allowed me to develop a hypothesis in answer to 
my research question. I subsequently conducted an empirical investigation into contemporary 
British identifications and securitizations which provided evidence to support my hypothesis. 
My research has additionally produced holistic pictures of the core international identifications 
held by the contemporary British public, pictures which have shown how the British have 
viewed their nation’s place on the international stage during recent and consequential periods. 
This has been accompanied with an outline of identification trajectories indicating which of 
these visions seem set to shift, remain, and disappear. In this chapter I will summarise these 
findings and how they contribute to important literatures. I will begin with a summary of my 
findings.  
 
Summary of Findings 
My research has produced three sets of findings. The first (and primary) finding regards 
the influence of public audiences’ identifications on securitization success. The other two 
findings are secondary and intended as datapoints of note to scholars studying identity in 
general and British identity in particular. These secondary findings regard the recent status and 
trajectory of the British public’s identifications, and the stability of identifications both in 
general and during securitizations specifically. I will now summarise each of these sets of 
findings in order. 
 
Influence of Public Audience Identifications on Securitization Success 
This thesis has presented theoretical reasons and empirical evidence that the 
relationships/co-locations between public audience’s identifications and (anti-)securitizing 
arguments generate specific levels of audience receptivities. These receptivity levels impact the 
ability of each argument to (de)securitize issues. In Chapter Two, I drew from cognitive, 
securitization, and identity studies to produce a hypothesis. This hypothesis’ main components 
included: 
 
1. In securitizations which are publicly visible and that require the approval of elected 
officials before security practices or laws can come into effect, the public (defined 
as individuals who are citizens of the state) becomes a relevant audience for the 
securitization.  
2. Individuals’ identifications or self-schemata have important characteristics 
regarding their strength, thickness, and alignment of content to rhetoric. 
3. Depending on the status of an individual’s identification characteristics (strong, 
thin, misaligned, etc.), these identifications will filter in/out certain rhetoric that the 
individual is exposed to. This will generate different levels of audience receptivity 
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4. The content of national identifications (national norms, influence, perception in the 
eyes of others, relationships, and history) filters in/out the very rhetoric central to 
(anti-)securitizing arguments (objects of worth, threats, and appropriate and feasible 
means of dealing with these threats to objects of worth). 
5. As such, the relationships between (anti-)securitizing arguments and the national 
identifications held by the audience will impact audience receptivity to these (anti-
)securitizing arguments.  
6. Audiences will not engage with arguments that they are unreceptive to. As such, 
the argument garnering lower audience receptivity has a lower ability to impact 
audiences’ perceptions of security issues.  
7. Consequently, in securitizations where the public is a relevant audience, the 
contestation between securitizing and anti-securitizing arguments (and thus the 
success of the securitization) will be impacted by the public audience’s 
identifications. 
 
Having developed this hypothesis, I then sought to empirically test it. To test whether 
or not public audience identifications did have an impact on securitization success in the way 
that I had hypothesised they do, I took two recent securitizations as my case studies. These case 
studies were chosen with the intention of comparing two securitizations in an English-speaking 
country in the 21st century that were highly similar if not identical in several important aspects, 
yet which produced different outcomes (success and failure respectively). The two case studies 
I selected were almost identical in terms of securitizing actors and securitizing environment 
(including the political, cultural, media landscape), and highly similar in terms of securitizing 
proposition. Additionally, in both cases the criteria I had laid out for situations in which the 
public is a relevant audience (securitizations which are publicly visible and that require the 
approval of elected officials before security practices or laws can come into effect) were met.  
Selecting such similar securitizations allowed me to isolate the factor of relationships 
between public audience identifications and (anti-)securitizing arguments. I could therefore test 
if the differences between these relationships in the two cases could account for the 
securitization succeeding in one case and failing in the other. In essence, by equalising the 
status of all other important factors and allowing for variance in this factor, I tested to see if 
this factor has an impact on securitization success in the manner that I hypothesised.  
Drawing from identity studies, I developed an inductive, interpretive, and empirical 
method for recovering public identifications from historic time periods. I applied my method 
to my case studies and in doing so tracked and mapped public identifications within these 
periods. This included a track of their strength, thickness and content, and a breaking down of 
their content in terms of norms, influence, and relationships. I also analysed the securitizing 
and anti-securitizing arguments made in the same time periods, breaking them down into 
arguments about objects of worth, threats, and appropriate and feasible means of dealing with 
these threats. I was then able see the relationships between public audience identifications and 
(anti-)securitizing arguments. Based on these relationships, I applied the following receptivity 
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 Applying these scores clearly showed that if the public is a relevant audience in certain 
securitizations as I hypothesised, and if identifications have an impact of securitizations as I 
hypothesised, then my hypothesis would predict and explain the failure of the 2013 
securitization as being the result of the securitizing argument garnering much lower audience 
receptivity than the anti-securitizing argument. Meanwhile, the success of the 2015 
securitization would be predicted and explained by my hypothesis as being the result of the 
securitizing argument garnering much higher audience receptivity than the anti-securitizing 
argument in 2015. As such, a comparison of actual historical securitization outcomes (failure 
in 2013 and success in 2015) with outcomes predicted by my hypothesis reveals that in my 
case studies public audience identifications influenced securitizations as my hypothesis 
predicted they would. This is a strong empirical validation of my hypothesis. 
 This finding can be most succinctly summarised as follows. In answer to my research 
question – “How do the public audience’s identifications influence the success and failure of 
securitizations?” – I have found that the relationships/co-locations between the public 
audience’s identifications and (anti-)securitizing arguments generate specific levels of 
audience receptivities. These receptivity levels are generated based on identification 
characteristics of strength, density, and alignment with (anti-)securitizing arguments. In highly 
visible securitizations these public audience receptivities impact the ability of each argument 
to (de)securitize issues. Specifically, the argument garnering lower public audience receptivity 
has a lower ability to impact public audience perceptions of issues as (not) being security 
issues. That argument consequently has a lower ability to gain legitimation and authorization 
of its proposed viewpoint through security practice. 
There is, however, a notable gap here. This gap concerns information on the degree of 
influence that identifications have on securitization success. My research has shown that, all 
things being equal, identifications can make the difference between a successful and a failed 
securitization, and consequently they have a significant and meaningful influence on 
securitization success. However, my research has not revealed (nor did it seek to reveal) the 
relative impact identifications have compared to the impact of other important securitization 
factors (securitizing move, securitizing actor, political, cultural, and media environments, etc.). 
To do so would require a comparative study of several rather different securitizations in which 
these other important factors are different to each other (comparing securitizations involving 
different actors but the same receptivities, different propositions but the same actors and 
different receptivities, etc.), and in which neither the securitizing nor anti-securitizing argument 
has a very low audience receptivity. This would be a complex analysis of several highly 
qualitative influences in varying environments, which is far beyond the scope of this thesis. 
What I have evidenced is that the relationships between identifications and these arguments 
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generate specific levels of audience receptivities to securitizing and anti-securitizing 
arguments, and these receptivities increase/decrease arguments’ ability to (de)securitize issues. 
Nonetheless, it remains to be researched what impact these identifications have relative to the 
impact of other important securitization factors. 
  
Status and Trajectory of the British Public’s Identifications 
 My research required that I track the identifications of the British public over two recent 
time periods. Tracking these identifications revealed both the recent status of these 
identifications and a possible trajectory that they seem to be following.  
In 2013, British normative identifications were highly changeable and inconsistent. The 
British were aspiring to be active and decisive while at the same time not knowing how to do 
so and lacking confidence in Britain’s capabilities as an international actor. The British public 
in 2013 saw Britain’s status as an internationally active nation as fundamentally important to 
British national character, yet concentrated only intermittently on what forms of international 
activity were actually desirable. When they did focus on specific elements of their normative 
character they were unsure of what exactly to stand for and how, identifying negatively with 
military force, positively with deference, switching between conflicting identifications 
regarding international duties, and ultimately not holding any specific positive normative goals 
regarding what types of activity Britain should be involved in.  
Identifications regarding British international influence in 2013 made up a much more 
consistent part of the British public’s identifications. They attributed international influence 
strongly to their opponents, occasionally to themselves, and never to their allies. Emphasis on 
holding clear visions and executing them decisively formed a significant part of British 
identifications regarding international influences, rather than more material-based forms of 
power. This clarity of vision and decisiveness is precisely what the British aspired to gain yet 
saw themselves as lacking, particularly when Russia was seen as exhibiting this trait (implying 
a form of Russian envy). Ultimately this contributed to a British sense of international 
powerlessness and a vision of the international stage as being filled with overwhelming 
oppositional forces. 
Finally, in 2013, identifications regarding Middle Eastern actors and issues made up a 
significant proportion of the British public’s identifications. When it came to the Middle East, 
the British held a debilitating sense of confusion about their goals and lacked confidence in 
Britain’s capabilities. They gravitated much more to the side of doubt than certainty, altogether 
lacking a clear sense of purpose and not knowing who exactly Britain should be supporting. 
The Middle East as a whole was identified with fractiousness, volatility and uncontrollable 
elements, while Syria was identified with unstoppable deterioration and regularly equated with 
the 2003 situation in Iraq. These general and specific senses of powerlessness were reinforced 
by a sense of international friendlessness, with no wholly positive international relationships 
coming to the fore at any point in 2013.  
All the British identifications from 2013 are summarised visually in the graphs on the 







In 2015, British identifications were quite different. In 2015 British identifications 
centred far more on Britain’s normative character and international influence than they did 
previously, with a much lower orientation towards the influence of, or Britain’s relationships 
with, other international actors. This in itself signals a much lower preoccupation with the 
status of other nations and overall a greater sense of British self-confidence. Normatively, the 
British identified much more positively with the use of military force, which became associated 
with both efficacy and a positive moral dimension. They were also more committed to assisting 
in international crises, identifying Britain positively with international cooperation, collective 
action, and shared responsibilities. Furthermore, British normative identifications in 2015 were 
no longer conflicted between the desire to be internationally forthright and deferent. The only 
normative identification that did not shift between the cases was the desire to be internationally 
active, which maintained a very similar strength over a long period. Overall, in 2015 we see 
British normative identifications that are much more open and even committed to 
internationally forthright activity utilising a broader range of tools in the service of a wider 
array of peoples. 
Regarding Britain’s own influence, in 2015 the British had entirely changeable 
identifications. Ideas of international influence were still largely formed from ideas of 
decisiveness and clarity of vision. However, there was also a greater emphasis on and belief in 
Britain’s economic and military power than previously, with the British becoming more 
confident in Britain’s influence as the case progressed. This was particularly so regarding 
British ideas of influence in Syria. Furthermore, in 2015 the British identified Britain with both 
low and high influence in Syria, as opposed to the overwhelming sense of powerlessness they 
held in 2013.  
When the British did concentrate on the influence of others in 2015 they concentrated 
on many of the same actors as in 2013. However, they no longer saw all opponents as strong 
and all allies as weak, which likely enhanced a British sense of international capability. This 
also reinforces the indication from the 2015 normative identifications that the British were 
seeing the international stage more as a place for productive action rather than as being filled 
with overwhelming oppositional forces. Furthermore, influence identifications were weaker in 
2015 overall, indicating that not only were the British less concerned with the international 
influence of others but they were also less certain about the status of these influences. Ideas of 
other nations’ influence were still primarily made up of articulations of decisiveness and clarity 
of vision, although material military and economic bases of international influence became 
much more prominent parts of these identifications. This backs up the British shift towards an 
openness to using military power (observed in the 2015 normative identifications) with a shift 
towards a greater vision of the importance of this form of influence. Finally, when the British 
did concentrate on their international relationships in 2015 they held more positive visions of 
these relationships. They also held a more acute sense of international threat, which briefly 
formed a notable part of the British public’s overall sense of place on the international stage. 
All the 2015 identifications are summarised visually in the graphs on the next two pages.  
It could well be noted that some of the identifications held in 2013 and 2015 were 
inconsistent and conflicted with each other. For instance, in 2013 the British believed that 







defer to international institutions, while in 2015 they believed that Britain should hold true to 
its international commitments, but were torn on whether or not Britain should assist migrants 
and refugees. This presence of inconsistent identifications is to be expected; individuals often 
exhibit dialogical selves rather than single consistent ones.421 Their impact, however, is difficult 
to gauge. On the one hand, conflicting identifications displayed both strength and weakness, 
which indicates that they are not necessarily more changeable or more easily manipulated than 
identifications that are unconflicted. On the other hand, the presence of two or more conflicting 
identifications is likely to have broadened opportunities for both securitizing and anti-
securitizing actors to align their arguments to a single individual’s identifications. This, 
however, seems like shaky ground on which build an argument. If an individual holds two 
conflicting identifications then one day they may find one set of identifications primed while 
another they would find the opposite set primed. (Anti-)securitizing arguments that align with 
conflicted identifications are therefore likely to experience varying and rather unpredictable 
levels of audience support. As such, these conflicting identifications would seem to be 
unreliable friends for (anti-)securitizing actors to appeal to. A concerted study into the impact 
of these conflicting identifications is nonetheless warranted, as during my research too few 
conflicting identifications emerged for any extraction of meaningful trends regarding their 
impact on securitizations. 
By breaking down the 2013 and 2015 sets of identifications and analysing the 
continuities and differences between them, certain trajectories were ascertained. These 
trajectories were made cautiously, with complete deferment to the possibility that trajectories 
can be shifted suddenly by major events, and conscious of the fact that trajectories become less 
useful as time goes on without continual tracking of relevant data. Analysis of the evolution of 
British identifications between 2013 and 2015 revealed that short-term identification stability 
was no indicator of long-term stability. Much more reliable indicators of long-term stability 
were high density and/or a lack of close relation to current events. Applying these indicators to 
the British identifications observed in 2015 revealed which identifications were likely to 
remain salient in the future, while observing the development of these identifications between 
the cases revealed what form they were likely to take on over time.  
The clearest among these trajectories were that the British look set to maintain or further 
develop identifications holding that Britain should be active/forthright, that the EU lacks 
influence, that Britain should be committed to international duties/bonds, and that Britain 
should be militarily active, along with Euroskeptic identifications. Meanwhile, identifications 
regarding British influence and US influence are likely to remain changeable. Finally, 
identifications regarding British international effectiveness and British military strength seem 
set to remain salient, although their direction is unclear given that they did not appear in 2013. 
It should be noted that a gap regarding this finding is that learning may have occurred 
between 2013 and 2015 that may well have ceased to occur since 2015. In the 2013-2015 period 
the British public were exposed to a number of highly salient narratives regarding the status of 
Britain and the international society which it sat within. These narratives are likely to have 
impacted British identifications during this time. Many of these narratives are less salient now 
than they were in that period. In particular, in the 2013-2015 period the degeneration of Syrian 
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Civil War was focused on to a great extent by the British media, while since 2015 the civil war 
has (in relative terms) stabilised and coverage of it become more intermittent. As such, the 
trajectories of British identifications between 2013 and 2015 should not be assumed to have 
continued without ongoing research. These trajectories should therefore be taken as (i) 
forecasts, not predictions, (ii) revealing of the type of information a researcher at the end of 
2015 would have been equipped with had they utilised this research method, (iii) an indication 
of the kind of information that could be improved upon if this method were taken up by other 
researchers who could apply it more continually and observe more trends in identification shifts 
over longer periods, hence keeping the trajectories short-term and well-informed by cumulative 
data.  
 
Identification Stability Outside and During Securitizations 
 Finally, my research has produced data regarding the stability of identifications both 
outside of and during securitizations, along with a method for analysing this stability. My 
method for analysing identification strength places identifications on continuums for strength. 
Identifications can have different positions on these continuums and these positions can change 
over time or be quickly shifted by specific significant events. This reconciles and 
accommodates differing research on identification strength which contrastingly emphasises the 
persistence or changeability of identifications, as I will detail below in the Contributions and 
Recommendations section. While this method can be applied across different cases, the data I 
have produced on identification strength over the course of my research is highly context-
specific, relating to the evolution of British identifications over the course of months in two 
recent time periods. It is also a purely empirical dataset, which I do not accompany with 
theoretical explanations. As such, I have presented this data within this thesis as empirical and 
context-conscious data which can be treated as a base. This base can be built upon through 
continued and regularly refined research into identification strength, research that can utilise 
these continuums for identification strength.  
 The main data points on identification strength both outside of and during 
securitizations which I present in this thesis are as follows.  
 
1. In the contemporary British context, identifications only weakened 5.5% of the time 
over which they were observed.  
2. Out of the 32 identifications which showed periods of prolonged strength only three 
eventually weakened.  
3. Securitizations displayed a low (but not non-existent) ability to affect identification 
strength.  
4. Identifications seemed to weaken in response specific shifts in attributions of 
decisiveness to different nations, shifts which seem to have been brought on by 
securitizations.  
 
 Contributions and Recommendations 
 I will now detail how these findings contribute to important literatures, and will also 




Contributions and Recommendations for Securitization Studies 
As I overviewed in Chapter One, when asking the question of “what causes 
securitization success and failure?” the securitization literature to date has primarily adopted 
three different outlooks. These are (i) non-causal perspectives on securitization success, (ii) 
securitizing move-focused explanations of this success, and (iii) securitizing actor-focused 
explanations of this success. My findings into how the audience influences securitization 
success/failure challenges these three outlooks.  
My findings challenge non-causal perspectives on securitization success by clearly 
demonstrating that pre-existing audience identifications have direct impacts on securitization 
processes which are initiated in a time frame following the origins of these identifications. In 
other words, a pre-existing element (identifications) impacts a new element (securitizing 
rhetoric) in a manner that can be regarded as causal. My finding further undermines the non-
causal perspectives on securitization that have been noted by Guzzini, Van Rythoven, and 
Baele and Thompson.422 Each of these securitization critics (as I detailed in Chapter One) have 
noted that the original securitization theory equates speech acts with securitizations to an 
unwarranted extent, and in doing so the theory allowed for a non-causal perspective on 
securitization success wherein the speech act itself signals a securitization. My findings 
contribute to this line of critique by empirically demonstrating that securitizing arguments must 
first interact with pre-existing identifications before they can impact security vernaculars and 
meanings in local contexts. The utterance itself does not guarantee any outcome, agreement, or 
rejection. For the securitization to occur, there must first be the negotiation of meaning which 
is guided in part by the relationship or co-location between arguments and audience 
identifications. My findings therefore act as a defence of causality in securitization and provide 
empirical evidence undermining the equation of speech acts with securitizations. 
Existing causal explanations of securitization outcomes have, as I overviewed in 
Chapter One, focused strongly on the securitizing move and the securitizing actor as the 
primary variables on which securitization success depends. My findings further contribute to 
the underdeveloped but growing body of literature arguing that the audience must be 
considered as an important factor alongside these two already well-document factors. My 
findings clearly show that in two scenarios in which the securitizing move and securitizing 
actors are in many ways identical or highly similar, differences in audience identifications can 
be seen to sway securitization success and failure. To be clear, I am arguing that the securitizing 
move and the securitizing actor both influence securitization success in tandem with the 
influence of the audience. I do not seek to undermine the validity or importance of securitizing 
move-focused and securitizing actor-focused explanations. Instead, my findings seek to 
undermine any heavy focus on one or both of those two types of explanations of securitization 
success. Variations in securitizing moves and securitizing actors will surely impact 
securitizations’ probability of success. However, I have empirically demonstrated that so does 
variations in audience characteristics, specifically their identifications and the relationship of 
these identifications to securitizing arguments. All things being equal, these audience 
identifications can make the difference between a successful and a failed securitization. 
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My findings not only lend weight to the argument that the audience must be taken into 
account in securitization analysis, but also contributes a specific, applicable, and systematic 
means of analysing the effect of audience identifications in securitization case studies. I have 
demonstrated that audience identifications have specific effects on audience receptivities to 
different arguments, and have presented an applicable method for examining and ascertaining 
this effect. My method of analysis enquires into, rather than assumes, the status of 
identifications, and therefore can be applied across contexts. It also provides a clear means of 
ascertaining the relationship between identifications and arguments. It does so by highlighting 
that the central characteristics of identifications are their strength, density, and alignment to 
arguments, and further highlighting which aspects of identification content (norms, influence, 
etc.) co-locate with which aspects of securitizing arguments (objects of worth, threats, etc.).  
Such a method of analysis not only contributes to future securitization studies across a 
range of contexts, it also directly upgrades existing critiques of securitization and turns these 
critiques into a concrete and applicable tool of analysis. As I outlined in Chapter One, I have 
adopted Balzacq’s423 arguments regarding the importance of psycho-cultural orientations and 
perlocutionary effects of speech. I operationalise these orientations and effects as being 
encapsulated in audience identifications and audience acceptance of arguments. I further adopt 
Bubandt and Bourbeau’s emphases on vernacular security talk by basing all interpretations of 
what securitizing arguments “meant” in my cases on intertextual analyses of contemporary 
identifications.424 Additionally, I have adopted Stritzel’s arguments on resonant values in 
sociopolitical/linguistic contexts by examining how securitizing arguments resonate and ring 
true or misalign with pre-existing identifications.425 By building from and synthesising the 
above works, I have contributed an applicable and systematic method of analysis for examining 
the effects of the audience in securitizations. 
I further contribute to securitization studies a strong empirical demonstration of the 
promise of adopting insights from cognitive studies into a field traditionally dominated by 
politically-based ontologies. As I outlined in Chapter One, securitization studies began with 
the Copenhagen School’s highly discursive ontology in which speech acts were the paramount 
if not exclusive forces at play. Critiques and adaptations of this perspective led to the praxis-
based ontology of the Paris School426, which included a range of institutional elements beyond 
speech. Several leading securitization critics including Vuori, Salter, Leonard, and Kaunert427 
went on to adopt even broader cultural ontologies. I now add to this mix a cognitive ontology, 
that forwards insights into physiologically influenced schemata, human development, and 
learning. For some, this may prove unsatisfyingly non-political, even denying of agency. As I 
argued previously, my analysis of securitization processes does not seek to deny the place of 
human agency and consequent political contestation entirely. Instead, it limits this to a form of 
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conditional agency, whereby those individuals with strong, thick self-schemata that misalign 
with securitizing arguments are strongly pre-disposed to reject these arguments without truly 
considering them. Adopting a focus on such cognitive predispositions undermines the primacy 
of speech, praxis, and even culture in securitization studies to an extent, but not entirely. I 
forward that cognition should be seen as a building block of commonly held political and 
cultural knowledge. Our analysis of the evolution, development, or short-term shifts in such 
knowledge (including knowledge of security) should therefore take cognitive processes into 
account. In this vein, I further Ted Hopf’s push to bring cognition into identity studies428. Hopf 
has argued for identity scholars to adopt a cognitive perspective on identity. I have argued that 
securitization should take into account identifications as viewed through a cognitive lens. In 
doing so, I extend Hopf’s work on cognition into the field of securitization, and I demonstrate 
the promise this has for securitization analysis. 
I additionally contribute not only empirical evidence that the public can be a relevant 
audience for securitizations, but also a set of criteria for identifying when the public will be so. 
This contribution lends weight to the significantly underdeveloped securitization literature 
focusing on the role of the public in securitizations. As I overviewed in Chapter One, the public 
audience has long been overshadowed by works treating bureaucratic, technocratic, and elite 
audiences as the key actors who need convincing in order for a securitization to be successful. 
I do not deny that for several securitizations such as those most examined by the Paris School429 
(including policing tactics, border patrol policies, and the militarization of police), the public 
may only pay a belated and marginal role. Nonetheless, in securitizations which are publicly 
visible and that require the approval of elected officials before security practices or laws can 
come into effect, the public will be a relevant audience for the securitization and must be 
analytically treated as such. As such, I contribute to securitization studies a complementary 
focus to that of the Paris School, explicitly calling for attention to be paid to the mass audience 
out in the open as well as the elite one sitting behind closed doors. This also ties in well with 
the FPA literature which in recent years has dedicated increasing focus to the public’s ability 
to consistently constrain the actions of state elites. This is in contrast to previous assumptions 
in the FPA literature which held the public to be irrational, incoherent, and generally 
malleable430, as I outlined in Chapter One. 
As such, my findings contribute empirical weight to the argument that the audience, 
including the public audience and their cognitively managed identifications, must be taken into 
account alongside securitizing move and actor focused explanations of securitization success. 
Consequently, a core recommendation I present to the securitization field here is to pursue a 
more holistic analysis of the contestation that occurs when security discourses clash. When 
securitizing and anti-securitizing arguments contest each other, we must account for this 
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process and the eventual winner by looking at how these discourses relate to each other, to their 
speakers, and to their audience’s identifications. To do so more effectively, a series of 
comparative studies should be conducted wherein different securitizations involving similar 
and disparate actors, moves, and audience identifications are analysed. Such a study could 
reveal the relative levels of influence these different factors have on securitization success. 
Until such a study or series of studies is conducted we can only conclude that each of these 
factors has a role to play, and we must adopt a much more self-conscious admission that any 
attempts to prioritise any one factor over the other are indeed assumptions. In order to bolster 
the development of such a holistic vision of securitization processes, the case selection bias 
towards instances of successful securitizations must be tempered with a higher attention to 
instances of securitization failures. Without doing so, the impact of various types of audiences 
on securitization processes can never be fully grasped. 
These analytical enhancements can have practical impacts. Adopting these perspectives 
regarding what moves public acceptance of securitizations is crucial for responsibly and 
effectively developing any security rationales/policies that are publicly visible, and even more 
so for those policies that require parliamentary approval. As I outlined in Chapter One, publics 
can influence securitization outcomes in a variety of ways, from giving moral support to 
directly driving the demand for securitizing or anti-securitizing measures. As was evidenced 
by the Iraq War, persistent decreases in public acceptance of security rationales can ultimately 
render these rationales and subsequent policies unsustainable, while short term bursts in public 
acceptance can enable the passage of policies that are unworkable in the long run. As such, 
understandings of how the public powers securitization processes can enable us to monitor and 
potentially impact these processes through our awareness of what makes them pan out in 
different ways. Very importantly, this applies just as much to monitoring and crafting better 
securitizations as to monitoring and crafting better anti-securitizations. Securitizing and anti-
securitizing actors, as well as those studying them, can use this knowledge to better understand 
and influence the discourses that enable and deter (un)desirable security practices. Indeed, this 
knowledge should overall deter securitizing actors from attempting securitizations by 
highlighting how difficult it is to generate new security rationales that do not largely reflect 
concepts about the nation that the public already closely holds. 
Overall then, my research contributes to the securitization field empirical evidence that 
the audience must be considered alongside securitizing move and actor focused factors that 
influence securitization success. At the same time, my research provides a systematic and 
applicable method for taking the audience into account. Building on and synthesising previous 
critiques of securitization studies, I introduce a perspective that emphasises the importance of 
the public audience and its psycho-cultural orientation – as encapsulated in their cognitively 
managed identifications – in constituting highly important sociopolitical and sociolinguistic 
contexts in securitization processes. By demonstrating how these audiences and identifications 
significantly affect the development of security meanings, my perspective emphasises the 
negotiated character of securitization processes and empirically counters the previous emphasis 






Contributions and Recommendations for Literature on the Security-Identity Link 
In Chapter One, I reviewed how Campbell has argued that security and foreign policy 
discourse and practices produce identities, and that we should view identity as the “outcome” 
of security practice and speech.431 This perspective adopts a heavy emphasis on the processes 
whereby identity is produced by security, rather than the other way around. Meanwhile Hansen 
argues for a much more multi-directional link between security and identity, asserting that 
foreign policy “draws upon” representations of identity and in doing so helps shape and 
reproduce them.432 My research lends weight to Hansen’s argument and undermines 
Campbell’s by showing that securitizing rhetoric must draw upon and resonate with pre-
existing identifications if it is to succeed in its reorientation of security meanings. While I 
accept fully that state security rhetoric/actions impact identity discourses, my research 
highlights that identity discourses simultaneously delimit the range of security rhetoric/actions 
available to the state. In doing so, it presents a challenge not to Campbell’s findings, but to his 
tight analytical focus (and, to be more direct, his overemphasis) on security’s impact on 
identity. Simultaneously, it buoys up Hansen’s more two-way approach to the identity-security 
link. 
At the same time, however, my research presents a challenge to the non-causal 
epistemology that Hansen employs. While Hansen seeks to argue that identity and security are 
so intertwined that neither can be seen as truly being the influencer of the other433, I have shown 
that in the moment of a securitization pre-existing identifications have a great sway in 
permitting and delimiting possible securitizing rhetoric. This securitizing rhetoric can in turn 
shape identifications, but my research demonstrates that the influence of pre-existing 
identifications on securitizations is considerable and empirically traceable. I agree that identity 
and policy are mutually constitutive, but securitizations take place in time and identities often 
precede them. Once they meet they then shape each other, but we cannot ignore the extent to 
which pre-existing identifications delimit and permit securitizing rhetoric. This undermines 
non-causal outlooks on the security-identity link. Nonetheless, Hansen’s argument that “the 
goal of foreign policy discourse is to create a stable link between representations of identity 
and the proposed policy”434 is one that my research provides strong empirical backing to, as I 
have empirically demonstrated that this process of linking identifications to proposed security 
policies (finding alignment between identifications and securitizing rhetoric) is central to the 
success of a securitization. 
 Furthermore, my research contributes empirical backing to Huysmans’ argument that 
alternative constructions of security must contest each other and do not do so in a vacuum.435 
It does so by showing that securitizing and anti-securitizing arguments must find means of 
aligning themselves to the public identifications that constitute the sociolinguistic environment 
these arguments are deployed within. Their comparative ability to do so will directly impact 
which argument will successfully reorient security meanings in this environment. Moreover, I 
have examined this contestation of security discourses in highly recent time periods. These 
                                                          
431 Campbell, Writing Security, p8 
432 Hansen, Security as Practice, p30. 
433 Hansen, p9. 
434 Hansen, 16. 
435 Huysmans, “Defining Social Constructivism in Security Studies” 
219 
 
periods involved a hyper-fragmented media landscape in which few people receive the same 
news in the same way. In doing so, I have contributed an update to research conducted by 
Campbell, Hansen, and Williams into elites’ ability to reshape security meanings in previous 
time periods which held a very different media landscape436. While their research may have 
indicated that elite rhetoric had a strong ability to reshape security meanings and consequently 
identities in those time periods, my research shows that in the 21st century elites have a greater 
need to draw upon existing identities rather than reshape them. 
This further substantiates Waever’s observation on “security identities”. As I outlined 
in Chapter One, Waever observed that by the end of the 20th century publics across Europe 
were increasingly adopting different identity discourses to their state elites437. Consequently, 
state discourses that were based on European identities and highlighting European security 
needs were being undermined by national discourses that were based on national identities and 
highlighting national security needs. National populations were therefore increasingly rejecting 
state rhetoric if this rhetoric was based on identity formulations not held by the nation’s public. 
My research adds to this observation by highlighting that publics in the modern era demonstrate 
a strong capacity to reject state security discourses that do not align with their identity 
discourses. Finally, my research lends weight to the argument put forward by Browning that 
securitizations should not be (as they often are) treated as forces that reify and therefore 
stabilise identities through invocations of dangerous Others. Instead, Browning argues, security 
rhetoric that goes against existing identifications can be destabilising for identities.438 My 
research backs up this argument by showing that security rhetoric can go against the grain of 
existing identifications, and if it does so it is likely to be rejected due to cognitive mechanisms 
seeking stability of self-knowledge.  
Overall then, my research contributes to the literature on the security-identity link by 
presenting a challenge to Campbell’s overemphasis on the ability of security discourse to shape 
identities and tempering it with empirical support for Hansen’s argument that security rhetoric 
must draw upon local representations of identity. I also provide empirical evidence for 
Hansen’s argument that the process of linking identity to security is central to security policy 
production, while at the same time I challenge Hansen’s non-causal perspective on the security-
identity link. Additionally, I take Huysmans’ argument that alternative security discourses must 
go through an engagement in a pre-existing environment, and I provide an empirical overview 
of such a contestation. I do so in a way that highlights how the public audience is an influential 
group in the modern era with the capacity to reject elite discourses that do not align with their 
pre-existing identifications. In doing so I provide backing for observations and arguments of 
Waever and Browning, while also updating Campbell, Hansen, and Williams’ older case 
studies with two case studies from the modern era.  
In conjunction with these contributions, I recommend that future research on the 
security-identity link be conducted in a manner that strongly acknowledges the dependency of 
both elements upon the other – rather than the primacy of one over the other – yet that does so 
with a causal epistemology which accepts that security rhetoric often enters environments pre-
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populated with identity discourse. Such research should continue to take note of previous works 
done in older time periods, but be conscious of how the changing nature of the modern media 
landscape undermines previous elite capabilities to use security rhetoric to shape – rather than 
simply find alignment with – public identifications.  
 
Contributions and Recommendation for Literature on UK Foreign Policy of Intervention 
 My research also has implications for studies into Britain’s foreign policy of 
intervention. To begin, my research undermines the longstanding perspective within this 
literature that interventionist policies are the preserve of the British executive branch. Much of 
this literature has seen the British parliament as having little to no role to play in the 
development or even the prevention of British interventionist policies. Kaarbo and Kenealy 
describe “the UK parliament’s weak reputation in foreign policy generally, and security policy 
specifically” along with “its tendency when consulted to respond with strong cross-party 
consensus in support of PMs’ preferences.”439 When it comes to interventionism, Heffernan 
has depicted the Commons as “weak and reactive: a legislature that chooses never to bite, a 
tiger muzzled by partisan politics”440 while Hill argues that “executives have been able to 
circumvent parliamentary powers without difficulty”441. These observations have significant 
implications. In an overview of parliamentary war powers from 1989 to 2004, Peters and 
Wagner pointed out that there is little systematic research on parliament’s role in security 
policy because it is assumed that parliament is unimportant.442 In short, parliament’s 
longstanding lack of impact on British foreign interventions has created an expectation that it 
is a non-player in this field and therefore not worthy of extensive analytical attention. This has 
resulted in an over-focus on executives, with individual leaders’ belief systems and even 
personalities becoming primary variables for analysis in literature seeking to understand British 
interventionism, as overviewed by Beech.443 
 My research signals that this focus on executives – and overlooking of parliament – in 
studies seeking to understand and perhaps forecast British interventionism needs to be 
reconsidered. While parliament may have had little input in the development of British 
interventions during previous decades, this may be set to change. Firstly, my research indicates 
that modern publics are capable of rejecting elite discourses that do not align with their 
identifications. Secondly, there is evidence to suggest that the public is likely to express this 
rejection through democratic channels which flow more directly through parliament than 
through the executive. This follows research conducted by Dieterich et al. which overviewed 
25 European parliaments over the course of a decade and found that parliaments are the 
democratic institutions most likely to respond to war-averse public opinion444. This 
responsiveness stems mostly from the greater number of public opinion “receptors” in 
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parliament compared to the executive, and the greater incentive for parliaments to influence 
foreign interventions by preventing them rather than forging them (as parliaments have little to 
no role in initiating these interventions). Consequently, I argue that parliament should be less 
assumed to be a talking shop or rubber stamp in the process for developing British 
interventionist policies. Instead, it should be questioned whether parliament may gain a more 
substantial decision-making role in this process. As such, my research contributes a signpost 
that the British parliament may be more capable of preventing and consequently shaping British 
interventionist policies than previously thought, and in doing so my findings challenge 
conventional thinking on this issue. I consequently recommend that the British parliament be 
given more analytical focus and feature more prominently in research on British 
interventionism. 
 Since the parliament’s decision in 2013 to veto the executive’s proposed interventionist 
policy, some research in this field has indeed adopted a more concerted focus on the role of 
parliament in British interventions. This is perhaps most strongly exemplified by Strong’s 
observation of a progression towards “the House of Commons [becoming] a forum for policy 
debate, where MPs exercise ‘practical judgement’ about foreign policy.”445 However, the 
literature that has focused on the role of parliament in developing interventionist policies in 
Syria and in wars more generally has almost exclusively focused on factors that have little to 
do with public attitudes. Parliament’s effect on British interventionism has instead been seen 
as the result of intra-party politics446, bilateral relationships between parliaments447, 
parliamentary bargaining across party lines448, and geopolitical realities which parliaments are 
aware of.449 The public’s attitude has not only been overlooked within this literature, but at 
times it has even been explicitly overviewed as a malleable factor that can be controlled or 
ignored by parliamentary elites.450 My research would suggest that the public is not only a 
significant factor in the development of certain interventionist policies, but also an analytically 
reliable one. I have shown that public assent to securitizing rhetoric follows certain rules and 
dependencies derived from cognitive mechanisms, mechanisms which should be sustained 
across cases. While the form of public identifications will vary across cases, their relevance 
and impact will not. This insight undercuts the lack of attention paid to the public and their 
identifications in the literature regarding the British parliament’s role in interventionist 
policies. 
Consequently, I recommend that the public factor be considered alongside the other 
equally relevant non-public factors listed above. In this vein, there is one recent study into the 
role of the public in British interventionist policies that I would recommend should be 
replicated and improved upon. In a 2015 study, Leech and Gaskarth451 identified variations in 
British decisions to intervene in different countries during the Arab Spring. Looking at 
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countries that had similarly high death tolls but experienced different forms and levels of UK 
intervention, they examined the role that bilateral networks on both the public and elite levels 
played in influencing British decisions to intervene or not to intervene. They concluded that 
the solidity and age of pre-existing elite security networks was the core determinant for British 
foreign policy engagement. On the one hand, this is the type of study (with its emphasis on 
comparing the influence of different public and non-public related factors across numerous 
cases) that I recommend should be conducted more extensively in order to properly identify 
the relative role of the public in influencing British interventionism. On the other hand, the 
execution of this study can be improved upon in light of my research. Leech and Gaskarth 
examined public societal links between Britain and various states in terms of the extent of 
media coverage and NGO attention that each state received.452 Doing so, they eventually found 
no correlation between these non-elite links and the likelihood of British intervention. Instead 
of examining how much the British people look at each state, my research indicates that future 
studies should examine how the British public envisions each state in relation to Britain. This 
is much more likely to reveal the influence of the public in the development of interventionist 
policies, and will provide a more reliable measure of the relative impact the public has 
compared to elite factors. 
 As my findings signal that scholarly research into British interventionist policies should 
focus more on the influence that public identifications have in the process of developing these 
policies, they further indicate that British interventionism is likely to become an increasingly 
democratized policy. This undercuts a core point of analysis from previous studies concerning 
British war powers and foreign policy development. Between 2003 to 2009, research conducted 
by three British think-tanks – Democratic Audit, the Federal Trust, and One World Trust – and 
a Swiss think tank – the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces – 
concluded that British war powers were among the least democratic in Europe, with the public 
displaying little to no ability to oversee the process whereby interventionist policies were 
developed453. My findings would indicate that this trend may be set to change, and in doing so 
they back up Strong’s more recent observation that “parliamentary contestation both 
democratizes and challenges the process by which Britain adopts particular roles in the world.” 
Accordingly, it will be necessary to openly and honestly examine the advantages and 
disadvantages, opportunities and potential pitfalls, of democratizing this process. On the one 
hand, more public engagement may well deter particularly undesirable instances of 
interventionism. Nonetheless, increased democratization of interventionist policy may also 
lead to an inconsistency of Britain’s stance on the world stage, with my research showing that 
even over the course of two years British public identifications are changeable enough to allow 
for the emergence of two very different attitudes to foreign interventions. As such, I contribute 
a signpost that British interventionist policy is likely to experience increasing democratization, 
and consequently scholarly research evidencing how British war powers were recently rather 
undemocratic may need to be reconsidered. I further recommend that we openly consider the 
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opportunities and problems that such a democratization would engender in the modern era, 
particularly post-Trump and post-Brexit. 
 Furthermore, my research indicates that analysis of debates on British foreign 
interventions should treat these debates as reflecting British role contestations, not just practical 
debates about immediate plans of action. I have shown that effective (anti-)securitizing 
arguments are those that align with national identifications held by members of the public, and 
contestations between securitizing and anti-securitizing arguments are in part decided by the 
extent of alignment with national identifications that these arguments enjoy. As such, debates 
on British foreign interventions – while partly reflecting arguments about the efficacy or 
practicality of proposed actions – also serve as forums in which varying British self-images 
contest each other in pursuit of the loudest “chime” with contemporary national attitudes. This 
contestation is not motivated purely out of a desire to form the most effective type of 
intervention (including a non-intervention). It is also motivated by individual citizens’ desire 
(a desire that is channelled through their representatives) for their vision of Britain (which they 
fundamentally believe to be true but which they know is contested by others) to be both 
expressed and gain dominance within an important national institution. Both this expression 
and this dominance afford the individuals who hold these images of Britain with a sense of 
empowerment, as the expression and/or dominance of certain “Britain is x” visions within an 
important national institution offers a level of demonstrable legitimacy to the claim that 
“Britain is x.” In other words, varying images of what Britain “is” on the international stage 
contest each other in the context of an intervention debate, in pursuit of both expression and 
dominance over other British self-images. Both this expression and this dominance provide the 
constituencies holding these self-images with a sense of empowerment by apparently 
legitimising the truth of their claim that “Britain is x.” As such, interventionism should be 
treated more explicitly and consciously as a medium for national self-expression and role 
contestations. As for which self-images we are likely to see expressed through British 
interventionist debates, my research would indicate that in the coming years certain 
identifications are likely to have increased salience for the British public and consequently for 
these debates. Based on the identification trajectories I previously laid out, we are likely to see 
a Britain that seeks to be more active and forthright on the international stage, more committed 
to perceived international duties, less wary of EU concerns or oversight, and more willing to 
use its military power. Future studies into continuing or potential British interventionism 
should therefore examine the continued salience of these identifications in the development of 
British interventionist policies. 
 Overall then, my research contributes to the scholarly literature on British foreign 
policy of intervention by highlighting the influence of public identifications in the processes 
developing such policies. This raises questions about whether previous research highlighting 
the ineffectiveness and non-role of the British parliament in developing interventionist policies 
needs to be reconsidered. I consequently recommend that parliament be given a stronger 
analytical focus, and highlight that existing research into parliament’s role has largely ignored 
the influence of public identifications. I also highlight specific comparative research that shows 
promise in this regard, and I indicate how such research may be improved in light of my 
findings. My research further indicates that the development of British interventionist policies 
may soon experience increasing democratization, and I recommend that in preparation for such 
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democratization we seriously consider the advantages and disadvantages of such a 
development. Finally, I highlight that British interventionist policy development should be 
viewed, in part, as a forum for British role contestations, and I indicate a likelihood of particular 
public identifications becoming more salient in these contestations. 
 
Contributions and Recommendations for Identity Studies 
 My research presents a method for analysing identification strength by placing 
identifications on continuums for strength. Identifications can have different positions on these 
continuums and these positions can change over time or be quickly shifted by specific 
significant events. This reconciles and accommodates differing research on identification 
strength – research laid out in Chapter Two – which contrastingly emphasises the persistence 
or changeability of identifications. This method encourages and facilitates empirical 
identification tracking studies in order to establish trends of identification strengths in different 
contexts. As such, my findings on identification strength in the contemporary British context 
can be treated as a base and example for establishing trends of identification strength in other 
contexts and for extending our understanding of these trends in the contemporary British 
context. This base and example can be built on in these contexts through continued and 
regularly refined research that utilises this method for empirically analysing identification 
strength and cumulates its findings over time so as to produce reinforced identification trend 
data and cautious identification trajectories. 
The implications of my findings on identification strength at first glance seem to 
reinforce assertions that identifications tend to be persistent and influential, at least in the 
contemporary British context. Identifications have been shown to rarely weaken in the short 
term, and have displayed notable influences on the success of different securitizations. This 
should encourage identity scholars to utilise their research foci and data to contribute to the 
study of both securitizations and other important rationale formations affected by national self-
images. However, while my research certainly highlights that identifications must be taken 
seriously as a factor that influences the success of securitizations, a closer look at my findings 
suggests that identifications cannot be expected to maintain or generate any specific security 
rationales or demand that any specific security policy be adopted in any securitization. Those 
scholars who emphasise identifications’ persistence and influence, particularly those who 
argue that identity group members can actually generate and uphold conflicts with other groups 
as a means of maintaining their group identity454, should therefore be cautious in their claims 
and keep the following aspect – and its implications – of my research in mind. 
My research into contemporary Britain has shown that in this context many of the 
national identifications that are core to securitizations are strong in the short term and weak 
in the long term. As I detailed towards the end of Chapter Five – where I also detailed important 
trajectories of modern British identifications – half of all identifications in 2013 disappeared 
between the cases, almost all of these disappeared identifications had been strong in 2013, and 
17 of the 24 identifications in 2013 either disappeared or became weak between the cases. This 
long-term disappearing or weakening of identifications is particularly prevalent among the 
more specific identifications that are directly related to contemporary issues or events, 
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including those relating directly to upcoming securitizations. By extension, the only 
identifications with long-term strength are those that are particularly broad/non-specific and 
rather unrelated to current securitizations. The short-term strength and influence of both 
specific and non-specific identifications is nonetheless evident. 
These findings directly address the differing identity research laid out in Chapter Two 
that contrastingly emphasises the persistence or changeability of identifications in the face of 
broader forces. While my research shows that the modern British do steadily maintain their 
self-images in the short term and reject ideas that conflict with these, it also reveals that these 
self-images are either very broad or weak in the long/middle term. Consequently, the range of 
specific discourses that have a chance of aligning or at least not misaligning with these self-
images will become very large over time. Indeed, even over a period of just two years between 
2013 and 2015 the British identity discourses that had greatly diminished the chances of any 
military action finding favour among the British public in 2013 had been sufficiently replaced.  
This changeability of identifications over the course of a few years may be explained 
by a variety of factors, but I would posit here that a core reason for it is that, as I outlined in 
Chapter Two, identifications are not held by states or institutions, but rather by the individuals 
within these states and institutions. States and institutions are constructs with no reflexive 
capacity and therefore no “self-image.” They can have images attributed to them, but cannot 
hold these images themselves. As a result, while states or institutions may maintain a great 
degree of stability over time (which would tempt us to think that the identity maintenance needs 
of the state or institution would be maintained over time, and consequently security discourses 
would be maintained and specific security discourses generated), the identifications that are 
core to securitization processes are actually being held by individuals within these states or 
institutions. These individuals are not nearly so path-dependent and stable over time as states 
or institutions. These individually held identifications consequently display the breadth and 
long-term weakness that my research has illustrated.  
This breadth and weakness mean that as contexts shift over time basic identifications 
will not only shift but also be interpreted in an increasingly wide range of ways. This means 
that seeing identifications as persistent and influential can be helpful but must be done 
cautiously. On the one hand, identity maintenance demands that certain currently held concepts 
be verified and complemented by securitizing rhetoric, and consequently looking at 
identifications provides very helpful in-roads for understanding how securitizations will play 
out in immediate contexts. On the other hand, the human need for identity maintenance cannot 
be expected to sustain anything more than the broadest of identity discourses as contexts 
evolve, and therefore should not be expected to give rise to or generate any specific security 
discourses over time. However, it does help explain why in the short term identifications 
display a great deal of stability, resistance to manipulation, and influence over securitizations. 
Identity studies should therefore seek to integrate their findings, foci, and concepts with 
the study of short-term persuasion processes such as securitizations so as to mutually enhance 
these studies fruitfully. At the same time, they must be highly cautious when forecasting the 
longer maintenance of security rationales and indeed hold back from any predictions of specific 
discourses or conflicts being generated or maintained as a result of identity maintenance needs. 
Identifications are a function of context, and over long periods only the broadest elements of 
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these contexts will maintain themselves. Predictions of the longer maintenance or generation 
of specific security discourses as a result of identity maintenance are therefore best avoided. 
 
Normative Implications and Recommendations 
This research is not without normative implications. Taking these considerations and 
analytical perspectives seriously requires affording the public and their pre-existing concepts, 
visions, hopes, fears, and beliefs about their nation a greater role in securitization processes. 
Ultimately, this is an admission that the public themselves play a significant role in 
securitization processes and determine the range of (anti-)securitizing rhetoric which will work, 
and which will not. This idea runs directly counter to the overwhelming normative standpoint 
that currently dominates the securitization field. 
I refer to the standpoint that securitization is a self-interested trick which is played by 
and for elites and which ultimately undermines democratic processes and norms. In the original 
securitization framework Buzan and Waever both detail the way in which securitization 
processes interrupt so-called “normal” democratic affairs and deter the routine procedures that 
democratic governance is usually supposed to enshrine455. The Paris School’s influential take 
on securitization details how security professionals drive securitizations for their own 
institutional interests, with Bigo stating that “securitization is anchored in the fears of 
politicians about losing their symbolic control over territorial boundaries” and that “the 
transformation of security is directly related to the interests…of professionals in the 
management of unease”456. In a decisively anti-securitization work, Aradau argues that 
securitizations encourage and indeed demand rapid and non-publicly mitigated executive 
decisions, which is undesirable for democracy457. This normative leaning, which has been 
overviewed in great detail by Roe458, sits firmly within the tradition of seeing securitizations as 
projects devised and driven by powerful and self-interested elites. 
However, our ability to place responsibility for securitizations and emergent security 
rationales with self-interested and manipulative elites who interrupt democratic processes in 
order to forward their interests is greatly undermined by the perspectives laid out in my thesis. 
My research has shown that – as security rhetoric must align with pre-existing public 
identifications in order to be successful – the public’s sentiments not only find expression in 
but also delimit the range of available security policies that can emerge through securitization 
processes. This seems a quintessentially democratic process, even if it results in policies – such 
as heavily policed borders and international wars – that are out of sync with modern liberal 
ideals. Indeed, the “rapid” nature of securitizations which Aradau, Buzan, and Waever criticize 
seems, in my research, to have been entirely thwarted by the public unease in 2013 with a rush 
to military airstrikes which was perceived as hurried and lacking necessary deliberation.  
None of this is to say that securitizing actors do not forward private or institutional 
interests through securitizations that can subvert the production of security policies that are 
truly in the public interest. The argument here is simply that publics too exert their will on the 
                                                          
455 Buzan, Wæver, and Wilde, Security, p29; Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization”. 
456 Bigo, “Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease”, p64-65 
457 Aradau, “Security and the Democratic Scene”, p392. 




securitization process, and the form of the security rationale that emerges from securitizations 
will in some way reflect (and certainly will not fall outside of) the desires, visions, and 
understandings of the public audience, even if these visions are not what is “best” for the public. 
Again, this influence of the public on securitization outcomes and the conditional nature of 
public assent to security rhetoric is something that is far more easily picked up on when we 
study failed securitizations (indeed, the conditional nature of public assent can only be missed 
by ignoring failed securitization case studies, which, as outlined previously, much of the 
securitization field has). To ignore this public influence – and the way in which public self-
schemata are a filter that security policies must pass through – and instead to attribute the power 
to drive securitizations primarily in elite hands can therefore be a form of moral absolution for 
the wider public that is both unwarranted and dangerous.  
This normative bias towards seeing securitizations as undemocratically elite projects is 
unwarranted as the public does have a role to play beyond being passive recipients of 
information. Publics have conditional agency and influential points of view that do not simply 
fall on the side of assenting to elites regularly (or even often). This agency and the 
commensurate power of the “will of the people” is often triumphed and celebrated if public 
sentiments influence long-celebrated political changes (such as the civil rights movement). 
Public agency is just as quickly forgotten and replaced with memories of being tricked or 
foolishly trusting elites if public sentiments approve – and indeed drive demand for – policies 
that are later seen as folly (such as Brexit). Even if we were to see publics as sometimes passive, 
we would still have to acknowledge that different publics allow different securitizations to gain 
assent. When the Iraq War was being argued for in 2003 the logic behind it was broadcast to 
the world, where it was accepted by the American public and rejected by the French.  
Furthermore, this normative bias towards seeing securitizations as undemocratically 
elite projects is dangerous because a problem cannot be fixed (if we see securitization as a 
problem) unless its source is properly identified and unashamedly acknowledged. If we hope 
to ensure that (anti-)securitizations are conducted either responsibly or not at all then we need 
to acknowledge the role played by the public and attribute relevant credit and blame for (anti-
)securitizations to elites and publics. When as academics we provide the academic/institutional 
knowledge that informs (anti-)securitizations, when as practitioners we execute these 
processes, and when as citizens we debate and seek to prevent any undesirable developments 
of these processes, we must focus our attention on publics and elites proportionately and then 
commensurately apply appropriate normative and practical pressures to both these societal foci. 
 
Implications and Recommendations for International Policy Formation 
 My research has broader implications for international policy formation. I have shown 
that highly visible (anti-)securitizations are processed by (and consequently their success and 
long-term sustainability depends on) a public’s conceptions of their nation. This is because 
(anti-)securitizing arguments contain assertions that directly relate to the character of the 
nation, and consequently these assertions are filtered in/out by public audiences’ 
identifications, specifically their national identifications. This same dynamic would therefore 
apply to arguments made by elites regarding any international policy that reflects the character 
of the nation. These include arguments regarding commitments to international institutions, 
normative frameworks underpinning international affiliations, and varying sides of moral 
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debates such as migration and interventionism. Broader public notions of what the nation is, 
stands for, and can do are therefore key components affecting the success of strategic 
communications between elites and publics regarding these policies. The success of these 
communications greatly contributes to making these policies sustainable and/or feasible.  
My research does not simply illustrate that attempts to generate new international policy 
rationales which run counter to certain pre-existing notions held by a potentially influential and 
hostile public audience are likely doomed to fail. To translate this concern into actionable 
output, my research provides an applicable research method and a concrete recommendation 
for its use. Specifically, I strongly advocate that identification tracking studies, such as that 
which I have conducted for contemporary Britain, need to be consistently conducted in specific 
contexts. These studies would utilise a method placing identifications on continuums for 
strength and would aim to uncover national identifications’ strengths, densities, and content in 
these contexts. This will establish and reinforce key data on what different publics believe 
about their nations. The research I have conducted on British identifications’ strength in the 
contemporary British context can be treated as a base and example for this research. 
Additionally, the trajectories of modern British identifications which I presented in Chapter 
Five could be improved upon and kept short-term and well-informed by cumulative data if such 
a tracking study were continued or regularly updated for the modern British context. 
By conducting such studies in specific and varying contexts we can begin to develop 
more detailed ideas of broader identification trends, particularly trends of identification 
strength. This data will do more than just provide future speakers with the information they 
need to successfully communicate the reasons why a public should or should not accept a 
certain international policy. It will also inform policymakers themselves of what types of 
policies are doomed to fail due to being based on concepts and national visions that are not in 
line with public schemata. Additionally, and very importantly, it can inform the policymakers 
and academics estimating various policies’ long-term sustainability of the likelihood of these 
schemata being changed. This will enhance the study and practice of the strategic 
communications between the political institutions developing these policies and wider publics. 
Such an enhancement can directly produce more politically feasible and hence sustainable 
policy output, along with higher quality academic research. 
 
 To Close 
 By adopting the concepts of identifications and schemata from identity and cognitive 
studies, and combining them with core critiques of the securitization field, I have produced and 
tested a hypothesis regarding the influence of identifications in securitizations, and have 
additionally produced pictures of the content and possible trajectory of modern British 
identifications. My hypothesis regarding how specific characteristics of identifications affect 
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This information can be used to uncover key data indicating how and why securitization 
success and failure is influenced by public audience identifications. This translates a range of 
securitization criticisms into a concrete analytical tool. It also shifts the emphasis in 
securitization research from elites, executives, and professionals to publics, with 
commensurate and important analytical and normative implications. Securitizations therefore 
must and can be seen as public and elite processes which are driven by both parties and which 
are poorly understood unless both these parties’ knowledge bases and intuitions are taken into 
account. 
 I have additionally produced a method that positions identifications on continuums for 
strength. The application of these continuums in specific contexts allows us to uncover 
important contextual information about identifications along with their likelihood of shifting, 
data which informs research on identity, securitizations, and broader international policy 
formation. This application reveals what types of information are likely to find favour amongst 
specific publics, along with the role that identity maintenance plays in the development of 
security and other policy rationales in both the long and short term. This directly contributes to 
the development of a more systematic, yet cautious and context-aware, understanding of the 
stability of identifications and the processes which power important international policy 
formations. 
This work lays the groundwork for continuing research with impact in several fields. 
Future identification tracking studies utilising this my method can reveal more detailed and 
ongoing identification trends and trajectories. This can inform both securitizations and the 
formation of broader international policies, along with contributing to research on 
identifications’ persistence. Scholars and practitioners of (anti-)securitization can therefore 
utilise my research to highlight and better understand the role of public audiences in (anti-
)securitizations, and consequently to craft and study these processes more effectively. This can 
lead to better scholarship and the deterrence of undesirable policies. My research has further 
implications for studies into the link between security and identity, as well as for research into 
British foreign policy of intervention. I encourage both fields towards a more concerted 
acknowledgement of the role of the public and the role of contestations between varying British 
self-images in important processes which develop security and interventionist policies and 
attitudes. 
I would like to close by addressing a question not asked by myself but by Deputy Prime 
Minister Nick Clegg near the conclusion of the 2013 House of Commons debate on whether or  
not to authorise airstrikes in Syria. The Deputy Prime Minister claimed that alongside the core 
question of whether or not to authorise those strikes “there is another question facing us tonight, 
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which is what kind of nation are we?”459 Although at first glance my research suggests that 
Clegg asked the truly pertinent question of the evening, I encourage you to consider that he 
asked the right question at the wrong time. The question of “what nation are we?” is not one 
that the British nor any nation answer on the eve of security crises. It is one that is answered 
and asked anew every day, and one whose answer is always in flux. Scholars of identity 
discourse, along with scholars and practitioners of security and international policies, both 
separately and in concert, must therefore find ways to keep up with this question and the 
answers given to it, or face losing touch with the imagined realities this question and these 
answers represent and affect. I commend this thesis to you, in the hope that it highlights the 
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Sheet One: Readership Data 
 The below data displays the average online and print readership of all news sources 
read by more than 0.1% of the British public during my 2015 and 2013 case studies. It also 
states the source of each data point. Links to these sources are laid out in Sheet Two. 
 
2015 
UK News Sources 
 
Avg. UK Daily  
Unique Browsers 
Avg. UK Daily 
 Print Circulation 
National Newspapers   
Daily Mail 14,631,628 (source ABC) 1,587,986 (source ABC) 
The Guardian 9,276,546 (source ABC) 165,672 (source ABC) 
The Telegraph 5,022,155 (source ABC) 480,730 (source ABC) 
Daily Mirror 4,565,253 (source ABC) 825,829 (source ABC) 
The Independent 3,277,301 (source ABC) 56,005 (source ABC) 
The Sun 1,616,705 (source ABC) 1,788,860 (source ABC) 
The Metro 1,450,287 (source ABC) n/a 
The Express 1,310,768 (source ABC) 403,343 (source ABC) 
Daily Star 651,577 (source ABC) 450,045 (source ABC) 
The Times 605,000 (source ABC) 407,566 (source ABC) 
i n/a (no website set up in 2015) 273,961 (source ABC) 
The Financial Times 224,088 (source PWC) 205,695 (source ABC) 
   
Regional Newspapers   
Manchester Evening News 558,095 (source ABC) 51,864 (source ABC) 
Evening Standard 440,299 (source ABC) n/a  
Liverpool Echo 422,360 (source ABC) 52,389 (source ABC) 
Belfast Telegraph n/a (figure not available) 44,141 (source ABC) 
Newcastle Chronicle 203,436 (source ABC) 30,361 (source ABC) 
Birmingham Mail 196,284 (source ABC) 24,260 (source ABC) 
Daily Record 138,600 (source Quantcast/SimilarWeb) 176,845 (source ABC) 
Teeside Evening Gazette 101,305 (source ABC) 23,774 (source ABC) 
Bristol Post 97,261 (source ABC) 17,554 (source ABC) 
The Scotsman 94,928 (source ABC) 22,740 (source ABC) 
The Herald 79,835 (source ABC) 32,141 (source ABC) 
Daily Post (Wales) 77,177 (source ABC) 23,272 (source ABC) 
Nottingham Post 76,103 (source ABC) 19,824 (source ABC) 
Yorkshire Evening Post 75,860 (source ABC) 19,914 (source ABC) 
Stoke Sentinel 73,637 (source ABC) 30,957 (source ABC) 
Leicester Mercury 72,769 (source ABC) 28,756 (source ABC) 
Daily Echo 72,737 (source ABC) 18,772 (source ABC) 
Derby Telegraph 71,415 (source ABC) 21,183 (source ABC) 
The Telegraph and Argus 69,307 (source ABC) 15,913 (source ABC) 
   
Specialist Avg. UK Monthly Unique Browsers  
The Economist 1,097,732 (source Quantcast/SimilarWeb) 235,350 (source ABC) 
The Spectator 348,980 (source Quantcast/Similar Web) 71,707 (source ABC) 
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New Statesman 178,604 (source Quantcast/Similar Web) 33,395 (source ABC) 
   
Websites   
Wales Online 258,964 (source ABC)  
   
Non-UK News Sources 
 Avg. UK Monthly Unique Browsers  
Newspapers   
New York Times 928,714 (source Quantcast/Similar Web)  
Washington Post 845,000 (source Quantcast/Similar Web)  
Irish Times 339,150 (source Quantcast/Similar Web)  
Wall Street Journal  272,673 (source Quantcast/Similar Web)  
NY Daily News 88,200 (source Quantcast/Similar Web)  
   
Specialist   
Politico 278,297 (source Quantcast/Similar Web)  
The Atlantic 276,920 (source Quantcast/Similar Web)  
SpiegelOnline International 268,736 (source Quantcast/Similar Web)  
The New Yorker 215,384 (source Quantcast/Similar Web)  
Newsweek 148,945 (source Quantcast/Similar Web)  
Christian Science Monitor 115,146 (source Quantcast/Similar Web)  
   
Websites   
Huffington Post 13,000,000 (source comScore)  




UK News Sources 
 Avg. UK Daily Unique Browsers Avg. UK Daily Print Circulation 
National Newspapers   
Daily Mail 7,193,926 (source ABC) 1,802,083 (source ABC) 
The Guardian 4,294,582 (source ABC) 189,646 (source ABC) 
Daily Telegraph 2,875,848 (source ABC) 557,536 (source ABC) 
The Sun 1,680,273 (source ABC) 2,258,359 (source ABC) 
Daily Mirror 1,123,000 (source NRS) 1,045,971 (source ABC) 
The Independent 1,221,330 (source ABC) 68,696 (source ABC) 
Financial Times 334,000 (source NRS) 236,281 (source ABC) 
Metro 320,140 (source ABC) n/a 
Daily Express 291,000 (source NRS) 530,631 (source ABC) 
The Times 178,000 (source NRS) 391,643 (source ABC) 
Daily Star 151,000 (source NRS) 547,955 (source ABC) 
i n/a (no website set up in 2013) 295,179 (source ABC) 
   
Regional Newspapers   
Daily Record 188,000 (source NRS) 252,575 (source ABC) 
Evening Standard 183,845 (source ABC) n/a  
The Scotsman 119,672 (source ABC) 32,433 (source ABC) 
Aberdeen Press & Journal  117,254 (source ABC) 65,482 (source ABC) 
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Liverpool Echo 91,136 (source ABC) 74,984 (source ABC) 
Herald Scotland 63,695 (source ABC) 23,176 (source ABC) 
Newcastle Chronicle 41,809 (source ABC) 43,308 (source ABC) 
Birmingham Mail 41,498 (source ABC) 40,280 (source ABC) 
Hull Daily Mail 38,583 (source ABC) 38,309 (source ABC) 
Leicester Mercury 31,977 (source ABC) 40,172 (source ABC) 
Belfast Telegraph n/a (figure not available) 49,228 (source ABC) 
   
Specialist 
Avg. UK Monthly  
Unique Browsers 
Avg. UK Daily 
Print Circulation 
The Economist n/a (figure not available) 209,000 (source ABC) 
The Spectator 349,000 (source ABC) 62,000 (source ABC) 
New Statesman n/a (figure not available) 29,000 (source ABC) 
   
Websites   
Wales Online 63,972 (source ABC) n/a 
   
Non-UK News Sources 
 
Avg. UK Monthly 
 Unique Browsers  
Newspapers   
New York Times No precise data, but over 100k  
Washington Post No precise data, but over 100k  
Irish Times No precise data, but over 100k  
Wall Street Journal  No precise data, but over 100k  
   
Specialist   
Spiegel Online International No precise data, but over 100k  
The New Yorker No precise data, but over 100k  
Newsweek No precise data, but over 100k  
   
Websites   

















Sheet Two: Complete List of Sources on Readership Data 
 The below are links to all the sources mentioned in Sheet One. 
 




UK National Papers Daily Print Circulation  




































Broadcasters’ Audience Research Board (BARB) http://www.barb.co.uk/viewing-

















Quantcast https://www.quantcast.com/  
 




































Sheet Three: Links to All Analysed Articles 
 These are links to documents in an opensource website. In these documents I have 
included every article which I analysed for articulations in both my cases, along with links to 
these articles’ sources. 
 
2015 Articles with Links: http://docdro.id/6IdHIZc  
970 articles containing 697,113 words. 
 
2013 Articles with Links: http://docdro.id/xubcwI6 
779 articles containing 606,078 words. 
 



































Sheet Four: Links to All Segments Coded for Articulations 
 Below are links to documents in an opensource website. In these documents I have 
gathered every segment from every article which I analysed for articulations in both my cases, 
along with these coded articulations. 
During my research, I manually and interpretively analysed and coded the articles 
linked in Sheet Three for articulations in the manner detailed in my Methodology Chapter. 
Upon completion of this coding exercise, I downloaded my coded segments in master excel 
sheets. The documents I have linked below are copies of these master Excel sheets. 
Here is an example segment from these sheets: 
 






An incredibly complex web of 
belligerents within the country is further 




In this example, under “Document name” we see that this segment came from 
Huffington Post on the 31st of October 2015. Under “code”, we can see that I coded this 
segment as containing an articulation that fell under the “National Influence” category. The 
articulation further fell under the sub-category of “Ability to Manage Syria”. The precise 
articulation was coded as “Syria is a Complex Quagmire.” Note that segments may be coded 
multiple times with multiple codes/articulations. Each of these coded segments represents one 
coded articulation. When I completed my coding exercise and downloaded these 
codes/articulations along with their time stamps into Excel I was then able to analyse them on 
a macro level by plotting the appearance of different articulations over time (this was easy to 
do via Excel). This produced the Articulation Graphs, Strength/Content Graphs, Density 
Graphs, and Master Graphs presented in this thesis. 
 
2015 Coded Segments: http://docdro.id/Jr3DbHr  
 
















Sheet Five: Links to Public Documents Analysed for (Anti-)Securitizing Rhetoric 
 These are links to documents in an opensource website. In these documents I have 
included every public document containing securitizing and anti-securitizing rhetoric which I 
analysed for both my cases, along with links to these documents’ sources. 
 
2013 Public Documents Containing Securitizing Rhetoric: http://docdro.id/81VwDwx  
 
2013 Public Documents Containing Anti Securitizing Rhetoric: http://docdro.id/p1qWgeo  
 
2015 Public Documents Containing Securitizing Rhetoric: http://docdro.id/kwxyW5S  
 



































Sheet Six: Links to All Segments Coded for (Anti-)Securitizing Rhetoric 
Below are links to documents in an opensource website. In these documents I have 
included every segment from every document which I analysed for (anti-)securitizing rhetoric 
in both my cases.  
During my research, I manually and interpretively analysed and coded the public 
documents linked in Sheet Five for rhetorical assertions pertaining to objects of worth, threats 
to these objects and feasible and appropriate (“appropriate” being subdivided into “just” and 
“necessary”) actions for resolving these threats. Upon completion of this coding exercise, I 
downloaded my coded segments in master excel sheets. The documents I have linked below 
are copies of these master excel sheets. 
 Here is an example segment: 
 




Just Action\Action Will Be Legal And 
Proportionate\Action Will Be Legal 
Let me set out what the House has in front of 
it today in respect of how we reached our 
conclusions. We have a summary of the 
Government’s legal position, which makes it 
explicit that military action would have a 
clear legal basis. 
 
 
Here we can see that this segment, from the 29th of August 2013, was coded as asserting 
a reason why the securitizing proposition was proposing a just action. The action was described 
as “just” because it was legal. Note that segments may be coded multiple times with multiple 
codes. Each of these coded segments represents one coded assertion. When I completed my 
coding exercise and downloaded these codes/assertions along with their time stamps into Excel 
I was then able to analyse them on a macro level by plotting the appearance of different 
rhetorical assertions over time (this was easy to do via Excel). This produced the Securitizing 
and Anti-Securitizing Rhetoric Graphs presented in this thesis. 
 
2013 Coded Securitizing Rhetoric Segments: http://docdro.id/w6cczKI  
 
2013 Coded Anti-Securitizing Rhetoric Segments: http://docdro.id/mHMvwzb  
 
2015 Coded Securitizing Rhetoric Segments: http://docdro.id/F8P5aqI  
 












Sheet Seven: Links to Detailed Graphs on (Anti-)Securitizing Rhetoric 
Below are links to documents in an opensource website. In these documents I have 
included detailed graphs outlining all the assertions that made up the different elements of the 
securitizing and anti-securitizing arguments in 2013 and 2015 as well as the proportions to 
which they did so. 
 
2013 Securitizing Rhetoric Detailed Graphs: https://docdro.id/ooDGT0G  
 
2013 Anti-Securitizing Rhetoric Detailed Graphs: https://docdro.id/igUD1FA  
 
2015 Securitizing Rhetoric Detailed Graphs: https://docdro.id/5gyvaxW  
 


































Sheet Eight: Links to Detailed Graphs on Identification Data 
Below are links to documents in an opensource website. In these documents I have 
included detailed graphs outlining all the identification data from both cases. 
 
2013 Identifications Detailed Graphs: https://docdro.id/22OLqPw  
 
2015 Identifications Detailed Graphs: https://docdro.id/OjnAuXF 
